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Editors’ Introduction
This issue of Genocide Studies and Prevention, titled “Global Approaches to Atrocity Prevention: 
Theory, Practice, and the State of the Field,” presents a critical overview of the current state of 
Atrocity Prevention around the world. The issue was conceived of in mid-2016 by Douglas Irvin-
Erickson and James P. Finkel, with the hope of responding to two immediate needs in scholarship 
and practice. First, we felt, scholars can always benefit from the perspectives of practitioners, 
officials, and others with experience working in various bureaucracies—while practitioners and 
policy makers could benefit from scholarship that helps them critically reflect on their work. 
Secondly, very little research was being conducted on the sudden outburst of energy around the 
world (over the past five years) to create national-level government, governmental, and civil-society 
institutions (with clear institutional connections to governments) dedicated to the prevention of 
genocide and mass atrocities.
Why there has been such little scholarship on these national mechanisms is a matter of 
speculation. Perhaps the horrors of mass atrocities and genocide in Syria, South Sudan, Iraq, 
Myanmar, and many other places, cast a shadow over these bright spots? Whatever the reason, 
the editorial board of GSP felt it was important to try and cast a spotlight on some of the positive 
developments around the world in the area of atrocity prevention. Even when the authors in this 
special issue feel that the institutions and “mechanisms” they are writing about might be failing to 
meet their goals or fulfill their mandates, there is nevertheless a collective sense that hundreds of 
millions of people around the world have a stake in the success of these efforts. 
How far has the field of genocide and atrocity prevention come in the last decade? Readers 
are encouraged to peruse back issues of GSP to get a sense for just how much the state of the field 
has evolved—looking especially to the first issue of the journal dedicated exclusively to atrocity 
prevention, issue 2.1 published in 2007.1 Now, there are national level mechanisms for atrocity 
prevention (or other national-level officially established bodies that include representatives from 
different areas of government relevant to the prevention of atrocity crimes) in Argentina, Burundi, 
Canada, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Germany, Kenya, Mexico, 
Paraguay, Switzerland, Tanzania, the United States, Uganda, and many others. Most of these 
national-level mechanism, such as the Ugandan National Committee for Genocide and Atrocity 
Prevention, are focused primarily on the prevention of mass atrocities domestically in their own 
national communities. Others, like the United States’ Atrocity Prevention Board, are exclusively 
concerned with the prevention of mass atrocities outside of the country. Others still, such as the 
Swiss national body, integrate both foreign and domestic prevention efforts into their mandate. 
There are also many international and regional mechanisms for atrocity prevention, working 
in various capacities (and in various directions), including the United Nation’s Office on the 
Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect, the International Conference on the 
Great Lakes Region, the African Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and so forth. Of course, 
these institutions and organizations have their own agendas, and are certainly not working 
synchronously. In some instances, they even seem to be contradicting each other. Yet, in one way 
or another, genocide and atrocity prevention is now part of their mandates. 
The authors who responded to our call for papers issued in 2016 represent some of the leading 
international scholars in the field. The editors were pleased to see many of the above-mentioned 
cases covered in the submissions, and we hope this issue will inspire GSP’s readers to submit 
research on those efforts left out of this issue. What makes this issue especially valuable is the profile 
of the contributors. Some of the authors consider themselves atrocity prevention practitioners, and 
many have years of experience working in government or international organizations. 
1 Herb Hirsch, “Editor’s Introduction,” Genocide Studies and Prevention, 2, no. 1 (2007), 1-6.
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Finally, we would like to thank the guest editor James P. Finkel for working tirelessly with the 
authors to produce this issue. We also extend a special thanks to our anonymous peer reviewers 
for their considerable efforts.
Douglas Irvin-Erickson
Christian Gudehus
Susan Braden
Joann DiGeorgio-Lutz
Lior Zylberman
Brian Kritz
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Global Approaches to Atrocity Prevention: Introduction to the Special Issue
Most observers who follow US human rights policy and atrocity prevention issues and recall the 
fate of Washington’s first effort to systematically foresee and prevent atrocities—the second Clinton 
Administration’s Interagency Atrocity Prevention Group led by former Ambassador-at-Large For 
War Crimes David Scheffer—probably expected the incoming Trump Administration to quickly 
dismantle the Obama era Atrocity Prevention Board and its subordinate units and procedures. 
Instead, despite the tumult of the Trump Administration’s first year in office, an Atrocity Prevention 
Board has been reconstituted under the auspices of the National Security Council’s International 
Organizations and Alliances directorate. The working level Sub-APB has continued to meet, 
staffed by a remarkable cadre of civil servants who are determined to ensure that the hard-learned 
lessons about what works are not lost, and who are also willing to reconsider approaches that 
have proved less promising or simply haven’t worked. To their credit, they seem to be giving 
considerable thought to seeking ways to bridge the traditional “regional-functional” divide that 
has frequently weakened Washington’s efforts on these questions.1 They also appear to be making 
a conscious effort to deepen the dialogue on atrocity prevention with key like-minded states and 
international organizations while simultaneously robustly engaging civil society. None of this is a 
one-time effort. It requires constant attention, and maintaining momentum is challenging due to 
frequent turnover of key staff, resource issues, and sudden shifts of policy decided at much higher 
levels of authority.
Meanwhile, as the essays that follow illustrate, atrocity prevention continues to attract attention 
from a diverse range of scholars and practitioners, both in the United States and abroad. Samantha 
Capicotto and Rob Scharf’s article,“National Mechanisms for the Prevention of Atrocity Crimes,” 
underscores the broad range of approaches to atrocity prevention currently being explored by 
different states, particularly in the global south, and the important role that local civil society 
is playing. It is hard to read their essay and avoid concluding that, while the mechanisms they 
discuss all have their individual challenges, the National Mechanisms are generating some of the 
most creative thinking about atrocity prevention that can be found anywhere.
Two of the issue’s articles explore the structures and evolution of atrocity prevention policy 
in key like-minded countries, Switzerland and Germany. Giulia Persoz in her “Neutrality: A Tool 
or a Limit for Preventing Mass Atrocity Crimes and Genocide? The Case of Switzerland” traces the 
development of Switzerland’s approach and Bern’s efforts to be pro-active, while simultaneously 
continuing to pursue its traditional neutrality. Persoz underscores Swiss creativity and its support 
for various regional atrocity prevention forums, which in 2013 gave rise to a new international 
network, the Global Action Against Mass Atrocity Crimes, or GAAMAC. Persoz describes 
GAAMAC as a “platform to exchange best practices” and for helping build state capacities to 
develop and implement national preventive strategies. Switzerland chairs the network’s Steering 
Committee.
Sarah Brockmeier and Philipp Rotman in “Germany’s Politics and Bureaucracy for Preventing 
Atrocities” set out to introduce us to “the political context and recent history of Germany’s 
institutional setup for atrocity prevention.” They recount the implications of Germany’s lack of 
a strong NGO community focused on atrocity prevention and note that “most of the prominent 
or semi-prominent politicians who do support a stronger German leadership role on atrocity 
prevention prefer to do so quietly, rather than championing the issue in public and risking to 
alienate voters.” Individual studies of various countries’ approaches to atrocity prevention have 
been few and far between. Hopefully, journal readers will take up the challenge in the months 
ahead to undertake similar research on other key countries including the UK, France, the Nordics, 
etc.
1 See James P. Finkel, Atrocity Prevention At The Crossroads: Assessing The President’s Atrocity Prevention Board After Two 
Years (Washington, DC: United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Center for the Prevention of Genocide, 2014); 
James P. Finkel, “Moving Beyond The Crossroads: Strengthening the Atrocity Prevention Board,” Genocide Studies and 
Prevention: An International Journal, 9, no. 2 (2015), 138-147.
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Persoz’s and Brockmeier and Rotman’s articles both touch on resources and coordination 
as key challenges. Ed Luck, in his “Why the United Nations Underperforms at Preventing Mass 
Atrocities” and Ekkehard Strauss in “The UN Secretary General’s Human Rights Up Front 
Initiative and the Prevention of Genocide: Impact, Potential, Limitations” highlight those issues as 
well. Luck insists that many of the UN’s shortcomings arise from conceptual misunderstandings 
and institutional dysfunction along with capacity deficits. He also notes that the UN’s emphasis 
on “maintaining impartiality and presence, humanitarian space and access may (sometimes) 
entail prioritizing the cultivation of good relations with the very regimes that may be committing 
or planning to commit… atrocities against their populations.” He concludes with an important 
reminder that we are still very early in the process of learning how to curb atrocities.
In one of the most far-reaching looks at the UN’s Human Rights Up Front Initiative to date, 
Strauss traces the evolution of UN thinking about various failures to deal effectively with atrocities, 
touching on Bosnia and Rwanda and more recently the Sri Lanka Panel’s report on UN missteps. 
He characterizes the Human Rights Up Front Initiative as an internal UN action plan aimed at 
introducing “a cultural change within the UN, an operational change to bring the three pillars 
of the UN Charter (i.e. development, peace, and security, human rights) closer together, and a 
change to UN engagement with its member states.” Strauss stresses that the Initiative is primarily 
a prevention tool that “aims to strengthen the link between early-warning and early-action.” It 
is based on “a general recognition that human rights violations” can be “an early indicator of a 
deteriorating situation and that field presences can observe changing events and discuss them with 
their counterparts on the ground.” To my knowledge, human rights has not heretofore figured 
prominently in most of the mainstream quantitative modeling efforts that aim to rank countries in 
terms of atrocity risk. Intuitively, this has never made sense to me. Regardless of whether the issue 
has been a data problem or a modeling issue, I suspect Strauss would agree that finding better 
ways to systematically and more dynamically integrate human rights information into our efforts 
at early warning of mass atrocities should yield important returns.
David Frank in his “The Reduction of Mass Atrocity Crimes in East Asia: The Evolving 
Norms of ASEAN’s Prevention Mechanisms” and Matthew Levinger in “Forging Consensus For 
Atrocity Prevention, Assessing the Record of the OSCE” shed renewed light on the value and 
importance of norms at a time when so many of what have long been considered established rules 
of international relations are being cast in doubt. While highlighting Myanmar’s treatment of its 
Rohingya population as a bright red exception, Frank notes the dramatic reduction in the incidence 
of mass atrocity crimes in East Asia over the past forty years. He argues that some of the change 
can be attributed to such “structural developments” as a decrease in the use of mass atrocities as 
a tool of war, rising incomes, and the spread of democracy, but his main focus is on the impact of 
the global community’s development of new norms like the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and 
their surprisingly rapid adoption by ASEAN and its member states. Matthew Levinger’s essay on 
the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) provides something of a more 
cautionary tale in comparison to Frank’s ASEAN piece. Levinger traces the evolution of the CSCE to 
what is now the OSCE along with its rules and institutions. He rightly lauds the accomplishments 
attributable to the generally quiet efforts of parts of the organization like the office of the High 
Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), but notes the impact that the evolution of NATO 
and the EU, and most importantly the strained relations between Russia and the US, have had on 
the OSCE’s ability to play the type of role that originally was envisaged.  He concludes that for 
OSCE to get back on track and “play a more robust role in enhancing human security in Eurasia,” 
the organization will need to find a way to begin “rebuilding the normative consensus between its 
Eastern and Western participating states.”
Finally, in their essay entitled “Improving Intervention Decisions To Prevent Genocide: Less 
Muddle, More Structure,” decision scientists Robin Gregory, Michael Harstone, and Paul Slovic 
draw on multi-disciplinary research in decision analysis and psychology to offer “a general 
approach to assessing genocide prevention decisions” that they believe could provide decision 
makers with insight into how to construct more defensible intervention policies, linking proposed 
actions to national values in a manner that is both consistent and efficient.  The authors readily 
concede that no decision-aiding framework can or should “make” the tough choices required of 
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the US (or any other) government with respect to interventions intended to reduce the risk of 
genocide or other mass atrocities.  But they argue (and  persuasively, in my view) that adoption of a 
clear decision-aiding framework can improve the quality and extent of those deliberations. Surely, 
with so many lives potentially at risk, more systematic and thoughtful deliberations are called for.
My thanks to the articles’ authors and the Journal’s editorial board for making this special 
issue possible.
James P. Finkel
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National Mechanisms for the Prevention of Atrocity Crimes
Samantha Capicotto 
The Auschwitz Institute for Peace and Reconciliation
New York,  NY, USA
What is a National Mechanism?
National Mechanisms for the Prevention of Genocide and other Atrocity Crimes are officially 
established bodies that include representatives from multiple areas of government relevant to 
the prevention of atrocity crimes.1 ” Atrocity crimes” refers to three legally defined crimes under 
international law: war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.2 National Mechanisms have 
been established to lead the development of a coordinated national strategy for the prevention of 
such crimes on behalf of their government. 
The inclusion of representatives from all relevant areas of the state enables National Mechanisms 
to carry out an initial system-wide assessment of strengths and weaknesses from the perspective of 
atrocity prevention. Following this assessment, the National Mechanism supports the development 
and implementation of the necessary preventive policies to bolster the state’s resilience to atrocity 
crimes. National Mechanisms are not intended to be the sole body of government tasked with 
thinking about prevention. Instead, they are meant to be the primary body responsible for ensuring 
that the entirety of the state is thinking about, and working towards, prevention.
National Mechanisms are vehicles through which states are able to exercise their responsibility 
to prevent genocide under their obligations as parties to the United Nations Convention for the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, as well as their responsibilities to prevent 
atrocity crimes as parties to other relevant international treaties, regional protocols, and as a 
product of their own national legislation. There is no single prescribed method for establishing 
a National Mechanism. However, a growing number of governments have looked to pre-existing 
institutions to incorporate this agenda, while others have chosen to establish new structures with 
the sole mandate of atrocity crimes prevention. 
With regard to the structure of these bodies, ministries of foreign affairs, justice, defense —
and where they exist, national human rights institutions—are regularly represented. Additionally, 
in some countries, ministries of education and national security forces are represented. In Latin 
America, national and international civil society organizations often play an advisory and support 
role through the provision of technical assistance, capacity building, and output monitoring. 
In the Great Lakes Region of Africa, by contrast, a heightened level of civil society engagement 
with National Mechanisms has been observed. In this region, representatives of civil society have 
membership in the Mechanisms alongside their government colleagues. National Mechanisms 
differ from state to state, but four major themes emerge in their mandates and activities: 
1. Risk assessment and early warning, including data gathering and analysis using an 
atrocity prevention lens, in order to detect patterns of group vulnerability and to alert 
the appropriate authorities so that they are able to take the recommended course of early 
action; 
1 The information presented in this article is drawn primarily from an annual publication produced by the Auschwitz 
Institute for Peace and Reconciliation (AIPR), an international non-governmental organization that works with states 
to prevent genocide and other atrocity crimes. Specifics relating to the parameters and activities of the National 
Mechanisms are reported by the members of the bodies themselves and aggregated by AIPR to provide a practical 
resource for use by practitioners in the field.
2 David Scheffer, “Genocide and Atrocity Crimes,” Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal 1, no. 3 (2006).
Rob Scharf 
The Auschwitz Institute for Peace and Reconciliation
New York,  NY, USA
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2. Development of training programs for civil servants and other relevant actors in society, 
which offer preventive approaches and practical tools that are able to be employed at the 
local and national levels; 
3. Recommendation and elaboration of policies geared towards the protection of vulnerable 
populations from risks of genocide and other atrocity crimes; and
4. Communication and partnership building with regional and international organizations 
on issues related to the prevention of genocide and other atrocity crimes.3
Across the globe, the majority of active National Mechanisms are at an early stage of development, 
capacity building, and work plan implementation. However, each year the Mechanisms engage 
more profoundly in targeted preventive programming and policy development, resulting in 
the whole-of-government approach to atrocity crimes prevention gaining both momentum and 
legitimacy. The following sections detail the work of specific National Mechanisms in the Great 
Lakes Region of Africa and Latin America on atrocity crimes prevention.
The Kenyan National Committee for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity and All Forms of Discrimination
History
On March 22, 2012, Kenya’s Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Thuita 
Mwangi, officially launched the Kenyan National Committee (KNC). The Committee was established 
and complies with the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) Protocol for 
the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity and All 
Forms of Discrimination, which all founding ICGLR Member States ratified on November 29, 2006. 
This Protocol reaffirms the responsibility of Member States to domesticate and operationalize their 
duties under international law to combat atrocity crimes. One of the measures under the document 
calls for the establishment of a Regional Committee for the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide, War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity and all forms of Discrimination. The 
ICGLR Regional Committee subsequently required all ICGLR Member States to establish their 
own National Committees to operationalize these duties under both the regional Protocol and 
international law.
The launch of the Kenyan National Committee was followed by two days of training on Early 
Warning Systems (EWS), facilitated by the UN Office of the Special Advisers on the Prevention of 
Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect (UN OSAPG).
Mandate
The Committee has a mandate to:
• Regularly review situations at both the national and county levels for the purpose of 
preventing genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and all forms of discrimination;
• Collect and analyze information related to genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
and discrimination;
• Alert both national and county governments in a timely manner to take urgent measures 
to prevent potential atrocity crimes;
• Suggest specific measures to effectively fight impunity for these crimes;
• Contribute to raising awareness and education on peace and reconciliation through 
national and county-level programs;
• Recommend policies and measures to guarantee the rights of victims of the crimes of 
genocide, war crimes, and/or crimes against humanity to truth, justice and compensation, 
as well as their rehabilitation, while taking into account gender-specific issues and 
ensuring that gender-sensitive measures are implemented; and
3 The Auschwitz Institute for Peace and Reconciliation (AIPR), National Mechanisms for the Prevention of Genocide and other 
Atrocity Crimes: Effective and Sustainable Prevention Begins at Home (New York: 2015), 3, accessed December 28, 2017, 
http://www.auschwitzinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/AIPR_National_Mech_Booklet_2015.pdf.
National Mechanisms for the Prevention of Atrocity Crimes
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• Monitor the National Program on Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation, 
Repatriation and Reinstallation (DDRRR) for former child soldiers, ex-combatants and 
combatants.
Structure
The National Committee operates under the guidance of a National Chairperson, who works 
in consultation with the Regional Committee, the National Coordinator of the Great Lakes 
Region, and other arms of the Kenyan government. The membership of the National Committee 
is drawn from governmental departments and non-governmental/civil society organizations. 
The Committee’s membership is currently comprised of representatives from: the Ministry of 
Provincial Administration and Internal Security, the Ministry of Justice, National Cohesion and 
Constitutional Affairs, the State Law Office, the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Kenya Police, 
the Office of National Cohesion and Integration Commission, the Kenya National Commission 
on Human Rights, Truth, Justice and Reconciliation, the Law Society of Kenya, the International 
Commission of Jurists, FIDA Kenya, Peace Net Kenya, the Kenya Red Cross, and the National 
Coordinator of the Great Lakes Region (the Committee’s coordinator).4
Outputs
Currently, the Committee is moving toward formalization within the Kenyan government and 
has drawn up a draft national legal notice seeking to formally institutionalize its mandate within 
the state. Although still in an interim period of consolidation, the Committee is already active, in 
carrying out its stated mandate under the auspices of the ICGLR. To strengthen the effectiveness of 
its operations, the KNC has established subcommittees on: the construction of a National Memorial 
for Post-Election Violence, Early Warning, Rules, Resource Mobilization, a national Genocide 
Prevention Bill and Policy, as well as the use of punishment as a preventive mechanism. The KNC 
has also undertaken training and capacity building initiatives for its members aimed at enhancing 
their knowledge and skills surrounding the prevention of atrocity crimes. 
Ahead of the general elections held on March 4, 2013, the KNC held a Peace Forum in the 
Coast region for County Commissioners, Provincial Commissioners, and community leaders. 
Using this precedent, the Committee has held peace fora in hotspots for potential violence around 
the country. The KNC also carried out an initiative of public messaging, distributing pamphlets 
with peace messaging in Nairobi and other at-risk regions.5 In order to respond to the atrocity 
crime risk factors presented by the outbreak of violence following the now-annulled August 2017 
election, Committee members are working in the field to mediate disputes and diffuse tensions at 
the local level among other preventive efforts.
Previously, the KNC co-organized a capacity building seminar in July of 2015 with AIPR that 
focused on the memorialization of violence related to the 2007-2008 electoral process. The seminar 
hosted participants from several Kenyan government bodies for training, with the objective of 
examining the state of prevention in Kenya and the surrounding region, as well as developing 
capacity to plan and implement prevention projects at national and grassroots levels. Additionally, 
the KNC participated in the Sixth Regional Committee Meeting and Training of the Regional and 
National Committee Members on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, War 
Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity and All Forms of Discrimination in the Great Lakes, held in 
January of 2015 in Kampala, Uganda. The activity provided ICGLR and state representatives 
with a space to share best practices and learn about the latest trends in prevention. The KNC also 
participated in an ICGLR Regional Committee Meeting in Congo (Brazzaville) in December of 
2015, which focused on the situation in Burundi. 
Finally, in February of 2016, the Committee attended a meeting organized by AIPR in 
Kampala, Uganda, and also contributed to the GAAMAC II meeting held in Manila, Philippines. 
4 AIPR, Effective and Sustainable Prevention, 5.
5 The Auschwitz Institute for Peace and Reconciliation (AIPR), National Mechanisms for the Prevention of Genocide and other 
Atrocity Crimes: Pursuing Institutionalization of the Prevention Agenda (New York: 2017), 6-7, accessed December 28, 2017, 
http://www.auschwitzinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/2017-National-Mechanisms-Booklet.pdf.
Capicotto & Scharf
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In March of 2016, the Committee participated in a workshop held by the Budapest Centre for the 
International Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities, as well as a training seminar conducted 
by the Tanzanian National Committee in collaboration with AIPR in Dar es Salaam. Additional 
training programs for committee members took place in December of 2016, February and August 
of 2017 in collaboration with AIPR. These programs focused on early warning and risk assessment 
frameworks and brought in partners from the region including the East African Community to 
develop and expand upon current models in place for the period leading up to the general elections 
in August 2017.
The Committee also has a number of planned activities, including:
• Establishing a memorial, or memorials, such as peace parks in the capital city of Nairobi 
and other strategic locations to commemorate past atrocities and promote prevention. 
The KNC is collaborating with the government of Argentina on this project, as Argentina 
has vast experience in establishing public memorials to commemorate atrocity crimes 
committed on their soil. 
• Spearheading the formulation of genocide prevention policy and legislation.
• Further considering ways in which punishment can be used as a mechanism to prevent 
future atrocities in collaboration with the Kenyan Judiciary.6
The Tanzania National Committee for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity and All Forms of Discrimination
History
The Tanzanian National Committee (TNC) was established under the auspices of the ICGLR 
Protocol for the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity 
and All Forms of Discrimination. Tanzania established their National Committee in February of 
2012, making it the first ICGLR Member State to do so.
The government prioritized its establishment of the Committee given the country’s history of 
religious tensions and internal land disputes — both recognized as potential flashpoints for future 
violence. Another potential spark for conflict stems from the presence, within Tanzanian borders, 
of refugees and groups of foreign citizens who oppose foreign governments. For decades, Tanzania 
has received refugees from neighboring countries such as Rwanda and has recently mediated peace 
talks in Burundi and Rwanda. Moreover, the country has hosted foreign opposition groups from 
many countries in southern Africa. According to the Chair of the National Committee, Felistas 
Mushi, these risk factors are a by-product of Tanzania’s inclusive culture. As explained by Ms. 
Mushi, Tanzanians strive to help fellow citizens and their neighbors build peaceful and tolerant 
societies. The requirements maintained by the Protocol, she said, are therefore complementary to 
Tanzania’s inherent commitments in this regard.7
Mandate
Tanzania’s National Committee seeks to prevent the crime of genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and all forms of discrimination through:
• Regularly monitoring situations and processes that could lead to these crimes;
• Collecting and analyzing relevant information;
• Alerting the government and proper authorities in a timely fashion to undertake 
• immediate measures to prevent the commission of these types of crimes;
• Recommending measures to effectively prevent them;
• Fighting impunity for the crimes listed above;
6 The Auschwitz Institute for Peace and Reconciliation (AIPR), National Mechanisms for the Prevention of Genocide and other 
Atrocity Crimes: Durable Solutions to Challenges in Effective Prevention (New York: 2016), 7, accessed December 28, 2017, 
http://www.auschwitzinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/2016-National-Mechanisms-Booklet-Electronic-
Version.pdf.
7 AIPR, Effective and Sustainable Prevention, 7.
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• Raising awareness on the processes that enable these crimes and educating others about 
• prevention to promote the implementation of peace and reconciliation programs;
• Recommending policies and measures to guarantee the rights of victims of these crimes to 
truth, justice, compensation, and rehabilitation; and
• Carrying out any further tasks the Minister of Justice may entrust to the Committee under 
its mandate.
Structure
The Tanzanian Committee is comprised of members of the government, human rights institutions, 
civil society, religious institutions, and academia. Government officials from the following 
institutions are represented: the Ministry of Constitutional and Legal Affairs, which holds the Chair, 
the President’s Office, the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International 
Cooperation, the Ministry of Defense and National Service, the Ministry of Home Affairs, the 
Ministry of Community Development, Gender and Children, the Attorney General’s Chambers, the 
Ministry of Education and Vocational Training, the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, 
the State Police Force, the Ministry of Information, Youth, Culture and Sports, the Ministry of 
East African Cooperation, and the Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance. From 
civil society, there is representation from the Centre for Foreign Relations, the Mwalimu Nyerere 
Foundation, and the Legal and Human Rights Center. Both Catholic and Muslim communities 
have representation on the Committee through the Inter-Religious Council. Finally, the University 
of Dar es Salaam and the Legal Aid Committee of the University of Dar es Salaam School of Law 
are also members.
The process of selecting members was based on the model provided in the ICGLR’s Rules 
of Procedure of the Regional Committee and was also localized according to the Tanzanian 
administrative system. The main goal was to draw membership from all key ministries and sectors 
dealing with peace and security, either directly or indirectly. Throughout its work, the Committee 
invites a broad spectrum of institutions to assist in implementing its operational strategy. For 
example, capacity building seminars for members have been conducted in collaboration with 
AIPR and other international organizations. The Committee’s operational strategy includes the 
development of partnerships and management capacity to enable further cooperative work. 
The Committee believes that broad participation and inclusiveness of Tanzania’s citizenry in the 
formulation and implementation of preventive policy ensures operational effectiveness.8
Outputs
The Committee has conducted interfaith peace forums and programs involving both civil society 
and political leaders, and has developed tailored training and technical assistance programs to 
increase capacity in order to carry out its mandate. These training programs have been supported 
by international civil society organizations, as well as the UN OSAPG. The first of these trainings 
took place in March and October of 2014 and covered such topics as electoral violence, land conflict, 
inter-religious tensions, and natural resource-based conflict. More recently, in March of 2016, the 
TNC and AIPR co-organized an additional training to: 
• Familiarize participants with the concept of genocide and other atrocity crimes, the 
relationship between them, and the processes by which they occur;
• Empower participants with the practical competencies (knowledge and skills) necessary 
to be able to identify, deter, and limit the impact of genocide and other atrocity crimes; and 
• Strengthen the capacity of leaders, as shapers of political will, to become agents of atrocity 
crime prevention with a heightened degree of sensitivity and awareness to the role of 
governmental and non-governmental actors in zones of conflict. 
 
8 Ibid., 8.
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The main topics discussed during this training were the prevention and management of electoral 
violence, early warning and response tools for atrocity crimes prevention, and the construction 
of institutional synergies between regional and national mechanisms for prevention. This event 
served as the third in a series of capacity building training seminars and has been followed by 
additional programming already taking place in 2017. 
The success of interfaith peace forums towards building peace and social cohesion in Tanzania 
is noteworthy. These forums have covered concrete strategies and opportunities to prevent 
genocide in Tanzania as well as the role of religious leaders in peacebuilding. More specifically, 
genocide prevention strategies most relevant to the Tanzanian context were identified as:
• Fostering peaceful cooperation, interactions, and coexistence between different religious 
faiths in peacetime;
• Encouraging the media to adhere to established professional ethics and act as positive 
forces relative to building national unity, social cohesion, and sustainable development; 
• Building political and governance systems on the principles of transparency, accountability, 
and the timely administration of justice; and
• Eliminating nepotism, discrimination, and injustice in national institutions.
Finally, the TNC is currently in the process of establishing a National Centre for Conflict Early 
Warning and Early Response. The objective of the Centre will be to build an efficient framework for 
information sharing and communication, utilizing available technologies among governmental and 
nongovernmental actors. The resulting network will include local and national-level representatives 
and function with the goal of providing timely advice and policy recommendations for burgeoning 
conflicts and threats to peace and security in Tanzania.9
The Uganda National Committee for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity and All Forms of Discrimination
History
Like the Tanzanian and Kenyan National Committees, the Ugandan National Committee (UNC) 
was established under, and in compliance with, the ICGLR Protocol for the Prevention and 
Punishment of Genocide, War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity and All Forms of Discrimination. 
The Ugandan National Committee was officially launched on October 15, 2012, in Entebbe, Uganda, 
with support from the UN OSAPG. A preliminary one-day training was held for members of the 
Committee to coincide with the launch, at which time a six-month work plan was developed. The 
plan addressed the unique challenges facing Uganda — a country where the process of genocide 
has unfolded in the past and where the risk of atrocity crimes remains.
Mandate
Uganda’s National Committee seeks to prevent the crime of genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and all forms of discrimination by:
• Regularly monitoring situations and processes that could lead to these crimes;
• Collecting and analyzing relevant information;
• Alerting the government and proper authorities in a timely fashion to undertake immediate 
measures to prevent the commission of the above crimes;
• Recommending measures to effectively prevent these types of crimes;
• Fighting against impunity for the above crimes;
• Raising awareness and providing education on the processes that enable these crimes to 
promote the implementation of peace and reconciliation programs;
• Recommending policies and measures to guarantee the rights of victims of these crimes to 
truth, justice, compensation, and rehabilitation; and
9 AIPR, Pursuing Institutionalization, 8.
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• Carrying out any further tasks the Minister of Justice may entrust to the Committee under 
its mandate.
Structure
Unlike others in the region, the Ugandan National Committee features a member of civil society 
as its chairperson. While all national committees in the Great Lakes Region include a significant 
number of non-governmental experts and practitioners, this structure is unique to Uganda. 
The UNC is comprised of the Chair and Secretary, a Treasurer, who represents academia and 
the legal community, and a representative from the Human Rights Commission of Uganda as 
the Communications Director. Additional members include representatives from the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, the Ministry of Gender, the 
Uganda People’s Defense Force, and other civil society organizations.10
Outputs
In August 2014, the UNC engaged in community-level consultative and mediation meetings 
to address tensions in Western Uganda. This led to the diffusion of violent escalations and has 
served as a model for further peace talks and mediation techniques undertaken by the Committee. 
In 2015, the Committee completed an initial assessment of national strengths and weaknesses 
from the perspective of atrocity prevention. The main policy gap that was discovered concerned 
domestic legislation for atrocity crimes. The Committee subsequently forged a partnership with a 
group of parliamentarians to draft a bill defining punishment for the crime of genocide as well as 
institutionalizing the UNC within the state apparatus. The “Genocide Bill”, as it is most commonly 
called, was introduced on the floor of parliament and was referred to a select committee. The UNC 
is working to support the passage of the bill into law over the coming parliamentary sessions, 
which will give Uganda a domestic legal framework for the National Committee and its mandate. 
Later, in December of 2015, the Committee led a training session, held in collaboration with 
AIPR, for various members of the National Committees in the ICGLR region. The primary objectives 
of the seminar were to provide background information on past experiences and to address new 
challenges and lessons learned on thematic issues involving the work of National Committees in 
the Great Lakes Region of Africa. It also worked to provide state leaders and National Mechanisms 
with policy and programmatic recommendations towards further institutionalization and increased 
sustainability of efforts for the prevention of genocide and other atrocity crimes. Members of the 
Ugandan Committee also participated in the March 2016 training in Tanzania, described in the 
previous section. During the workshop, Ugandan representatives proposed initiatives for the 
translation of existing human rights documents and legislation into local languages as well as 
classroom and extracurricular programs for youth on the prevention of paramilitary mobilization. 
Paramilitary mobilization remains an ongoing problem and one to which the Committee has 
devoted much of its work. Unfortunately, the successful and complete implementation of these 
programs is still pending the availability of resources.11
The Commission for International Humanitarian Law of Costa Rica (La Comisión 
Costarricense de Derecho Internacional Humanitario - CCDIH) 
History 
The Costa Rican government has looked to the existing body of the CCDIH to manage the state’s 
agenda of atrocity crimes prevention. The Commission was created by an Executive Order in 2004 
as an inter-ministerial/inter-departmental body with an advisory role to the Executive branch of the 
government. The CCDIH is also mandated to implement International Humanitarian Law (IHL) 
and propagate its dissemination. The Commission is led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Culture, and is the only inter-ministerial mechanism in Costa Rica with a mandate and competency 
in issue areas pertaining to atrocity crimes prevention. 
10 AIPR, Effective and Sustainable Prevention, 10-11.
11 AIPR, Durable Solutions, 9.
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Mandate 
The mandate of the CCDIH concerning IHL is drawn from Costa Rica’s commitments in this area, 
as party to various international treaties, regional agreements, and national regulatory legislation. 
As the CCDIH performs an advisory role on matters of compliance with relevant legal obligations 
and assists in the implementation and dissemination of regulations, it is, therefore, well suited to 
operationalize the agenda of atrocity crimes prevention, considering that the field of IHL holds 
many tools for prevention. Specifically, the CCDIH has a mandate to carry out the following 
functions: 
• Make recommendations to the Executive on measures to be taken towards the 
implementation of international legal provisions in force relevant to International 
Humanitarian Law; 
• Advise the Executive in the drafting of bills and regulations to ensure Costa Rica meets its 
international obligations in the field of International Humanitarian Law; 
• Promote, encourage and support the dissemination of International Humanitarian Law in 
the institutions of the state and society in general, as well as taking appropriate action to 
this end; 
• Attend meetings, seminars, and conferences related to International Humanitarian Law, 
with the nomination of the Executive; 
• Promote and collaborate with the academic authorities of the country for the incorporation 
of International Humanitarian Law in educational curricula; and 
• Suggest actions to contribute to the implementation and enforcement of international 
humanitarian law. 
Structure
The Commission consists of three subcommittees, which manage various aspects of the body’s 
work. They are a) Rules/Standards, b) Outreach and Education, and c) Protection of Cultural 
Property. The Commission includes the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Education, 
the Ministry of Justice and Peace, the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of the Presidency, 
the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Culture and Youth, the Attorney General’s Office, the 
Judiciary, the Legislature, the Office of the Ombudsman, the University of Costa Rica, the National 
University, the National Council of Rectors, the Costa Rica Red Cross, and the Bar Association 
of Costa Rica. Thus, the CCDIH’s membership exemplifies a whole of government approach 
in addition to including membership from other sectors, such as academia and civil society, 
which are extremely important to the development and implementation of effective preventive 
policy within the country. Furthermore, the efforts of Costa Rica in this area demonstrate that a 
government does not need to establish a new body to act as a National Mechanism, but instead can 
pursue this agenda through an existing mechanism that includes the necessary characteristics and 
competencies. 
Outputs 
The CCDIH has produced a number of outputs that contribute to the prevention of atrocity crimes 
in Costa Rica. Firstly, under the impetus of the Subcommittee on Rules and Standards, the Costa 
Rican Legislature has begun the process of incorporating protections for individuals and property 
under International Humanitarian Law (IHL) into the National Penal Code. Specifically, the 
drafted bill pertains to “Offenses Against Human Rights” and “Crimes Against Persons or Property 
Protected by International Humanitarian Law.” The bill is awaiting discussion and debate during 
an upcoming plenary session of the Deputies of the Legislative Assembly. 
Additionally, the Commission is currently working to address the status of the implementation 
of current international law into the National Penal Code as it pertains to the prevention of 
genocide. At this time, the crime of genocide is stipulated in Article 375 of the National Penal 
Code, however, according to the Commission, the stated law fails to fully meet the current 
international standards on atrocity crimes, particularly with regards to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, of which Costa Rica is a signatory. Therefore, the Commission is 
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recommending that Article 375 be amended to include specific and systematic acts of torture 
and forced disappearance, whether committed within the context of an armed conflict or outside 
of one. 
Regarding its mandate to disseminate IHL, there are a number of activities the Commission 
has highlighted within the framework of its tenth anniversary, specifically pertaining to its work 
with state institutions and civil society. The CCDIH has been involved in the development of 
training programs for various actors from these sectors, including those from state security forces 
and legislative bodies. Additionally, the CCDIH organized a series of workshops to prepare for the 
XXXII International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, which was held from December 
8-10, 2015 in Geneva, Switzerland. The first workshop, held on March 4, 2015, consisted of an 
introduction to IHL at the headquarters of the Bar Association of Costa Rica, with participation 
from civil society and legal professionals. Drawing on its mandate for collaboration with academic 
authorities, the CCDIH has recently established partnerships with the National University of Costa 
Rica and its Faculty of Law, which led to the initiation of a series of activities with the Commission, 
beginning in 2017. 
Beyond these outputs, the Commission has been very active in communicating with the 
general public on issues concerning IHL and, by extension, the prevention of atrocity crimes. It has 
participated in various radio programs, such as Radio Universidad de Costa Rica, to speak about 
these topics and their importance in the lives of civilians. The CCDIH also sponsored the Race of 
the Red Cross in Costa Rica, which welcomed the participation of over 3,000 runners and carried 
messages related to IHL and the prevention of atrocity crimes. 
The CCDIH also played an important role in the organization of the 2014 Global Action 
Against Mass Atrocity Crimes meeting held in San Jose. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs developed 
the program, in coordination with the governments of Denmark, Argentina, Switzerland and 
Tanzania. The event looked to bring together representatives from government and civil society 
around the world who serve as focal points for atrocity crimes prevention. 
Finally, members of the CCDIH have participated in multiple training seminars held by AIPR 
in conjunction with Costa Rica’s membership –through its Ministry of Foreign Affairs– in the Latin 
American Network for Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention. As a result, these participants are 
now able to organize training modules on topics related to genocide prevention for the members 
of the CCDIH. The last session, which took place on August 5, 2016, was called “Social Identity 
and the Creation of ‘the Other’” (Identidad Social y la Creación del Otro), and was inspired by 
AIPR’s curriculum for the Latin American edition of the Raphael Lemkin Seminar for Genocide 
Prevention.12
Other Emerging Mechanisms
Argentina
The government of Argentina is currently in the process of developing its National Mechanism for 
the Prevention of Genocide. The motivation for the creation of this inter-ministerial Mechanism 
comes from its national human rights policy, which has been in development since 2003. The 
establishment of a National Mechanism is complementary to a number of existing initiatives on 
fundamental human rights related to memory, truth, and justice that were launched in light of the 
country’s civil-military dictatorship of 1976-1983. 
In this sense, the National Mechanism is an essential institutional tool in the pursuit of higher 
levels of effectiveness in the prevention of genocide and other mass atrocities and is consistent with 
Argentina’s active membership in the Latin American Network for Genocide and Mass Atrocity 
Prevention. The impetus for establishing a National Mechanism is also derived from Argentina’s 
responsibility as a party to the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide. In this context, the Mechanism will serve as a tool for the domestication and 
operationalization of international law. Official authorization of the Mechanism will be provided 
through a Presidential Decree, which, as of the date of publication, is awaiting signature by the 
12 AIPR, Durable Solutions, 17-18.
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President.
The Argentinian National Mechanism has been designed as an inter-ministerial body with 
a well-defined framework for governmental and non-governmental actors playing a joint role in 
matters related to the prevention of atrocity crimes. In accordance with the Presidential Decree, the 
responsibilities of the Mechanism will include:
• Risk detection and early warning, including the development of procedures for the 
circulation and exchange of information within the government and to interested external 
parties, including civil society organizations and academic institutions, on various cases 
and situations posing a possible risk of atrocity. This also provides for the development of 
a standardized evaluation process for the data gathered. 
• Systemic prevention and awareness, including the implementation of seminars and 
trainings on topics related to human rights, international humanitarian law, transitional 
justice, and other related topics under the prevention umbrella. This also provides for 
the implementation of standardized training curricula on anti-discrimination and atrocity 
prevention for public academic institutions, as well as institutions training civil servants. 
Lastly, it entails the development of an evaluation process for content in the media and 
mass communications. 
• Collaboration and information exchange, including the establishment of procedural 
mechanisms for data processing and communications with the United Nations, as well 
as regional organizations, such as the Latin American Network for Genocide and Mass 
Atrocity Prevention.
The agencies that will participate in the National Mechanism and form its Coordinating Committee 
are the Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs and Worship, Justice and Human Rights, Education, 
Public Communications, and Institutional Reform and Democracy Building, as well as the 
Director of the Ministerial Cabinet, and the National Institute for the Prevention of Discrimination, 
Xenophobia and Racism. The Mechanism will also include a Committee for Genocide Prevention, 
which serves as a space for exchange with civil society organizations that are accredited by the 
Committee. Additionally, a Federal Network for Genocide Prevention will be established under 
the auspices of the National Mechanism, and will assist in developing the capacity of the Federal 
Government to coordinate prevention policy with provincial authorities.
As of the date of this publication, the nascent National Mechanism has only had preparatory 
meetings. However, the development of internal procedures is currently underway. The next step 
in the process will be the coordination of a National Action Plan for genocide prevention, which will 
be approved and put into place once the Presidential Decree has been signed and an assessment of 
the strengths and weaknesses of the current prevention policy framework has been conducted.13
Paraguay
The Truth, Justice and Reparation Directorate General of the Office of the Ombudsman, as well as 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Paraguay — both Focal Points of the Latin American Network for 
Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention — have developed a bill to create a National Commission 
on the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities. The National Commission will facilitate 
interagency coordination among the various state agencies that have authority with respect to 
the prevention of genocide and other mass atrocities. The establishment of the Commission is 
supported by Paraguay’s responsibilities derived from international law under the framework 
of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 
To this end, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs acts as the focal point for the domestication of the 
Convention.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the General Directorate for Truth, Justice and Reparations 
within the Office of the Ombudsman will chair the National Commission. The Commission shall 
13 AIPR, Effective and Sustainable Prevention, 17-18.
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consist of a primary and alternate representative from the following institutions: the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, the Office of the Ombudsman, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Justice, 
the Ministry of Education and Culture, the Ministry of National Defense, the Judiciary, the Public 
Prosecutor, the Departments of the Armed Forces, the Ministry of Defense, Congress, and the 
State Police. The Commission reserves the right to call upon other institutions to join, should their 
membership become necessary.
The Congressional approval process for the bill creating the National Mechanism is currently 
underway, having been submitted for official consideration by six Senators. The prospective 
Commission is engaging with AIPR to develop capacity building programs, which will provide 
training to the body’s members in order to assist in effectively carrying out its mandate.14
Common Challenges and Innovative Solutions
A number of the National Mechanisms featured in this article have existed in various forms for 
several years, and so it is appropriate to discuss some of the challenges that they are facing in 
effectively carrying out their mandates and highlight some of the innovative solutions they have 
developed to meet these obstacles head-on. Despite the varying geographical landscapes and 
even more diverse political and social narratives, a number of the challenges faced by National 
Mechanisms exhibit common themes. 
States establishing new bodies often face difficulties in formally integrating the nascent 
Mechanism into the national government, such that it becomes an official body with resources 
allocated towards its mandate. This has been the experience of the Kenyan, Ugandan and Tanzanian 
National Committees, as well as the emerging Mechanisms in both Argentina and Paraguay. Each 
of these bodies is still waiting for proper legal integration through the necessary bureaucratic 
processes of their legislatures. Without this formalization, it remains very difficult for members to 
receive official leave from their primary professional duties to carry out programming and activities 
convened by the Mechanisms. Additionally, without proper funding allocated by their respective 
national legislature, the Mechanisms are obliged to seek resources from outside organizations in 
order to carry out their activities, which is not a sustainable practice. 
While this lack of resources has continually proven to be among the most challenging obstacles 
to overcome, the Tanzanian, Ugandan, and Kenyan National Committees have been successful 
in employing outside funding to carry out a diverse array of programming. This includes the 
successful execution of a variety of training seminars, memorialization projects, and early warning 
activities, all while concurrently working towards formal institutionalization. As Felistas Mushi, 
Chairwoman of the Tanzanian National Committee, explains: 
Our biggest strength as a Committee is our individual and collective commitment to 
prevention work. Despite all the challenges, the Committee has been able to accomplish what 
we have thus far because of this commitment, which has given us a great deal of credibility.15 
Conclusions and Lessons Learned 
In reviewing the outputs and activities of existing National Mechanisms for the Prevention of 
Genocide and other Atrocity Crimes, a small collection of lessons learned should be highlighted. 
Perhaps the most important of these lessons is that a National Mechanism does not necessarily need 
to be formally integrated into the central government to begin carrying out its stated mandate. We 
have seen this in the experiences of the Kenyan, Ugandan, and Tanzanian National Committees, 
as well as the nascent National Mechanisms in Argentina and Paraguay. In the same vein, a 
Mechanism also does not necessarily require its own resources to hold effective programming such 
as trainings, peace forums, and other meetings at the outset. Collaboration with outside partners, 
whether through regional bodies or international civil society organizations, foundations, or 
donor governments, has proven to be an effective method for gathering the requisite resources and 
14 AIPR, Pursuing Institutionalization, 11.
15 AIPR, Effective and Sustainable Prevention, 9.
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expertise to hold programming under their stated mandates in the initial stages of their work plan. 
Additionally, the role that National Mechanisms play in the gathering and assessment of 
information has not been significantly constrained by a lack of formal institutionalization. As long 
as the members representing the various apparatuses of the national government and other sectors 
of society are present and committed to the mandate, in many cases information has continued 
to flow. This information has been utilized to issue formal policy recommendations to the proper 
authorities, often providing crucial early warning for potential crises. 
That being said, it is also clear from discussions held between AIPR and members of the National 
Mechanisms that the long-term sustainability of these bodies, as well as their general effectiveness 
over the coming years through administration changes and shifting political contexts, depends 
heavily on their formal institutionalization into governmental structures and the allocation of 
budgetary resources that follows. Therefore, its long-term importance cannot be understated. This 
is why each of the Mechanisms has prioritized the active pursuit of institutionalization alongside 
their ongoing activities. 
Based on the collective experiences of existing bodies, the following considerations are 
important in the establishment of new National Mechanisms: 
Mandate: The establishment of a National Mechanism often requires that a national 
government take a strong policy position on atrocity prevention as a national priority. 
This will not only aid in the inception of a new Mechanism, but also allow for the future 
actions of the body to be framed as part of this national-level policy. In the case of 
the African Great Lakes Region, the 2006 Protocol that mandated the establishment of 
a regional committee and individual national committees continues to constitute the 
main point of departure. 
Membership: What areas of government should be represented, and why? 
Comprehensive membership confers many benefits and extends beyond government. 
Civil society organizations are also seen to be key partners in an effective prevention 
agenda, occupying both formal advisory roles and participating directly alongside 
governmental members of a National Mechanism. 
Structure: It is important include both horizontal and a vertical considerations. 
Horizontally, all relevant departments must be included. Vertically, Mechanisms can 
often produce policies that would require implementation by agents within the national-
level administration, as well as those from regional and local power structures. While 
this may be clearer in federated states, it is not exclusive to them. 
Goal: It is important to emphasize that the objective of these mechanisms is the design 
of unified national policies for the prevention of genocide and other atrocity crimes. 
Inherent in this is an emphasis on “upstream” prevention, meaning that National 
Mechanisms aim to address the steps leading up to violence, taking measures to halt 
these processes before we see any resulting casualties. 
Function: National Mechanisms are established to carry out two main functions. The 
first of which is to carry out a system-wide assessment of strengths and weaknesses 
from the perspective of atrocity prevention. Ideally, the results of the assessment 
should lead the discussion on further functions of the mechanism. Secondly, they are 
established to support the design, implementation, and coordination of national policies 
for prevention.
Outputs: In order to maintain institutional momentum and demonstrate efficacy, there 
is a need to realize concrete achievements. These most often include trainings, published 
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national strategies, inter-ministerial forums, and a variety of other programs or policy 
recommendations. The National Mechanism needs to display value added to ensure its 
sustainability. 
Impact: Ideally, the process of establishment should build in a system of impact 
evaluation. The National Mechanism should also be flexible in amending its work plan 
in order to take the results of any evaluation into account. 
Budget: National Mechanisms can rely on international assistance in the short term, 
but they must quickly become self-sustaining, which requires inclusion in the national 
budget. This step constitutes a true indication of the priority that a national government 
gives to the establishment of a National Mechanism.16 
These lessons are important to note for countries working to establish their own National Mechanisms 
within the particular context of their governmental structure and the societal conditions concerning 
atrocity crimes prevention. Genocide and other atrocity crimes are complex social problems that 
must be addressed effectively by the societal collective as a whole. Thus, it follows that the state 
must employ a whole of government approach to the prevention of such crimes, bringing in those 
representatives who have responsibilities concerning prevention to the planning table, as well as 
non-state actors who play a key role in prevention policy implementation. 
In Confronting Evil: Engaging Our Responsibility to Prevent Genocide, James Waller notes the 
importance of National Mechanisms in the upstream prevention of atrocity crimes. To mitigate risk 
factors for atrocity associated with governance, conflict history, economic conditions, and social 
cohesion, he finds that “initiatives that are highly responsive to the unique internal dynamics of 
the society are crucial in building a state’s resilience, reducing its susceptibility to genocide and, 
ultimately, reinforcing a state’s sovereignty.”17 He follows this by citing the work of a number 
of National Mechanisms featured in this article as examples of effective frameworks for civilian 
protection. Bridget Moix has asserted that: 
…Turning genocide prevention inside-out to focus first on supporting and strengthening 
local capacities for peace within a society, linking them more effectively with regional and 
global backup response systems, would not only save lives, it would also be significantly less 
expensive and less damaging, and holds greater promise for finally closing the prevention 
gap so often debated.18 
The work of National Mechanisms represents a more community-based or localized approach to 
atrocity prevention, inclusive of both state and non-state actors within society. Moix points to various 
examples of what she calls “local peace agency,”19which provides important opportunities to the 
field of genocide prevention, challenging the dominant assumptions about external interventions. 
She goes on to explain that such localized approaches my help “re-orient our theory and practice 
in ways that can help [us] move upstream to earlier prevention, break repeating cycles of violence, 
and ensure more sustainable recovery and reconciliation processes over the long-term.”20 
This growing understanding within the field, one that supports local solutions to local problems 
and involves both state and non-state stakeholders in the development of prevention strategies, is 
reflected in the emergence of National Mechanisms and has manifested in their programming and 
16 AIPR, Durable Solutions, 24-25.
17 James Waller, Confronting Evil: Engaging Our Responsibility to Prevent Genocide (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 
196-197 and 163.
18 Bridget Moix, “Turning Atrocity Prevention Inside-Out: Community-Based Approaches to Preventing, Protecting, and 
Recovering from Mass Violence,” Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal 9, no. 3 (2016), 62.
19 Ibid., 60.
20 Ibid.
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activities. The proliferation of these bodies in states around the world lends itself to the notion 
that National Mechanisms represent an inclusive approach to atrocity prevention that has had a 
positive impact on our field and will continue to do so. 
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Berlin, Germany
Germany has accepted the unique responsibility arising from its history. The avoidance of 
war and violence in international relations, the prevention of genocide and severe violations 
of human rights, and the defence of endangered minorities and the victims of oppression 
and persecution are integral to Germany’s reason of state.1
As of June 2017, this is official German government policy, adopted by the federal cabinet as the 
highest executive organ in its “Guidelines on Preventing Crises, Resolving Conflicts, Building 
Peace.” Compared to earlier policy documents, the ambition is expressed more strongly than 
ever: raison d’état, or reason of state, is vernacular usually reserved for Germany’s unwavering 
commitment to the survival of the state of Israel. 
The statement quoted above must be seen in the context of Germany’s broader coming of age in 
matters of international leadership. It does not describe the emphasis on preventing genocide and 
mass atrocities in current policy. Interpreting this aspiration and its prospects for shaping future 
policy requires substantial background on the past and present of Germany’s political debates 
and bureaucratic infrastructure on crisis prevention, atrocity prevention, and responsibility to 
protect.
This paper consists of two main sections. The first introduces the political context and recent 
history of Germany’s institutional setup for atrocity prevention. The second describes this setup 
and explains its strengths and weaknesses, as well as the key challenges to be addressed in order to 
live up to the aspiration of making more effective contributions to the prevention of genocide and 
other atrocities. We conclude with an outlook on Germany’s contributions to atrocity prevention 
in the next few years. 
Context: Debates on Prevention and Intervention in Germany 
Atrocity prevention as a distinct category in German political debates is fairly new and still rarely 
used. Over the past 15 years, the issues that were discussed in the US as atrocity prevention were 
linked either to the responsibility to protect (R2P) or to conflict prevention, which is referred to as 
“crisis prevention” in the German debate.2 Part of the reason for this is evident in the language. 
There is no consistent, agreed-upon phrase for “mass atrocities” in German. However, the two 
debates about R2P and conflict prevention have been almost completely disconnected from one 
another: the R2P debate is tainted by its association with military intervention, while the conflict 
prevention debate is shaped by an emphasis on long-term, structural peacebuilding with civilian 
means. Accordingly, atrocity prevention is almost never treated as a category in itself, and there is 
little awareness of the differences between conflict and atrocity prevention.3 
“Never Again What?” Contradicting Historical Lessons at the Center of the Prevention Debate
Key to comprehending German views on all three categories – R2P, conflict prevention and atrocity 
prevention – is understanding the societal and historical debates in Germany on these topics. This 
1 German Federal Government, Guidelines on Preventing Crises, Resolving Conflicts, Building Peace, July 21, 2017 (German 
Federal Foreign Office), accessed December 31, 2017, www.diplo.de/guidelines. 
2 The German policy community uses the term “crisis prevention” (“Krisenprävention”) where most English speaking 
experts would use conflict prevention. The German usage comes with many conceptual debates on its own.
3 Gregor Hofmann, „Politische Bekenntnisse ohne Folgen,“ HSFK Standpunkte 6 (2013), 6.
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is linked to Germany’s own history and the Holocaust, but also the history of the peace movement 
and its role in shaping the internationalist left. The distinct meaning and use of the pivotal term 
“never again” in Germany illustrates a key difference to the United States. 
In the US, genocide prevention advocates, Holocaust survivors, and high-ranking politicians 
regularly draw comparisons between the Holocaust and mass atrocities in Rwanda, Srebrenica, 
Darfur or Syria.4 Historical responsibility, in that interpretation, includes not only remembering 
the past but also fighting mass atrocities today. 
In Germany, the phrase “never again” is used in two ways. First, to refer to “never again war,” 
the conclusion drawn from the responsibility for two World Wars that expresses the core of the 
pacifist streak in mainstream German society. Second, where “never again” is used in reference 
to the Holocaust (“never again Auschwitz”), it is usually interpreted as a responsibility to prevent 
right-wing ideology, racism, and fascism in Germany. When, in 1999, then-foreign minister 
Joschka Fischer used “never again Auschwitz” to mobilize support for the military intervention 
in Kosovo, he was heavily criticized for abusing the phrase and diminishing the singularity of 
the Holocaust. Since then, politicians hardly ever make such connections. In the German peace 
movement, including significant parts of the foreign policy community from the left of the political 
spectrum, the Kosovo intervention is still hugely controversial. 
In 2001, the International Commission for Intervention and State Sovereignty that developed 
the idea of a responsibility to protect actually had a prominent German member. Klaus Naumann 
had recently retired as the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee and previously served as the 
Inspector-General, effectively the Chief of Staff, of the German Bundeswehr. Known as a passionate 
advocate for muscular intervention in the Balkans, Naumann was put in charge of the chapter 
on military options by the Commission. The German government, however, did everything to 
ignore that Naumann existed: the defense department refused to meet or even reply to his requests 
for guidance, and the Foreign Office directed him to junior officials who received his occasional 
reports about the proceedings but refused to provide him with any insight into the considerations 
of the government on the matter.5
It took a whole decade, as well as a controversial German vote in the UN Security Council, 
to bring the R2P debate home. Beginning in 2005, when the UN General Assembly endorsed a 
version of R2P, German policymakers treated the concept as a legal norm in the making that 
required German support at the level of the European Union and the United Nations, mostly 
in the sense of including the words “responsibility to protect” in statements and resolutions.6 
In 2011, Germany’s controversial abstention on a resolution authorizing an intervention in 
Libya triggered the first genuinely public debate on R2P in Germany.7 Mainstream newspapers 
published editorials on R2P’s origin and purpose, and parties in the Bundestag voiced their support 
for R2P in party motions. In this context, German policymakers began to see R2P as not only 
international law in the making, but also a moral principle and a practical commitment that needs 
operationalization.
The dominant links to Kosovo and Libya, however, exemplify the bias in the public perception 
of atrocity prevention in Germany. To this day, every debate about preventing or stopping atrocities 
gets short-circuited into a debate about military intervention. Whatever the political decision, 
whether Germany refuses to employ military force, as in Libya, or whether it breaks a longstanding 
taboo and delivers military assistance, as in Iraq in 2014, as soon as the military question is settled, 
the debate ends. How best to use and equip German armed forces for such interventions, or which 
other diplomatic, economic, or judicial tools the German government has at its disposal, is hardly 
ever subject to public or even expert discussion. 
4 See, for example, Elie Wiesel, “Genocide Prevention Initiative Launch” (speech, Washington, DC, April 23, 2012), United 
States Holocaust Memorial Museum, accessed February 20, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_xTGJxYp76w.
5 Interviews with former German policymakers, Berlin, Summer 2013.
6 Sarah Brockmeier, Gerrit Kurtz, and Julian Junk, “Emerging Norm and Rhetorical Tool: Europe and a Responsibility to 
Protect,” Conflict, Security and Development 14, no. 4 (2014), 448-449.
7 Sarah Brockmeier, “Germany and the Intervention in Libya,” Survival Global Politics and Strategy 55, no. 6 (2013), 63-90.
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Little Civil Society and Political Pressure 
The open public dispute over Germany’s lessons from history may also partly explain why 
the German public and civil society advocacy are relatively listless and lackluster on atrocity 
prevention. Whereas US reforms on atrocity prevention have been significantly driven by civil 
society mobilization, there is no comparable NGO infrastructure devoted to the issue in Germany. 
Most internationalist civil society organizations, including religious and human rights groups, 
build on an anti-imperialist, often pacifist tradition of opposing American interventions during 
the Cold War and beyond. They advocate for human rights and peace in general, but hardly any of 
them work on atrocity prevention specifically. Instead of embracing R2P as an advocacy tool, most 
of them see the principle primarily as a back-door attempt to legitimize military adventures. There 
are very few exceptions: Genocide Alert, Crisis Action, Human Rights Watch Germany, and the 
Society for Threatened Peoples are the main groups.8 In contrast to the US, Germany does not have 
large-scale advocacy campaigns pressuring the government to take action on particular country 
cases or to improve its atrocity prevention tools.
All of this makes atrocity prevention an unattractive and even difficult issue for political 
leaders to support. Most of the prominent or semi-prominent politicians who do support a stronger 
German leadership role on atrocity prevention prefer to do so quietly, rather than championing the 
issue in public and risking to alienate voters. 
In the European Union as a whole, dynamics are similar. Although a large number of groups are 
committed to peace and human rights, the topic of atrocity prevention does not play a substantial 
role in major human rights organizations.9 There are also fewer political entrepreneurs, such as 
Samantha Power, who alternate between civil society and bureaucracy. Compared to the United 
States, political elites and the bureaucracy in both Germany and the European Union are less open 
to exchange with academia and civil society in general. 
These differences between the United States and the European Union are exemplified by a 
comparison between the results of the U.S. Genocide Prevention Task Force (GPTF) and the fate 
of the attempted European replica, the Task Force on the EU Prevention of Mass Atrocities.10 The EU 
Task Force, in 2012, provided a thorough assessment of the EU’s strengths and weaknesses on mass 
atrocity prevention and provided a list of recommendations to European institutions on how to 
improve the institutional set-up of the EU (some of which we repeat below). Yet while many of the 
GPTF’s recommendations were taken up by the Obama administration, the EU Task Force’s report 
seems to have largely been forgotten shortly after its presentation in early 2013. The key difference 
between the EU and the US version of the reports was not the quality of their content, but the 
political clout of their drafters. The most important feature of the Genocide Prevention Task Force 
was its composition, a veritable who’s who of credible foreign and security policy experts, chaired 
by Madeline Albright and William Cohen. This was vital to its acceptance as an objective among 
Washington’s political elite. The European equivalent, initiated by a Hungarian NGO, failed to 
receive such high-level political backing for its work—a reflection of the differing conditions for 
promoting mass atrocity prevention between the US and the European Union. 
Recent Growth in Responsibility 
Despite the shortcomings in the political and societal context for atrocity prevention debates 
in Germany and the EU, Berlin’s role in the world and willingness to take on responsibility has 
been growing. This has important side effects for atrocity prevention, as we will show in the next 
section. 
8 One of the authors was a board member of Genocide Alert from 2010 to 2015. More information on Genocide Alert’s 
work can be found at http://www.genocide-alert.de. 
9 Chiara De Franco, Christoph O. Meyer, and Karen E. Smith, “‘Living by Example?’ The European Union and the 
Implementation of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P),” Journal of Common Market Studies 53, no. 5 (2015), 994–1009.
10 Budapest Centre for the International Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities, The EU and the Prevention of Mass 
Atrocities – An Assessment of Strengths and Weaknesses (Hungary: Foundation for the International Prevention of 
Genocide and Mass Atrocities, February 2013), accessed December 31, 2017, http://massatrocitiestaskforce.eu/Report_
files/The EU and the prevention of mass atrocities - an assessment of strenghts and weaknesses.pdf.
Brockmeier & Rotmann
©2018     Genocide Studies and Prevention 11, no. 3 http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.11.3
23
For a long time, Germans have seen events in distant war zones as something that does 
not concern them. This has been changing. The 2015 refugee crisis confronted many previously 
unconcerned Germans with the reality of wars and atrocities in far-away places. Chancellor Angela 
Merkel summarized this tendency in an unusually candid fashion in the fall of 2015: “In many 
regions war and terror prevail. States disintegrate. For many years we have read about this. We 
have heard about it. We have seen it on TV. But we had not yet sufficiently understood that what 
happens in Aleppo and Mosul can affect Essen or Stuttgart. We have to face that now.”11
German support of the negotiations with Iran, Berlin’s central role in addressing the crisis in 
Ukraine, its decision to arm the Kurdish Peshmerga in their fight against IS as well as its support of 
the anti-IS coalition with up to 1200 German troops are all signs that Germany is taking increasing 
responsibility. Polls show unprecedented backing for this approach. In annual polling about public 
attitudes toward security issues, record numbers of Germans reported that they now support an 
active role in addressing the problems, crises and conflicts of the world. After 2000, support for this 
question usually lingered between the mid-40s and mid-50s; in many years, there was essentially 
a tie between supporters and opponents of an active role. In 2014, the picture changed. Suddenly, 
there were clear majorities in favor: support jumped to 59%, then 66% (2015) and then 63% (2016), 
with fewer than 35% opposed each year.12 
In this context of growing international ambitions, based on a foundation of growing public 
support, the last administration issued two new foundational documents about Germany’s 
international posture. In the summer of 2016, a new defense white paper was issued, while a year 
later, in the summer of 2017, guidelines on “Preventing Crises, Resolving Conflicts, Building Peace” 
followed. Both documents broke new ground in placing Germany’s responsibility for international 
peace and security in the context of its historical past. In so doing, the government has begun to 
turn a powerful argument that had previously been used mostly to support restraint and passivity 
into a justification, even a requirement, for the country to play a more active role. 
Both documents are formally of equal status, adopted by the entire cabinet as the highest 
organ of the executive, and both are meant to express a cross-party consensus that should hold for 
the next five to ten years, regardless of changes in government. At the same time, German security 
policy continues to be lopsidedly biased toward territorial and alliance defense, and the defense 
white paper—which does not go into any kind of detail on atrocity prevention—is thus seen as 
significantly more important than the guidelines. The effective political weight of the guidelines 
remains to be seen in the coming years.
Germany’s Institutional Setup for Atrocity Prevention
Who Owns Atrocity Prevention? Inter-agency Coordination 
The administration of Germany’s international relations is based primarily on the country’s 
parliamentary system of government and an electoral system that usually leads to coalition 
governments. Germany’s Basic Law firmly enshrines the “Ressortprinzip” (usually translated as 
“departmental principle”) that grants a high degree of autonomy and responsibility to individual 
ministries. Compared to many other Western democracies, these legal foundations and the decades 
of political custom built on them have produced an unusually weak role for the Chancellery 
in any but the top-tier foreign policy issues of the day. The day-to-day policymaking process 
is supposed to be coordinated by the Foreign Office but on any overlapping policy issues, its 
leadership role is often challenged by either the Defense or the Development Ministry. In contrast 
to almost any other country in the world, the latter is a separate ministry, independent from the 
Foreign Office.
These general observations have a number of implications for atrocity prevention. First, 
Germany’s Federal Security Council is largely defunct as a policy-making forum on international 
11 Karl Vick and Simon Shuster, “Time Person of the Year: Chancellor of the Free World,” TIME, December 9, 2015, 
accessed December 31, 2017, http://time.com/time-person-of-the-year-2015-angela-merkel/.
12 Markus Steinbrecher, et al., Security and Defense Policy Opinion climate in the Federal Republic of Germany (Potsdam: Centre 
for Military History and Social Sciences of the German Armed Forces, 2016), accessed December 31, 2017, http://www.
mgfa-potsdam.de/html/einsatzunterstuetzung/downloads/161124kurzberichtbevoelkerungsumfragezmsbw2016.pdf. 
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security; its main role is to take decisions about arms exports. On conflict prevention and 
peacebuilding, the existing working level coordination group has done little more than facilitate 
information exchange between various ministries. There is no other cabinet-level forum to 
coordinate international security or prevention issues, not even a single deputies-level forum 
with this kind of broad mandate. After years of constant squabbling, the cabinet decided in June 
2017 to pilot a “coordination group for crisis prevention, stabilization and peacebuilding” among 
directors-general (roughly equivalent to undersecretaries in the U.S. administration). Its future 
under the new administration depends on the arrangements and decisions to be taken by the next 
government. 
Second, given these structural challenges, there is little inter-agency strategy development on 
conflict prevention and stabilization in general, let alone atrocity prevention. In addition, so far, 
German political leaders across all ministries lack an overview of the tools available for atrocity 
prevention. What is still missing is an inter-agency review that could provide an overview of 
existing instruments and capabilities and that not only refers to the tools of the Foreign Office 
and the Ministry of Defense, but also include the contributions by the Development Ministry, 
intelligence services, as well as the Ministries of Justice, Finance and the Interior. 
Conflict Prevention, Stabilization and R2P in the Foreign Office 
If there is no structure akin to the Atrocities Prevention Board coordinating inter-agency 
prevention initiatives, is there at least an individual in any of the ministries responsible for such 
coordination? In the fall of 2012, the German foreign office named the deputy director of its UN 
division the R2P focal point. However, successive focal points have mostly viewed themselves as 
the German representative at international focal point meetings organized by the Global Centre 
for the Responsibility to Protect. None of the German focal points of the past five years considered 
themselves responsible for looking inward and examining how the German government could 
improve its coordination and improve its tools for atrocity prevention.13 
The relative neglect of R2P stands in stark contrast to the huge build-up of resources for “crisis 
prevention, stabilization, peacebuilding and humanitarian aid,” which is the name of an entirely 
new directorate-general created in 2014. As of 2017, it has more than 100 staff and an annual budget 
of more than 2 billion euro, the largest part of which is being spent on humanitarian aid. After 
the most recent reshuffling in the summer of 2017, there is now a division for “strategic foresight, 
early warning, scenario planning, R2P and civilian experts” as part of the new directorate-general. 
It supports the R2P focal point and seeks to keep track of atrocity risks as part of its broader early 
warning and early action efforts (see below).
The Foreign Office has long funded projects for what is known as civilian crisis prevention 
– usually without a link to an explicit conflict analysis or strategy process, but rather based on 
suggestions or requests from embassies or implementers (mostly NGOs) submitting proposals. 
In the fall of 2012, along with designating a formal R2P focal point, it began designating already 
existing crisis prevention projects as R2P projects to be able to respond to international or civil 
society questions about its operational footprint. Of course, the distinction between crisis, conflict, 
and atrocity prevention is usually more relevant at the analytical stage (to avoid missing certain 
risks) than at the level of programming. 
An even larger proportion of the increased spending—hundreds of millions of euros per year 
in recent years—goes into civilian stabilization projects. Again, there is no formal distinction made 
between funding for atrocity prevention or R2P. Many of these projects seek to re-establish basic 
public services along with the social fabric of communities after civil war, displacement, and/
or atrocities. Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya, among others, are priority countries. In recent years, 
some of this support went to supporting communities outside government or extremist control in 
Syria. Some projects promote inter-ethnic reconciliation or similar efforts that might be considered 
contributions to atrocity prevention in particular, while others follow merely broadly similar goals. 
However, despite significant conceptual investments into the improvement of programming for 
13 Brockmeier, The Future of Germany’s Support.
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crisis prevention and stabilization at large, the role of atrocity prevention or R2P in decisions about 
priority countries or program design remains unaddressed.
Early Warning 
A prerequisite for prevention is the ability of government bureaucracies to develop appropriate 
strategic policy options at an early stage and in every new phase of escalation. In most cases, however, 
violence escalates while the pressure to act only mounts as a response to media attention, at which 
point it is too late for most forms of prevention. As in other countries, German decision-makers 
are then too often confronted with the choice between either authorizing a military intervention—
with all the associated political and practical risks of such an intervention, which translate 
into significant obstacles for such a decision—or just standing by while the slaughter unfolds. 
For this reason, it is critically important to create political instruments that provide a wider 
range of policy options at all stages of violent escalation14 and increase the government’s capacity 
to detect crises early. Related to the lack of coordination structures in the German administration, 
there are several individual early warning tools by different ministries, but no opportunities to 
analyze their results together and adjust the German government’s strategy and programing 
accordingly. 
While the foreign ministry draws on its embassies, there is little incentive for individual 
ambassadors to raise the alarm bells. Diplomats themselves are overextended, since embassies in 
at-risk countries are often too small and their freedom of movement is restricted. In some cases, 
embassies have been closed precisely at a time at which particularly close monitoring of the situation 
would have been decisive. There is no training for the diplomatic corps or embassy personnel on R2P 
or the risk factors in atrocity prevention (let alone for intelligence agents or development workers). 
Aid workers regularly complain about the lack of reporting from the government on violence and 
conflict risks, while government representatives prohibit them from publicizing their own early-
warning analyses. The Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development commissions annual 
country assessments by the German Institute of Global and Area Studies, which classifies the 90 
countries that the ministry works in into three categories: low risk of conflict, increased risk of 
conflict, acute risk of conflict. This traffic light-style system is supposed to guide country desk 
officers in longer-term programming decisions and is shared with the Foreign Office, but there is 
no systematic, unified approach by the whole government to assessing the results of the different 
early warning instruments and devising a response. 
The situational awareness provided by the intelligence services with regard to atrocities is even 
more deficient, largely because threats to Germany dominate the mission of the Federal Intelligence 
Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst, BND).15 Meanwhile, German military advisors serving in fragile 
countries are not even required to report on conflict or atrocity risks. Some of them consider any 
kind of critical reporting on local partners, even within their confidential internal channels, as 
damaging to their trust-building mission. 
Mediation Capacities and Sanctions 
The new government guidelines on crisis prevention and peacebuilding identify German support 
to mediation initiatives as a priority and commit the government to strengthening its own capacities 
as well as those of international institutions. The government also promises to appoint more high-
ranking special envoys for specific crises. Germany might also be able to increase its support to 
mediation capacities on a European level; in many cases, the EU as a whole can be better placed to 
mediate than individual member states. In recent years, the Mediation Support Team within the 
European External Action Service (EEAS) has provided technical support to mediation processes 
in Mali, Myanmar, Lebanon, South Sudan, CAR, and Ukraine.16 
14 Compare to Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 2002).
15 German Federal Government, “Konfliktregionen weltweit,” Bundesnachrichtendienst, accessed November 
10, 2017, http://www.bnd.bund.de/DE/Themen/Lagebeitraege/Konfliktregionen/Konflikte_node.
html;jsessionid=7B3B77A151CA04D165390DFA3075F070.2_cid377. 
16 European External Action Service, Factsheet EU Mediation Support Team, EEAS, accessed November 10, 2017, http://eeas.
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Similarly, the guidelines promise to strengthen targeted sanctions and sanctions regimes—
something that the German government would do through the European Union as well. The threat 
or imposition of targeted sanctions such as visa and travel bans, or the freezing of assets against 
individual perpetrators, is one tool at the disposal of the international community to deter atrocities. 
In comparison to the United States, the EU’s capacity to impose and monitor targeted sanctions 
remains very weak. While more than 180 people are dedicated to designing and implementing 
sanctions at the US Treasury, some US policymakers complain that they face just a handful of 
people at the EEAS to deal with the measures.17 Here the EU could learn from the US experience, as 
well as review its own lessons from previous sanctions regimes.18 Strengthening the EU’s capacity 
to design and impose sanctions will also allow it to engage more with the United States on the 
legal questions concerning listings of individuals. The required legal changes include improving 
the legal framework for sanctioning individuals so that well-founded travel and financial sanctions 
will be more difficult for perpetrators to challenge in the European Court for Human Rights.
Conflict-Sensitive Development Cooperation
In the context of Germany’s system of strong ministerial autonomy, the fact that R2P belongs, 
so to speak, to the Foreign Office has long been a convenient excuse for other ministries to avoid 
participating in any possibly controversial discussion on their potential contributions to atrocity 
prevention. This is regardless of the fact that several other ministries have been responsible for 
important contributions to atrocity prevention themselves. While atrocity prevention or R2P are 
thus not formally recognized as relevant issues by the German development apparatus, there is a 
longstanding commitment (with its associated institutional backbone) to contributing to conflict 
prevention, security, and peacebuilding in development cooperation. The Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development has a policy division for “peace & security and disaster risk 
reduction,” and the implementing agencies have their own departments on peace and conflict 
reduction. 
Around two-thirds of the partner countries of German development cooperation are fragile or 
in conflict. The Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development and its main implementing 
agencies, the KfW banking group and the Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), 
claim to implement conflict-sensitive development programming and to follow a do-no-harm 
approach. Their analytical foundation for doing so is the country-specific traffic light assessment 
mentioned above as well as an internal GIZ classification of countries at risk of conflict. Both 
lists are updated once a year. If a given country is marked yellow or red in the annual analysis, 
the corresponding programs need to conduct a so-called peace and conflict assessment. This 
assessment (in theory) includes an analysis of the main conflict drivers and key actors, identifies 
development needs related to the risk factors, outlines options for contributions to peacebuilding 
that the suggested project could deliver, describes external risks, and suggests ways to monitor the 
implementation of such projects.19 In this context, there should be trainings for all employees in risk 
management and conflict sensitivity in crises countries. 
In reality, the degree of conflict sensitivity for any given program depends very much on the 
country context and its staff. In some cases, conflict sensitivity has been exclusively understood 
as reputational risk management for GIZ or its implementing partners, not as minimizing the risk 
that a given project escalates a conflict. In some countries – in particular those that receive a high 
level of political attention in Berlin – time and pressure to spend money is so high, that there is no 
time for proper analysis, trainings, or check-ins for and with implementing partners.20 
europa.eu/factsheets/docs/factsheet_eu-mediation-support-team_en.pdf.
17 Interview with policymaker at the US Treasury Department, March 2015, Washington, D.C. 
18 Mark Leonard, “A vision for the EU’s new foreign policy strategy,” European Council on Foreign Relations, April 24, 
2015, accessed November 10, 2017, http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_a_vision_for_the_eus_new_foreign_
policy_strategy3006.
19 GIZ, Safeguard Konflikt und Kontextsensibilität, Guidance note for staff, on file with authors, January 2017. 
20 Interviews with GIZ employees, evaluators of GIZ projects and officials of the German Federal Foreign Office and the 
Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, throughout 2017.
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Support to International Criminal Justice Mechanisms
An area in which the German administration has made promising progress in 2017 is international 
criminal justice – again without labeling it atrocity prevention or as relevant to R2P, as was the 
case with development cooperation. Until recently, the baseline for German or EU contributions to 
the national or international criminal prosecution of atrocity perpetrators was low.21 The German 
Federal Criminal Police (Bundeskriminalamt) has a “Central Unit for the Fight against War Crimes 
and further Offences pursuant to the Code of Crimes against International Law,” which cooperates 
with the war crimes units of international police services in the EU Genocide Network, with the 
International Criminal Court, as well as with Europol and Interpol. The level of staffing remains 
low, and witness protection as well as stakeholder involvement require improvement.22 
The influx of almost a million refugees from Syria and the introduction of universal jurisdiction 
in German law has led to significant developments. First, the Federal Prosecutor is investigating 
cases in which suspected Syrian war criminals are now on German soil. As of late 2017, German 
authorities have conducted 27 investigations against individuals for war crimes committed in Syria 
or Iraq, as well as two wide-ranging investigations about Syrian war crimes (so-called structural 
investigations without targeting a particular accused individual). Four of the individual cases have 
been brought to trial on charges of war crimes or crimes against humanity, in addition to 45 cases 
based on terrorism charges.23 
Second, it seems that the German Federal Prosecutor is willing to, for the first time, apply the 
principle of universal jurisdiction and prosecute high-ranking members of the Assad regime for 
war crimes or crimes against humanity. The so-called principle of opportunity has so far given 
German prosecutors an out from prosecuting war criminals worldwide (something that would 
theoretically be possible within German law). The principle stipulates that if perpetrators are not 
in Germany, do not have German citizenship, and the prosecution has little chances for success, 
the Office of the Federal Prosecutor (Bundesanwaltschaft) can decide against taking up such as case. 
On Syria, however, the fact that thousands of potential victims and witnesses now live in Germany 
and that there is more available evidence gathered on the crimes of Syrian regime members, 
has significantly increased the chances of success. In mid-2017, the Federal Prosecutor General 
(Generalbundesanwalt) seemed willing to bring a case against key members of the Assad regime 
to trial (in absentia) in Germany. In the fall of 2017, the Federal Prosecutor was handed the so-
called “Ceasar” files, which had been smuggled out of Syria years earlier and document systematic 
torture in Syrian prisons with photographic evidence. The German Federal Prosecutor is the first 
judicial authority worldwide that could use evidence to issue international arrest warrants against 
key members of the Assad regime. 
Military Contributions 
Despite a growing readiness to deploy German troops, military interventions remain controversial 
and their mixed results have only reinforced a tendency to be skeptical about the utility of military 
force to achieve political objectives among the German strategic community. Accordingly, for the 
Ministry of Defense, atrocity prevention is a difficult issue in several ways. Despite 82% support 
in polls for using the military to “prevent acts of genocide”24 and the fact that the public had little 
21 Despite the massacre in Andijan/Uzbekistan (2005) and the EU sanctions, the German armed forces continued 
its military training program; the erstwhile Uzbek Interior Minister, Sakir Almatow, the person with primarily 
responsible for “Andijan,” traveled to Germany in November 2005 on “humanitarian grounds” and received 
treatment in a private clinic in Hannover. On criminal law actions against war criminals in Germany: Dominic 
Johnson, Simone Schlindwein, and Bianca Schmolze, Tatort Kongo – Prozess in Deutschland. Die Verbrechen der 
ruandischen Miliz FDLR und der Versuch einer juristischen Aufarbeitung (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2016). 
22 Wolfgang Kaleck, “Keine Straflosigkeit bei Kriegsverbrechen – Völkerstrafprozesse in Deutschland voranbringen,“ 
Anhörung im Ausschuss für Recht und Verbraucherschutz des Deutschen Bundestages (statement, Berlin, April 25, 
2016), European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights, accessed December 31, 2017, https://www.bundestag.
de/blob/419958/16a05fb20339cecc383b10dba5835b10/ecchr-data.pdf.    
23 Human Rights Watch, “These Are the Crimes We Are Fleeing” Justice For Syria In Swedish and German Courts, October 2017, 
accessed December 31, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/ijsyria1017_web.pdf. 
24 Körber Foundation, Einmischen oder zurückhalten? Ergebnisse einer repräsentativen Umfrage von TNS Infratest 
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objection to arming and training the Kurdish Peshmerga since 2014, the measure is still considered 
unpopular. Preventing or stopping atrocities is also widely seen as irresponsible overreach among 
the military itself and the strategic community, partly due to a lack of expeditionary capabilities 
and partly because of a lack of familiarity with specific operational and tactical scenarios such as 
those developed in the Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO) project in the US or similar 
work in Norway.25 As a result, neither the Defense Ministry as an institution nor any incumbent 
ministers have anything to gain politically by actively looking for expeditionary adventures. 
The most likely scenario for a German military contribution to preventing atrocities in the 
coming years is through its growing participation in UN peace operations. Since 2015, up to 
600 soldiers have been serving with the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali. This tripled German 
participation in peacekeeping, which had thus far been limited to contributions to the UN Interim 
Force in Lebanon and to a few soldiers each in South Sudan, Darfur, and Liberia, among other 
places. At the same time, the German government presents its participation in Mali not as a 
contribution to strengthening the UN peacekeeping system and the protection of civilians, but as 
a contribution to the fight against terrorism. Similarly, the government contributed to the anti-IS 
coalition as a response to French demands. 
It is still likely that German contributions to peacekeeping will further increase in the next four 
years, and since most peacekeeping operations are mandated to protect civilians, it would be high 
time for the German military to familiarize itself with the practical challenges of this particular 
mission. So far, there is no doctrine on operational or tactical protection of civilians (POC) in the 
Bundeswehr that goes beyond the basics of international humanitarian law. 
The other military pillar that Germany is likely to expand in the coming years is military 
assistance. A new €100m train and equip program, created in 2016, partly aims to build the 
capacity of reliable military contributors to UN, African Union (AU), and other peace operations, 
particularly in Africa and the Middle East. This program is set to expand along with a similar police 
training component and an older, slightly smaller non-lethal equipment and advisory program. 
As the specific projects under these programs move from their historical focus on logistics and 
medical support toward frontline capabilities, a focus on operational and tactical protection of 
civilians and broader atrocity prevention scenarios such as safe zones will become increasingly 
relevant as well.26
Engaging Emerging Powers and Rebuilding Effective International Order
Since the global political fallout over NATO’s abuse of the UN Security Council resolution for 
military intervention in Libya 2011,27 leading powers have been unable to find common ground 
to discharge their duties in safeguarding international peace and security. The most glaring 
example has been the war in Syria. Most major supporters of atrocity prevention turned their 
attention away from the multilateral promotion of atrocity prevention toward internal, operational 
instruments they were able to improve regardless of the multilateral environment. At the same 
time, atrocities take place in a permissive political climate. In an increasingly contested world 
order, technical instruments such as prevention, stabilization and development projects through 
Politikforschung zur Sicht der Deutschen auf die Außenpolitik [Get in or Keep out? Results of a representative survey by 
TNS Infratest Policy Research about the View of Germans on Foreign Policy], October 2014, accessed February 20, 
2018, http://www.aussenpolitik-weiter-denken.de/fileadmin/user_upload/allgemein/Koerber-Stiftung_Umfrage_
Aussenpolitik_Broschuere.pdf. 
25 Stephen F. Burgess, “Comments on the Mass Atrocity Prevention Response Operations (MARO) Handbook,” 
Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal 6, no. 1 (2011), 66-69, accessed December 31, 2017, http://
scholarcommons.usf.edu/gsp/vol6/iss1/9; Stian Kjeksrud, Alexander W. Beadle, and Petter H.F. Lindqvist, “Protecting 
Civilians from Violence: A Threat-Based Approach to Protection of Civilians in UN Peace Operations,” (Oslo: FFI and 
NODEFIC, 2016), accessed December 31, 2017, https://www.ffi.no/no/Publikasjoner/Documents/Protecting-Civilians-
from-Violence.pdf. 
26 One of the authors developed more detailed recommendations along these lines in Andreas Heinemann-Grüder and 
Philipp Rotmann’s contribution to the Peace Report 2017. Heinemann-Grüder and Rotmann, Practical Implementation of 
Prevention.
27 Sarah Brockmeier, Oliver Stuenkel, and Marcos Tourinho, “The Impact of the Libya Intervention Debates on Norms of 
Protection,” Global Society 30, no. 1 (2016), 113-133.
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criminal prosecutions, sanctions, mediation, or military force alone will not stop atrocities. In many 
cases, Syria or Burundi being just two of the most obvious current examples, preventing atrocities 
remains foremost a problem of international political order.28
For the UN Security Council to overcome its paralysis on atrocity prevention, the Council 
needs to address the danger of mandate abuse. Germany, which is seeking another two-year non-
permanent seat for 2019 and 2020, could play a pivotal role in building bridges, having abstained 
from the ill-fated mandate for the military intervention in Libya together with the later critics 
Brazil, India, Russia and China. Germany could use the Brazilian proposal for “Responsibility 
while Protecting” (RwP) as a starting point in such an endeavor. Brazil proposed the idea in late 
2011, frustrated with how the Libya intervention had turned into regime change with no checks by 
the UN Security Council. At the time, the initiative fell flat,29 but the substantive proposals continue 
to be worth another serious look. 
RwP focused on two areas that are of continued interest to Germany: the criteria for the use of 
force to protect civilians, and the creation of accountability mechanisms for the use of force. Given 
the controversies surrounding Resolution 1973, it is unlikely that the Security Council will ever 
again pass a resolution to protect civilians with all necessary means without also installing checks 
or regulations that give the council more control over an intervention.30
Conclusion 
Slowly, Germany is making progress on atrocity prevention, but the issue is far from playing a 
key role in Berlin. As our review of Germany’s bureaucratic structures on atrocity prevention has 
shown, German contributions to atrocity prevention—whether diplomatic, financial, conceptual or 
military—will not fill the gap created by the US retreat in this area any time soon. This is equally 
the case for other countries in the European Union and the EU as a whole. Much of the recent 
progress, both on the operational and on the doctrinal levels, is the result of nimble bureaucratic 
entrepreneurship rather than popular political mobilization or effective lobbying by civil society. 
Civil servants, as the name implies, are servants of state and society. More domestic political and 
civil society leadership will be required to realize Germany’s stated commitments to preventing 
genocide and mass atrocities.
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Introduction
If the United Nations always succeeded or never succeeded in preventing atrocity crimes, then 
there would be no point in trying to improve its performance. Instead, its track record has been 
remarkably uneven. Its quiet successes at preventing mass violence have been more than matched 
by horrific and well-publicized failures to prevent (or protect).1 Though it is impossible to measure 
prevention with any degree of certainty, it appears that the world body has, on occasion, made a 
positive difference.2 So, it has potential. But, in too many situations, that potential has not been 
realized. This essay asks why the UN’s preventive efforts have been so inconsistent and how some 
of the shortcomings in its performance might be remedied.
At the outset, this paper makes three assumptions. One, over the years, the United Nations has 
been no worse at preventing mass atrocities than have been regional and sub-regional organizations, 
governments, and/or civil society. Two, when prevention has worked, it has generally been because 
there has been productive collaboration among actors of these various types and levels, so credit 
or blame should be shared. Three, nevertheless, mediocrity on any actor’s part is not an acceptable 
standard when it comes to an issue of public policy with such existential implications for human 
life.  
This essay argues further 1) that the United Nations has a unique combination of assets that 
could be put to much better use in this area, 2) that shortcomings in its performance arise as much 
from conceptual misunderstandings and institutional dysfunction as from capacity deficits, 3) 
that these shortcomings have negative implications for whether and how effectively other critical 
actors respond to the atrocity prevention challenge, and 4) that steps could be taken to improve the 
situation significantly without a huge infusion of scarce resources. These points are addressed in 
the following four sections on potential, shortcomings, implications, and remedies, respectively.
Potential
International efforts to prevent mass atrocity crimes require four core elements: legitimacy, 
authority, capacity, and strategy. Legitimacy is the ability to generate and sustain political support 
on the local, national, and regional, as well as international, levels for the preventive measures being 
undertaken or contemplated and for the purposes being served. Authority, which may buttress 
legitimacy, derives from those legal instruments and institutional decision-making processes that 
confirm that those preventive actions are appropriate to the circumstances and proportional to the 
purposes being pursued. Capacity refers to having and/or mobilizing and being able to employ the 
requisite physical, material, financial, and human resources to carry out the preventive measures 
fully and effectively. Strategy relates to the ability to assess and frame the unfolding situation 
1 For the purposes of this paper, mass atrocity crimes are considered to be those identified under United Nations, General 
Assembly Resolution 60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome, October 24, 2005 (UN Doc. A/RES/60/1), paragraph 138, 
its discussion of the Responsibility to Protect, namely genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against 
humanity. The terms atrocity and mass atrocity are used inter-changeably in this paper.  
2 In his 2015 and 2016 reports on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon noted 
that preventive efforts by the United Nations and its partners had helped to prevent mass atrocity crimes and/
or their escalation in Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, and Timor-Leste. United Nations, Report of the 
Secretary-General, A Vital and Enduring Commitment: Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, July 13, 2015 (UN Doc. 
A/69/981-S/2015/500), para. 8; United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General, Mobilizing Collective Action: The Next 
Decade of the Responsibility to Protect, July 22, 2016 (UN Doc. A/70/999-S/2016/620), paras. 33 and 55. Twelve chapters 
of the 2016 Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect are devoted to situations in which mass atrocity crimes 
occurred or were prevented. See Alex J. Bellamy and Tim Dunne, eds., Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 693-910. Also see Naomi Kikoler, “Guinea: An Overlooked Case of the 
Responsibility to Protect in Practice,” in The Responsibility to Protect: Overcoming the Challenge of Atrocity Prevention, eds. 
Serena K. Sharma and Jennifer M. Welsh (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 304-323. 
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and the players involved both in a timely manner and from an atrocity prevention perspective, 
to develop an effective plan for response to developments on the ground, to build a sustainable 
coalition of actors on all levels willing to pursue the same objectives in a mutually reinforcing 
manner, and to reassess and adjust the strategy as needed in the face of unexpected developments. 
Ultimately, prevention is not completed until steps are taken to discourage a reoccurrence of such 
threats of mass atrocities.
Legitimacy should be one of the United Nations’ prime attributes. The 193-member General 
Assembly, the world’s only virtually universal political body, has endorsed both the Genocide 
Convention and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Though its decisions--other than on internal 
matters—are not legally binding, the Assembly has, from its earliest days been the world’s prime 
incubator of global norms and standards. Since 2009, the Assembly’s annual informal interactive 
dialogues on R2P have shown broad and persistent support from the Member States for the 
preventive dimensions of R2P, even as some delegations continue to express reservations about 
possible coercive measures under the third pillar of the Secretary-General’s implementation 
strategy (as crafted by this author).3 Successive Secretaries-General have produced a series of 
well-received reports on conflict prevention, something which António Guterres has pledged to 
make the centerpiece of his tenure.4 In many cases, moreover, the United Nations is more likely to 
be perceived as a disinterested actor than would neighbors or more distant but powerful states. 
Perceptions of impartiality should bolster claims to legitimacy.   Multilateral measures are generally 
assumed to be more legitimate than unilateral ones, as long as the measures undertaken by the UN 
(or a regional body) are not perceived as being manipulated by a few powerful Member States to 
further narrow national interests.
Authority should be another advantage for the world body. Its Charter gives the United 
Nations ample legal authority for initiating preventive efforts and for building global-regional 
partnerships to do so, as well as historically unprecedented authority for undertaking multilateral 
enforcement action. Prevention is the first purpose mentioned in the Charter and Chapter VI lays 
out a wide range of non-coercive tools for preventing and resolving conflict. Chapter VIII defines 
the modalities for collaboration with regional arrangements in these pursuits, while Chapter VII 
outlines the Security Council’s unsurpassed and historically unique enforcement powers.
Though enforcement is often thought of solely in terms of coercive military action, there are 
a wide range of sanctions—relating to diplomatic, political, financial, and economic measures, as 
well as restrictions on military assistance and arms transfers—that could be employed with greatest 
effect early in a crisis for preventive and/or deterrent purposes, whether targeted on individual, 
group, or national actors. Multilateral sanctions tend to be much more persuasive than unilateral 
ones, so getting Security Council authorization can be an essential step. In the context of atrocity 
prevention, it should be recalled that the Council’s enforcement powers override the constraints on 
intervening in essentially domestic matters noted in Article 2 (7). Though the Charter is silent on 
genocide and mass atrocities, it is replete with multiple references to promoting and encouraging 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. In that regard, the Security Council has the 
authority to make referrals to the Intrnational Criminal Court (ICC), a non-UN body, concerning 
the alleged commission of atrocity crimes. In a number of situations, UN representatives have 
reminded local and national actors of this possibility.
3 In 2009, the General Assembly held both a short informal interactive dialogue and then a formal debate on the Secretary 
General’s report, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, of 12 January 2009, which laid out his three-pillar strategy. 
United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, January 12, 2009 (UN Doc. 
A/63/677). This author was the architect of the strategy and the principal drafter of that report and all other statements 
and reports by the Secretary-General on R2P from 2007 to mid-2012. Each year since 2009, the Secretary-General 
has produced a report on different aspects of R2P to be addressed at informal interactive dialogues of the General 
Assembly.  The reports and summaries of the dialogues can be found on the web sites of the Global Centre on the 
Responsibility to Protect and of the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect.
4 The first major report, by Secretary-General Kofi Annan, was United Nations, Report by the Secretary-General, Prevention 
of Armed Conflict, June 7, 2001 (UN Doc. A/55/985-S/2001/574). More recently, see António Guterres,“Secretary-
General-Designate Remarks to the General Assembly on Taking the Oath of Office” (speech, New York, December 12, 
2016) United Nations.
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It is commonplace to observe that the United Nations’ claims to legitimacy and authority are 
not matched by a reliable capacity to carry out its decisions and to forward its values. There is 
much to this observation. However, this is more a commentary on its capacity for response than 
for prevention, given that a coercive response under Chapter VII requires the mobilization of the 
economic and/or military capacities of the Member States, as well as authorization by the Security 
Council. The organization’s capacities for preventive action under Chapter VI and Article 99 (see 
below)—even if only undertaken by the Secretary-General, the Secretariat, or other parts of the 
UN system—do not necessarily depend on explicit action by the Member States.  These preventive 
capacities are quite varied and broad, if not deep or robust. 
In terms of structural or upstream prevention, the UN system has a presence, whether for 
sustainable development, humanitarian, human rights, peacebuilding, peacekeeping, and/or 
conflict resolution purposes, in most of the countries of potential concern. In terms of operational 
or more immediate preventive measures, when endorsing R2P at the 2005 World Summit, the 
gathered heads of State and government agreed to support the United Nations “in establishing 
an early warning capacity” and to assist States “under stress before crises and conflicts break 
out.”5 Though the Summit authorized the establishment of a Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) 
limited to post-conflict scenarios, it should be recalled that the initial proposal for the Commission, 
introduced by Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 
in late 2004, envisioned it having an R2P-like preventive function as well. The first core function 
for the Commission, according to the High-level Panel, should be “to identify countries which are 
under stress and risk sliding towards State collapse” and “to organize, in partnership with the 
national Government, proactive assistance in preventing that process from developing further.”6 
The substantive parallels to the R2P language on assisting states under stress are striking. Yet the 
fact that the preventive dimension of the PBC was not retained in the Summit articulation of the 
purposes of the PBC is suggestive of the political hurdles that have to be overcome in some cases 
of structural and operational prevention, as well as in crafting effective responses to unfolding 
atrocities.
In terms of operational prevention, under Article 99 of the Charter the Secretary-General “may 
bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the 
maintenance of international peace and security.”7 Since 2009, this clause has increasingly been 
interpreted as including the potential commission of mass atrocity crimes, whether in statements 
to the Council by the Secretary-General, his Special Advisor for the Prevention of Genocide, or the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights.8 The bully pulpit that the Secretary-General and his small 
army of SRSGs (Special Advisers, Special Representatives, and Envoys) share can be critical to 
getting preventive messages to would-be perpetrators, bystanders, vulnerable populations, media, 
civil society leaders, governments, and regional arrangements. These messages have often been 
about discouraging the incitement of atrocity crimes, something which all of the world leaders 
agreed at the 2005 World Summit to prevent (paragraph 138 of the Outcome Document). In this 
author’s experience, pushing back against indications of incitement has proven to be one of the 
most flexible and timely tools in the prevention toolkit.
5 United Nations, 2005 World Summit Outcome, paras. 138 and 139, respectively.
6 United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure 
World: Our Shared Responsibility, 2004 (United Nations Department of Public Information), 83, para. 264.
7 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945 (United Nations), 
article 99. 
8 The inclusion of the four R2P crimes under Article 99 was proposed by this author to the Security Council’s Ad Hoc 
Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa in December 2008. This has since become common 
practice. United Nations Security Council, Letter Dated 30 December 2008 from the Permanent Representative of South 
Africa Addressed to the President of the Security Council, December 31, 2008 (UN Doc. S/2008/836), 13. Also see Simon 
Chesterman, “Relations with the Secretary-General,” in The UN Security Council in the 21st Century, eds. Sebastian von 
Einsiedel, David M. Malone, and Bruno Stagno Ugarte (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2016), 453. In his final report on R2P, 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon noted that “when the situation has required it, I have informed the Security Council 
of atrocity crime risks and urged it to take early and decisive action. My hope is that future Secretaries-General 
will continue to draw on the authority provided to them under the Charter of the United Nations.” United Nations 
Secretary-General, Mobilizing Collective Action, 11, para. 39.
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Strategy, perhaps more than the other core dimensions, is an area under construction. Though 
the General Assembly approved the Genocide Convention almost seventy years ago, the first 
UN plan to prevent genocide was not articulated until 2004 to mark the tenth anniversary of 
the Rwandan genocide (discussed more fully below).9 Since 2009, the Joint Office on Genocide 
Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect has developed an all-encompassing Framework for 
Analysis for the Prevention of Atrocity Crimes and the Secretary-General’s annual reports on 
different aspects of R2P have placed a heavy emphasis on prevention. Though the UN was late to 
framing concepts and strategies for preventing atrocity crimes, so too were governments, regional 
organizations, and academia. In the 1990s, however, the UN was at the forefront of the articulation 
of concerns about human security and human protection that continue to provide an intellectual 
and political context for atrocity prevention.10 This intellectual heritage suggests that the world 
body is in a position to develop a broader and more multilateral framework for preventing and 
responding to mass atrocity crimes beyond the narrower perspectives of some governments, much 
as it did in the case of counter-terrorism following the attacks of 9/11.  
Shortcomings
It would be tempting, but overly sweeping and simplistic, to assert that the primary reason for 
the UN’s underperformance in atrocity prevention has been because of the narrow domestic and 
geopolitical agendas of powerful Member States. This may be the case in places, such as Syria, 
Sudan, or Yemen, where the geopolitical stakes are perceived to be high and the UN’s entreaties 
have fallen on deaf ears. The UN’s preventive efforts may well have had more success in low 
profile cases on the whole than in high profile ones in which there have been more actors of 
significance. Yet the UN has done relatively well in some places, such as Kyrgyzstan and Kenya, 
where the stakes were high geopolitically and relatively poorly in others, such as Sri Lanka and 
Central African Republic, where the international stakes were modest.  
It may well be that the 193 Member States are simultaneously the greatest strength and 
the greatest weakness of the United Nations. Either way, forging their collaboration on matters 
of common concern was a founding purpose of the organization. So it is not enough for the 
Secretariat—or for capitals or civil society-- just to lament the differences among key Member 
States and declare some situations to be too politically sensitive to handle, especially when there 
appears to be an imminent threat of mass atrocity crimes. The inter-governmental bodies provide 
the mandates that the Secretariat has an obligation to implement, but the latter cannot be passive 
bystanders to the political process. Their responsibilities are not limited to narrow interpretations 
of the specific mandates they are assigned by the inter-governmental bodies. 
UN officials are obligated both to act to further the principles and purposes of the Charter 
and, as noted above, to inform the Security Council of possible threats to international peace 
and security under Article 99 of the Charter. The latter entails taking proactive steps to gather 
and assess the information needed to provide the Council and other relevant organs with 
the Secretariat’s informed and considered judgements about situations of concern. As the 
2000 Brahimi peacekeeping report famously commented, in the context of mass atrocity 
prevention, the Secretariat has an obligation to tell the Security Council what it needs to hear, not 
what it wants to hear.11 Too often, the Secretariat engages in pre-emptive self-censorship, trimming 
their analytical sails before even testing the direction and velocity of the political winds. (There 
have also been occasions, of course, when the Secretariat has exaggerated risks and potential 
casualties.)
9 The reasons for this delay are discussed in Edward C. Luck, “Roots of Ambivalence: The United Nations, Genocide, and 
Mass Atrocity Prevention,” in Policies and Practices for Preventing Atrocities, eds. Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff 
(London: Routledge, forthcoming).
10 Tellingly, genocide prevention and mass atrocity prevention—the latter under the rubric of R2P--were among the last 
entries in a long list of human protection concerns adopted by the UN. They were preceded, among other concerns, 
by humanitarian assistance, internal displacement, children and armed conflict, sexual and gender-based violence, 
women, peace, and security, and civilian protection in peacekeeping contexts. See Chapter One of Alex J. Bellamy and 
Edward C. Luck, The Responsibility to Protect: From Promise to Practice (Cambridge, UK: Polity Books, forthcoming).   
11 United Nations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, August 21, 2000 (UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809).
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The long tradition of blaming the Member States for every UN failing has done little to enhance 
understanding of how to improve the organization’s performance, especially in areas, such as 
atrocity prevention, in which the Secretariat could, and often does, play a major operational role. 
The Security Council’s growing willingness to hear from the Secretariat—and, in informal settings, 
from civil society—about potential atrocity crimes has been an important step forward, but much 
more could be done in the future to make this a more regular feature of Secretariat-Member State 
collaboration.12 Little attention, for instance, has been given to the roles the General Assembly, the 
Peacebuilding Commission, and the Human Rights Council could play in forwarding the atrocity 
prevention agenda.   
Though the Assembly, under Article 12 (1) of the Charter, may not make recommendations 
on matters being addressed by the Council, it may discuss or investigate any matter. It has, for 
instance, passed several pointed resolutions on Syria, reflecting broad frustration among the 
Member States about the blockages within the Council on the situation.13 Under the Uniting for 
Peace formula, the Assembly has a long history of authorizing peace operations under Chapter 
VI of the Charter.14 Though such operations would not have an enforcement mandate, they might 
play a useful function as preventive deployments in places where there are real possibilities of 
instability and atrocity crimes. Under Article 11 (3) of the Charter, the Assembly has the equivalent 
of Article 99 authority for referring threats to the Council. As noted earlier, the Assembly has been 
the locus for efforts to refine R2P and to build broader Member State support for it. But it has 
also been the forum for frustrating attempts to gain the human and financial resources needed to 
mount a proper and sustainable effort to prevent atrocity crimes. For instance, a small minority in 
the Assembly’s Fifth Committee has been able—or allowed—to repeatedly block the provision of 
even very modest capacities to implement R2P, despite its endorsement at the highest levels at the 
2005 World Summit. 
As noted above, the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) was originally conceived as an inter-
governmental body that could deal with countries either sliding into or emerging from conflict. It 
was established as a subsidiary advisory body both of the General Assembly and of the Security 
Council.15 Though its pre-conflict function was dropped, it could still have a preventive role in 
helping societies that had suffered sectarian violence from repeating the cycle. This could be a 
significant preventive measure, as it has long been said that the best predictor of genocide is past 
genocide. In its country-specific configuration, the PBC could potentially help draw economic 
and political resources to situations of atrocity concern that have not received much international 
attention. In practice, however, there has been relatively little overlap between the countries on 
which the PBC has focused and those of highest priority from an atrocity prevention viewpoint. 
As a 2015 review of the PBC underscored, for a variety of political and institutional reasons, it has 
not been able to realize its potential for strategic leadership or for bridging the gaps between the 
Security Council and the General Assembly.16
The Geneva-based Human Rights Council came rather late to the R2P debate for both political 
and geographical reasons. However, the Council’s Commissions of Inquiry on the Democratic 
12 Alex J. Bellamy, “UN Security Council,” in Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect, eds. Alex J. Bellamy and Tim 
Dunne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 249-268; Edward C. Luck, “Prospects for Institutional Renovation and 
Reform,” in The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations, 2nd ed., eds. Thomas G. Weiss and Sam Daws (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, forthcoming).
13 The General Assembly, for instance, authorized the creation of a mechanism to investigate the alleged commission of 
atrocity crimes in Syria. United Nations, Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 21 December 2016 (UN Doc. A/
RES/71/248).
14 Dominik Zaum, “The Security Council, the General Assembly, and War: The Uniting for Peace Resolution,” in The 
United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice Since 1945, eds. Vaughan Lowe, et al. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 154-174.
15 United Nations, General Assembly Resolution (UN Doc. A/RES/60/1180); United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1645 
on Post-conflict Peacebuilding, 2005 (UN Doc. 1645).
16 United Nations, Identical Letters Dated 29 June 2015 from the Chair of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the 
Peacebuilding Architecture Addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council, June 
30, 2015 (UN Doc. A/69/968-S/2015/490); United Nations, The Challenge of Sustaining Peace, Report of the Advisory 
Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture, June 30, 2015 (UN Doc. A/69/968-S/2015/490).
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People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and on Syria have both been outspoken about the growing 
evidence of mass atrocity crimes, and the former invoked R2P and called on the international 
community to address the dire human protection situation in the DPRK more vigorously.17 In late 
2016, the Russian Federation failed to be elected by the General Assembly to membership in the 
Human Rights Council, purportedly because of widespread concerns about the commission of 
atrocity crimes in Syria.18 From the passage by the General Assembly of the Genocide Convention 
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights a day apart in 1948, these two agendas have 
followed parallel, not convergent, paths.19 Mutual respect and common purpose have been 
combined with a sense of ambiguity and even ambivalence about the relationship between atrocity 
crimes and human rights.20 In terms of implementation, the relatively large Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights in Geneva and its much smaller cousin addressing genocide 
prevention and R2P in New York have tended to have distinct perspectives on reporting and 
institutional matters, even as they generally have viewed specific situations from similar but not 
congruent perspectives.21 It was this author’s experience that the human rights conditions in a 
country were not always indicative of its proclivity to mass violence. Some chronic human rights 
violators were relatively stable, while some societies that were not among the worst violators, such 
as Kenya and Kyrgyzstan, nevertheless witnessed sudden violence and atrocity crimes. 
The pursuit of human rights is not the only seemingly natural partner for atrocity prevention 
in which the relationship has had dysfunctional elements. In the case of humanitarian affairs, the 
differences have run deeper, based on divergent conceptual and political assumptions that are 
not easily reconciled. R2P, in particular, has not been embraced by many in the humanitarian 
community because of its inclusion of the use of coercive military force as a response option 
in extreme situations. As Hugo Slim has put it, the concerns of humanitarian actors about the 
third pillar of the Secretary-General’s R2P implementation strategy “focus on four issues: the 
politicization of civilian protection; raised expectations that tend to freeze conflicts and postpone 
peace-making; the likely failure of force and the widening of conflict; and the contamination of 
humanitarian agencies by association.”22 
From an atrocity prevention or R2P perspective, the emphasis in humanitarian principles on 
maintaining impartiality and preserving humanitarian space and access may entail prioritizing the 
cultivation of good relations with the very regimes that may be committing or planning to commit 
mass atrocities against their populations. These differences came to a head in the shaping of the 
UN Secretariat’s response—the Security Council largely stayed on the sidelines--to the mounting 
violence targeted at civilians in the concluding phases of the civil war in Sri Lanka in late 2008-early 
2009. It was decided at the upper reaches of the Secretariat that the situation should be framed as a 
humanitarian emergency, with the Emergency Relief Coordinator and the Office for Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) put in charge. R2P and genocide prevention perspectives were 
17 United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea, February 7, 2014 (UN Doc. A/HRC/25/63) and Detailed Findings (UN Doc. A/HRC/25/CRP.1). 
18 It is highly unusual for one of the five permanent members of the Security Council to lose such a vote. Julian Borger, 
“Russia Denied Membership of UN Human Rights Council,” The Guardian, 28 October 2016.
19 It took several decades for human rights to gain a solid foothold in the UN Secretariat, and the first UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights was not appointed until 1993, 45 years after the Universal Declaration. Genocide 
prevention took even longer, not gaining any presence in the Secretariat until 2004, as discussed below.
20 For largely historical reasons, the ten human rights treaty bodies addressed by the Human Rights Council do not 
include the Genocide Convention. United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General, Status of the Human Rights Treaty 
Body System, July 18, 2016 (UN Doc. A/71/118), 2, para. 1. For the negotiating history of the Genocide Convention and 
the singular role of Raphael Lemkin, see James Waller, Confronting Evil: Engaging the Responsibility to Prevent Genocide 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 15-23 and Samantha Power, “A Problem from Hell:” America and the Age of 
Genocide (New York: Harper Collins, 2002), 51-60. For a discussion of the reluctance of the UN founders to embrace 
genocide or atrocity prevention, see Luck, Roots of Ambivalence.
21 The appointment in 2010 of an Assistant Secretary-General to head the High Commissioner’s office in New York has 
enhanced the opportunities for collaboration.
22 Hugo Slim, “Saving Individuals from the Scourge of War: Complementarity and Tension between R2P and 
Humanitarian Action,” in Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect, eds. Alex J. Bellamy and Tim Dunne (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2016), 555.
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not welcome in the deliberations, reports of mounting human rights violations were dismissed, 
and the UN’s voice was muted as the war crimes unfolded.23
The internal review of the organization’s failures in the Sri Lankan crisis was candid about its 
shortcomings and pointed to a number of areas needing improvement. The primary institutional 
response was the enunciation of the Rights Up Front Action Plan by Secretary-General Ban in 
September 2013.24 The Plan had many positive elements, including the development of more 
coherent and streamlined means of collecting and integrating information on serious human 
rights violations into crisis response planning at UN headquarters. From an atrocity prevention 
perspective, however, the results have been more mixed. The differences in perspective between 
the humanitarian and atrocity prevention views of the crisis in Sri Lanka were finessed rather than 
confronted.  
As Andrew Gilmour, at the time a key official in the Office of the Secretary-General and now 
Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights in New York, put it: “those involved in formulating 
the initiative avoided getting into what was seen as an unproductive debate on the distinction 
between the ‘protection of civilians’ and the ‘protection of human rights,’ as Rights up Front is 
committed to both.”25 He goes on to note the common emphasis in Rights Up Front and R2P on 
prevention and to underscore the concerns of some Member States with the possibility of using force 
under an R2P banner.26 Though the use of force was never a desirable or feasible alternative in Sri 
Lanka, the 1999 reports on the UN’s failures to act in a timely and decisive manner in the Rwandan 
genocide and the massacre at Srebrenica highlighted the consequences of the UN’s reluctance to 
take decisive military action when atrocity crimes were unfolding and it was a feasible option.27
The Rights Up Front initiative had significant implications, as well, for decision-making in 
the upper echelons of the Secretariat. A Senior Action Group (SAG) was established, chaired by 
the Deputy Secretary-General, to review a range of ongoing crises and to insure that human rights 
perspectives were taken into account. Though probably a net positive for atrocity prevention, 
SAG added little in those cases in which violence was not necessarily preceded by an escalation 
of human rights abuses. It also helped to ease the demise of the Policy Committee, a high-level 
group that had been chaired by the Secretary-General and that permitted more opportunities 
for his Special Advisers to present the case for addressing particular situations from an atrocity 
prevention perspective. This author’s experience suggests that there are risks in imposing any 
barriers to the direct access of those mandated to prevent atrocity crimes to the Secretary-General 
or in creating distance between the Secretary-General and his/her personal responsibility for acting 
to try to prevent such crimes.28 That, after all, should have been one of the primary lessons from 
Sri Lanka.
23 The report of the Secretary-General’s Internal Review Panel on UN Action in Sri Lanka of November 2012 was never 
published, but it can be found on line (with some sections redacted). Also see Kimberly Nackers, “Framing the 
Responsibility to Protect in the 2009 Sri Lanka Civil War,” Global Responsibility to Protect 7, no. 1 (2015), 81-108; 
Kimberly Nackers, “Sri Lanka,” in Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect, eds. Alex J. Bellamy and Tim Dunne 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 876-894; Damien Kingsbury, “Sri Lanka,” in The Responsibility to Protect: The 
Promise of Stopping Mass Atrocities in Our Time, eds. Jared Genser and Irwin Cotler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012), 298-315; Edward C. Luck and Dana Zaret Luck, “The Individual Responsibility to Protect,” in Reconstructing 
Atrocity Prevention, eds. Sheri P. Rosenberg, Tibi Galis, and Alex Zucker  (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2016), 237-242.
24 The “Rights Up Front” Detailed Action Plan prepared by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, dated March 2014, 
is available online, though it is marked as an internal document. For a highly favorable view, see Gerrit Kurtz, With 
Courage and Coherence: The Human Rights Up Front Initiative of the United Nations, (Berlin: Global Public Policy Institute, 
July 2015).
25 Andrew Gilmour, “The Future of Human Rights: A View from the United Nations,” Ethics & International Affairs, 28, no. 
2 (2014), 240-241.
26 Ibid., 246-247.
27 United Nations, Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, 
December 16, 1999 (UN Doc. S/1999/1257); United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General 
Assembly Resolution 53/35: The Fall of Srebrenica, November 15, 1999 (UN Doc. A/54/549).
28 The author introduced the notion of an Individual Responsibility to Protect (IR2P) into the Secretary-General’s 2009 R2P 
implementation strategy. The concept is explained at greater length in Luck and Luck, The Individual Responsibility to 
Protect.
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Another potential asset—the presence of UN peacekeepers on the ground—has proven to be 
a mixed blessing. The record has been inconsistent. In Rwanda, Srebrenica, Sierra Leone, Darfur, 
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), mass atrocities occurred despite the presence 
of UN forces. A moral hazard can be created when the promise of protection is not matched by 
commensurate action by those institutions and countries with the capacity to offer protection, as 
with the Security Council’s declaration of safe areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina.29 Yet in Mozambique, 
Cambodia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Côte d’Ivoire, and Mali, the blue helmets 
helped to prevent mass atrocities or their reoccurrence. In Kenya (twice), Kyrgyzstan, and Guinea 
(Conakry), preventive efforts prevailed without an international force on the ground. In South 
Sudan, peacekeepers have provided shelter for hundreds of thousands of civilians even as mass 
atrocities escalated elsewhere.  
Given this mottled history, it is not surprising that the United Nations has developed distinct, 
if related, doctrines for the protection of civilians (POC) in a peacekeeping context and for mass 
atrocity prevention and R2P.30 Those in charge of peacekeeping at the UN have tended to be quite 
cautious about R2P for both political and conceptual reasons and about adding atrocity prevention 
tasks to already ambitious mandates for over-stretched peacekeeping operations.31 The United 
Nations, at this point, does not have a well-developed doctrine for the use of force, with or without 
consent, for the explicit purpose of protecting civilians from atrocities or of deterring such crimes.32 
It has relatively few cases from which to draw lessons and these scattered experiences have been 
quite disparate. As Paul Williams puts it, “while it is understandable that the main practitioners of 
POC (UN peacekeepers and the Secretariat) would like this agenda to remain as uncontroversial as 
possible, pretending that these mandates can ignore the four R2P crimes or that they do not arise 
from a similar sentiment as R2P-inspired military intervention is not helpful.  Avoidance is not the 
solution.”33
This conceptual muddle has not been simplified or clarified by the growing recognition that 
non-state armed groups are—and have long been—among the more virulent perpetrators of atrocity 
crimes. In 2008, when this author was Special Adviser, he introduced armed groups, including 
those practicing terrorism, into the UN’s R2P lexicon, which previously had focused entirely on 
governments as the sole perpetrators.34 Now, however, there is a real danger that concerns about 
preventing mass atrocity crimes could be distorted or overwhelmed by the much larger narrative 
and more widely embraced policy agenda on counter-terrorism. It is not entirely reassuring, in that 
regard, that the first time that a Security Council meeting directly addressed R2P was in a counter-
terrorism context or that the Secretary-General’s 2015 report on conflict prevention included a 
29 On moral hazard, see Alan J. Kuperman, “The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from the Balkans,” 
International Studies Quarterly, 52, no. 1 (March 2008), 49-80. On safe areas, see Phil Orchard, “Revisiting Humanitarian 
Safe Areas for Civilian Protection,” Global Governance, 20 (2014), 55-75.
30 Paul D. Williams, “The R2P, Protection of Civilians, and UN Peacekeeping Operations,” in Oxford Handbook of the 
Responsibility to Protect, eds. Alex J. Bellamy and Tim Dunne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 524-544.
31 Jean-Marie Guéhenno, the able Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations from 2000-2008, has asserted 
that talk about possible humanitarian intervention had made it more difficult to obtain consent to a more traditional 
peacekeeping deployment in Darfur and that the use of force in Libya had stiffened Chinese and Russian resistance 
to effective action in Syria. He also argues, unconvincingly from this author’s experience, that those countries 
favoring R2P are less likely to commit forces than those taking a more negative stance in the annual R2P debates in 
the General Assembly. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, The Fog of Peace: A Memoir of International Peacekeeping in the 21st Century 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2015), 186, 286, 310, and 305, respectively.
32 Nevertheless, since the Secretary-General’s first report on R2P in early 2009, the Security Council has authorized 
robust military enforcement measures at least in part for human protection purposes in six situations (all in Africa): 
Côte d’Ivoire (resolutions 1933 (2010), 1962 (2010), 1967 (2011), and 1975 (2011)); Libya (resolution 1973 (2011)); Mali 
(resolution 2100 (2013)); CAR (resolution 2127 (2013)); DRC (resolutions 2098 (2013) and 2147 (2014)); and South 
Sudan (resolutions 2206 (2015) and 2304 (2016)).
33 Williams, The R2P, Protection of Civilians, 539.
34 Edward C. Luck, “From Promise to Practice: Implementing the Responsibility to Protect,” in The Responsibility to Protect, 
eds. Jared Genser and Irwin Cotler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 85-106. On the statist orientation of the 
original conception of R2P, see Luck and Luck, Individual Responsibility.
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section on “Violent Extremism and Atrocity Crimes.”35
The mother of all muddles, however, has been the UN’s conflation of conflict prevention 
and atrocity prevention.36 When Secretary-General Kofi Annan proposed the world body’s first 
post and action plan to prevent genocide in 2004, to mark the tenth anniversary of the Rwandan 
genocide, he apparently had no inter-governmental mandate to do so. Instead, he cited a Security 
Council resolution on conflict prevention, which responded to his report on conflict prevention. 
Neither document addressed the matter of atrocity or genocide prevention, despite the two mea 
culpa reports in 1999 on the organization’s failures in Rwanda and Srebrenica.37 For the UN, the 
temptation to make atrocity prevention a subset of conflict prevention and resolution can be 
overwhelming. The Charter has countless references to preventing and resolving conflicts and, 
as noted above, not one to genocide or mass atrocities. The UN—both its Secretariat and its inter-
governmental organs—is highly sophisticated and experienced in the former and little more than 
a novice in the latter. As they say, when your only tool is a hammer, everything looks like a nail. 
This would apply as much in the UN context to peaceful settlement as it does to the use of force in 
the US government.  
Though it is undoubtedly true that more atrocities occur within armed conflicts than outside of 
them, experience has shown that horrific atrocities have occurred in a number of situations without 
armed conflict. During the period when the author was Special Adviser, these cases included, 
among others, Kenya (twice), Guinea (Conakry), and Kyrgyzstan, as well as the early stages of the 
violence in Libya and Syria. The etiology of mass atrocity crimes may sometimes include armed 
conflict, but that explains neither why atrocity crimes do not occur in all armed conflicts nor why 
they often take place in other circumstances. Prevention, therefore, demands a broader yet more 
dedicated understanding of the origins, course, termination, and possible reoccurrence of atrocity 
crimes. The very process of conflict resolution may tempt one or more parties to resort to the 
commission of atrocities to undermine the potential peace settlement, as may have been the case in 
both Rwanda and Srebrenica.
Conflating conflict prevention and atrocity prevention presents challenges for practice as well 
as for understanding and doctrine. For those engaged in mediation, keeping doors to the parties 
open will generally be perceived as more important than relaying uncomfortable messages about 
possible atrocity crimes. It was this author’s experience that warnings from UN headquarters to 
parties in a conflict about behavior that was troubling from an atrocity prevention perspective 
were sometimes seen by SRSGs in the field and officials of the Department of Political Affairs in 
New York as too pointed or untimely. Governments are never eager to be told that their supporters 
or armed forces are committing atrocities, especially when they are facing armed opposition and 
their grip on power is threatened.  
Sometimes quiet diplomacy, especially by the Secretary-General and/or senior regional 
figures, can make a difference in preventing atrocities, especially when the regime is divided or 
not fully committed to a genocidal project and the message is given relatively early. As noted 
above, the advent of the ICC has added a critical talking point about the decline of impunity 
and possible personal consequences for leaders in such situations, but that message tends to fall 
on deaf ears when the targeted leadership already sees the struggle in existential terms, has the 
backing of a permanent member of the Security Council, or the atrocities are being committed 
by extremist armed groups. From a conflict resolution perspective, however, the invocation of 
35 United Nations Security Council, Arria Formula Meeting on the Responsibility to Protect and Non-State Actors, December 14, 
2015. The statement by this author is available on the web site of the Global Centre on the Responsibility to Protect. 
United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations and Conflict Prevention: A Collective Recommitment, 
September 25, 2015 (UN Doc. S/2015/730), 9, paras., 32-34.
36 Alex J. Bellamy, “Operationalizing the ‘Atrocity Prevention Lens’: Making Prevention a Living Reality,” in Reconstructing 
Atrocity Prevention, eds. Sheri P. Rosenberg, Tibi Galis, and Alex Zucker (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2016), 67-69; Ruben Reike, “Conflict Prevention and R2P,” in Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect, eds. 
Alex J. Bellamy and Tim Dunne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 581-603; Edward C. Luck, “Getting There, 
Being There,” in Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect, eds. Alex J. Bellamy and Tim Dunne (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016), 297-299.
37 Luck, Getting There, Being There, 294-296.
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possible post-conflict ICC referrals may be regarded as a deterrent to a peaceful settlement that 
could leave leaders vulnerable to prosecution. In sum, when conflict prevention and atrocity 
prevention narratives converge, they can be mutually reinforcing, but often quite the opposite has 
been the case.
Implications
As the foregoing discussion underscores, the fact that the United Nations is pursuing so many 
related agendas simultaneously presents both opportunities and challenges for atrocity prevention 
efforts. There is no shortage of symbiotic possibilities, both in the field and at headquarters. But 
it is difficult to pursue so many policy streams at the same time and in the same place, as policy 
coherence tends to be far more difficult to achieve than surface-level coordination. Early warning, 
in this author’s experience, is much less of a problem than assessment and framing. Policy makers 
with different responsibilities are likely to read the same information flows in distinct ways. What 
are the frameworks and patterns within which policy makers understand, sort, and prioritize 
the information before them? Why was Rwanda framed chiefly as a matter of implementing the 
Arusha accords rather than of preventing a massive genocide? Why was it believed that Serbian 
forces would not test the Security Council’s will to enforce the safe areas it had established? Why 
was Sri Lanka regarded as a primarily humanitarian matter? And why were the early responses 
to the growing violence in Syria couched as a question of regime change rather than as a question 
of changing regime behavior and addressing the longer-term risks of mass atrocities, including 
against the ruling largely Alawite minority? Can atrocity prevention perspectives, given their 
chronically weak institutional positions, even get a voice at the key decision-making tables?
In this regard, the question of mainstreaming R2P and genocide prevention concerns presents 
risks as well as opportunities. In his final report on R2P, Secretary-General Ban was anything but 
ambivalent. The United Nations,” he asserted, “must redouble its own efforts to mainstream the 
responsibility to protect. Faced with mounting challenges on multiple fronts, business as usual 
will not be sufficient.”38 The common theme from the multiple reviews of related UN work in 
2015-2016, he underscored, was prevention. Fair enough, but the price of gaining the benefits of 
wider institutional visibility and greater conceptual coherence cannot be that atrocity prevention 
becomes just part of the bureaucratic checklist of other, more robust, institutional mandates.  In the 
process of mainstreaming, it is essential that the singular perspective of atrocity prevention not be 
lost. The goal must not be the typical bureaucratic blending of messages—for which the UN is well 
known--but to maintain a distinctive and sometimes obnoxious voice for the prevention of mass 
atrocities. It has been—and will continue to be—hard to have it both ways. 
Finding a distinct voice can be particularly difficult at the stage of structural prevention, 
when states under stress are not yet at a crisis point. As this author commented in 2001, in the 
context of conflict prevention, structural prevention strategies can confront a “dilemma of 
comprehensiveness” in which so many factors are perceived as potentially relevant that there is no 
basis for coherent priority setting or policy making.39 If everything is critical, then nothing is.  More 
recently, the UN’s joint office on genocide prevention and R2P developed a Framework of Analysis 
for Atrocity Crimes that is being employed with increasing frequency around the UN system.40 As 
a checklist, it has some merit. But, with 14 risk factors and 143 indicators, the Framework does not 
provide a clear basis for determining the relative weight of the various factors and indicators. Most 
importantly, it lacks a dynamic dimension and a sense of which of these elements matter the most 
in which situations. For those decision makers charged with making quick and critical decisions 
in situations of acute concern, an over-reliance on such generic lists or templates could lead to the 
overlooking of those characteristics that make each situation unique.  
38 United Nations Secretary-General, Mobilizing Collective Action, 17, para. 60.
39 Edward C. Luck, “Prevention: Theory and Practice,” in From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN 
System, eds. Fen Osler Hampson and David Malone (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2001), 256. Bellamy, Operationalizing the 
‘Atrocity Prevention’ Lens, 65-66.
40 United Nations Secretary-General, Mobilizing Collective Action, 12, para. 41.
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For these reasons, it is understandable that policy makers tend to put a premium on operational 
over structural prevention. Early engagement with societies under stress can be helpful for 
developing familiarity with the local dynamics and for gaining a modicum of mutual trust. Being 
engaged, however, is not the same thing as making a difference when push comes to shove. Mass 
atrocities are not spontaneous events. They require some degree of planning and mobilization, 
flowing from a series of destructive choices over time. The United Nations, regional arrangements, 
neighbors, influential governments, and civil society need to recognize opportunities to interrupt 
and disrupt such a chain of decisions and actions before they become irreversible. Some regimes 
and armed groups, of course, are determined to take such a course and cannot be dissuaded. 
Others, however, are reachable and perhaps persuadable through some combination of reason, 
carrots, and credible sticks. Local partners can be invaluable, particularly from civil society, media, 
clergy, the private sector, and parliaments. Where no such partners can be engaged because of 
the authoritarian or totalitarian nature of the political and security systems, as in Syria or the 
DPRK, respectively, then external actors have much less to work with and less chance of making 
a difference.
In all of this, getting the framing right is essential. That is why this author based the Secretary-
General’s R2P implementation strategy on the premise of “early and flexible response tailored to 
the specific needs of each situation.”41 That is also why efforts to smooth out R2P’s rough edges 
so that it can blend better with other UN mandates pose the risk of missing the most valuable 
and distinctive elements of atrocity prevention work. This was not meant to be a comfortable, 
inoffensive quest. Crafting the most productive conceptual and working relationships between 
atrocity prevention and its conflict prevention, peacekeeping, human rights, and humanitarian 
cousins may take some time. As even Goldilocks discovered, it takes patience to find the right fit. 
But the effort is worth it.
How these conceptual, doctrinal, and institutional matters are resolved will matter far beyond 
the confines of the world body. As discussed earlier, the UN’s unmatched political legitimacy and 
legal authority mean that what it does and does not do, where it does or does not speak out, matter 
much more than its deficits in material capacities would suggest. It is not a marginal player when it 
comes to atrocity prevention, in operational as well as normative terms, because of its catalytic role 
in encouraging regional and sub-regional bodies, governments, and civil society to step up when 
atrocities are threatened and societies are under stress. Each time the UN fails to utilize its voice or 
to try to make a difference, it feeds cynicism about the prospects for preventing mass atrocities and 
makes such crimes appear to be normal, if not acceptable. The world body, in that regard, has an 
enduring obligation to keep hope alive.   
When costs and risks are high, the UN may have trouble rousing others to action, especially 
when its own Security Council is divided. But it has a responsibility to try to make a difference. 
Time has shown that the absence of its voice can be deafening when it decides to look the other 
way, as in Cambodia, Rwanda, and Sri Lanka. Each of its absences from the struggle for prevention, 
just as its operational shortcomings, tends to undermine both its moral authority/legitimacy and 
the strength of the norms, purposes, and principles for which it stands. In atrocity prevention, 
people and governments expect the UN to demonstrate moral and political leadership. And they 
notice when it fails to do so.
Remedies
Any honest enumeration of lessons learned about how to do atrocity prevention better is bound to 
be both short and speculative. The base of experience is recent and scattered. Trying to prevent mass 
atrocities is a recent endeavor, whether by governments, international institutions, or civil society. 
The United Nations did not even begin to articulate a strategy—and that just to prevent genocide—
until 2004.  Not surprisingly, the learning curve has proven to be quite steep. No one who has tried 
to curb atrocities could ever claim it to be an easy or assured task.  We are still learning how to do it. 
It is essential to retain a profound sense of modesty about what has been accomplished and about 
41 United Nations, Secretary-General Defends, Clarifies ‘Responsibility to Protect’ at Berlin Event on ‘Responsible Sovereignty: 
International Cooperation for A Changed World,” July 15, 2008 (UN Doc. SG/SM/11701).  
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what future prospects look like. Vulnerable populations should not expect the United Nations to 
be anything close to a miracle worker, as it has at best proven to be a sometimes partner and/or 
catalyst to prevention and, less often, to protection.  
R2P, in this author’s view, offered two essential elements, both of which remain works in 
progress. One was to underscore that the prevention of atrocity crimes imposes both individual 
and collective responsibilities. Neither side of this equation will get far without the other. Notions 
of collective responsibility bring collective action problems. As the UN illustrates all too well, in 
this and most other areas, collective undertakings offer myriad opportunities for passing the buck. 
Nevertheless, as noted at the outset, there is reason to believe that the unique political legitimacy 
and legal authority offered by the United Nations and other inter-governmental bodies outweigh 
the collective action dilemmas that multilateral approaches to problem-solving entail. Only 
occasionally do other, more unilateral, avenues offer feasible and sustainable alternatives. The 
collective action dilemmas associated with genocide prevention and R2P at the world body led this 
author to emphasize the need for a parallel assumption of an individual responsibility to protect.42 
As discussed above, the Secretariat can, and often has, acted without specific mandates from the 
Security Council or other inter-governmental organs. Obviously, the best chance of making a 
difference is when both individual and collective responsibilities are triggered at the UN and it has 
willing partners at the regional, national, and local levels.
The second essential element offered by R2P was the possibility of drawing much broader 
public, political, and media interest to prevention and protection issues. The fact that the assembled 
heads of state and government at the 2005 World Summit endorsed R2P at a time when they could 
not agree on many other matters was, in and of itself, quite remarkable. The Secretary-General’s 
2009 implementation report generated the longest debate on any question in the General Assembly 
that year, and there have been reports and Assembly debates (informal interactive dialogues) every 
year since. The Security Council has referred to R2P in 62  resolutions as of June 2017, with the 
frequency actually accelerating since the controversies over the use of force in Libya in 2011.43 The 
academic and policy literature on R2P seems endless.  
Much of the commentary has, naturally, been critical, but the essential point is that the advent 
of R2P has undoubtedly spurred far more attention and analysis to the question of how to prevent 
atrocity crimes and protect populations than had been achieved over the more than a half century 
between the agreement on the Genocide Convention in 1948 and the ICISS report introducing 
R2P in 2001. Whether that momentum is sustainable, however, remains an open question. The 
progress with parliamentarians has been decidedly uneven and sporadic, and the discouraging 
developments in Syria, Yemen, and South Sudan appear to have had a dampening effect. As of 
spring 2017, 59  governments had appointed R2P focal points, but there is little uniformity in their 
backgrounds or assignments.44 It may be that too much of the action has been at the UN in New 
York and too little in national capitals.
Atrocity prevention and R2P continue to be much more political than technical or institutional 
challenges, though progress on the latter could affect political calculations about what is possible 
and what the associated costs and risks of engagement are likely to be. Among the steps that could 
be helpful at this point would be:
• Assigning a higher priority to identifying, discouraging, and disrupting incitement.
• Developing global, regional, and national doctrine and capacities for preventive 
deployments of peacekeepers and monitors in countries under stress, such as was done in 
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Burundi.
• Revisiting the initial conception of the PBC as an inter-governmental body concerned with 
situations under stress and sliding towards conflict and possible atrocities as well as those 
42 Luck and Luck, The Individual Responsibility to Protect.
43 This number is drawn from the web site of the Global Centre for R2P, which maintains a running list of the relevant 
resolution texts. The Centre counts R2P references in 17 statements—PRSTs—by the President of the Council as well. 
The International Coalition for R2P also tracks the Council references on its web site.
44 For updates, see the web site of the Global Centre for R2P, which acts as the secretariat for the focal points network.
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emerging from conflict.
• Reviving the convening function given to the Special Advisers for Genocide Prevention 
and for R2P in the Secretary-General’s 2010 report on early warning and assessment.45
• Initiating joint UN/African Union and UN/European Union assessments of lessons learned 
from past efforts to prevent mass atrocities and of ways to enhance their collaboration 
in operational prevention efforts in the future, including responding to incitement and 
undertaking preventive deployments individually or jointly.
• Preparing a report by Secretary-General Guterres on how atrocity prevention fits 
thematically, operationally, and institutionally into his announced intention to prioritize 
prevention strategies in the work of the United Nations.
None of these or similar steps could make much difference, however, without a more far-reaching 
reassessment of the UN’s institutional culture when it comes to preventing atrocities and protecting 
populations. Despite three wrenching mea culpa reports on Rwanda, Srebrenica, and Sri Lanka, 
there remains a deep-seated resistance in the Secretariat and among the Member States to absorbing 
the hard lessons of those fundamental failures. There have been two entrenched assumptions: one, 
that the UN’s natural and proper stance towards parties should be one of impartiality and two, that 
the use of force should always be a last resort. Neither assumption, in this author’s view, conforms 
with the provisions or spirit of the Charter. Each has its place, but should not be applied uniformly, 
especially when the risk of mass atrocities appears high and imminent.
The 2015 report of the Secretary-General on conflict prevention properly heralds the value 
of impartiality for providing “access to a diverse number of stakeholders with whom we can 
build trust and engage.”46 But it goes too far in asserting that the UN’s unique role stems from 
“impartiality and the legitimacy derived from the principles of the Charter.”47 In fact, the Charter 
never uses the term “impartiality” or anything similar, as this is an attribute for conflict resolution, 
not a founding principle of the organization. There are times when the UN should be impartial 
and others when it needs to take sides.  To avoid the League of Nations’ debilitating shortage 
of will and capacity, the founders of the UN did their best to prepare it to organize resistance 
to aggression. In his report on The Fall of Srebrenica, Secretary-General Annan criticized the “the 
general tendency to assume that the parties were equally responsible for the transgressions that 
occurred,” which led to negotiations with those planning and executing atrocities that “amounted 
to appeasement.”48 He faulted the “institutional ideology of impartiality even when confronted 
with attempted genocide.”49 And he concluded that “the men who have been charged with this 
crime against humanity reminded the world and, in particular, the United Nations, that evil exists 
in the world. They taught us also that the United Nations global commitment to ending conflict 
does not preclude moral judgements, but makes them necessary.”50
The founders would also be surprised to learn that it has become customary at the UN to 
assert that the use of force should always be a last resort. That is far from what they had in mind 
in crafting the Charter. In preparing the Secretary-General’s 2009 strategy for implementing R2P, 
this author used the phrase “measure of last resort” instead. This was meant to convey the notion 
that force was not a preferred tool, given its costs, risks, and consequences, but that it should not be 
relegated to consideration as a final, desperate, alternative when all else has failed.  The stance of 
some Member States and members of the Secretariat that force should be regarded as a last resort 
in a sequential or chronological manner runs counter to the goal of protecting populations and 
to Secretary-General Ban’s early and flexible response strategy. Regarding the latter, Secretary-
General Annan’s report took his predecessor to task for speaking “against a ‘culture of death’” 
45 United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General (as drafted by this author), Early Warning, Assessment and the 
Responsibility to Protect, July 14, 2010 (UN Doc. A/64/864), 7, para. 18.
46 United Nations, United Nations and Conflict Prevention, 4, para. 12.
47 Ibid.
48 United Nations, Fall of Srebrenica, 107, paras. 496 and 500.
49 Ibid., 108, para. 505.
50 Ibid., 108, para. 506.
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and for “arguing that peace should be pursued only through non-military methods.”51 He 
acknowledged that “errors of judgement were made—errors rooted in a philosophy of impartiality 
and non-violence wholly unsuited to the conflict in Bosnia.”52 And he pointed to “the pervasive 
ambivalence within the United Nations regarding the role of force in the pursuit of peace.”53  
More than two decades after these horrific failures to protect, the debate over R2P illustrates 
how deeply these inhibitions continue to affect the effort to articulate and implement an effective 
UN strategy for curbing mass atrocities. For instance, Brazil’s ‘responsibility while protecting’ 
(RWP) proposal, whatever its other merits, would have imposed both a sequenced approach 
to R2P implementation and a series of standards for Security Council authorization for the use 
of force in stopping atrocities that do not exist for the Council’s employment of force for other 
purposes.54 That approach certainly would not have been among the lessons drawn from Rwanda 
and Srebrenica.
Given these multiple obstacles, some imposed and others self-generated, it is striking that the 
United Nations has had any success at all in helping to prevent mass atrocities. It has undoubtedly 
underperformed, but its assets, particularly in terms of legitimacy and authority, are both real and 
sustainable. There are unrealized capacities on the Secretariat side and the Member States could do 
much more if they had greater confidence that their investments in the world body would pay off 
and if they generally placed a higher priority on preventing atrocities and protecting populations. If 
there is good news about unrealized potential, it is that there are substantial opportunities waiting 
to be pursued. At every level—individual, local, national, regional, and global—curbing atrocities 
is a relatively new enterprise that could take decades to nurture and develop. Possible synergies 
abound. It is time to stop pointing fingers, to start taking responsibility, and to get to work on 
building the kind of partnerships that could make a real difference over time.  
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Introduction1
In September 2013, Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon adopted the Human Rights Up Front (HRUF) 
initiative and communicated his decision in a letter to staff in November. He recommitted, on behalf 
of the UN senior leadership and all staff, to uphold the responsibilities the Charter assigned them 
whenever there is a threat of serious and large-scale violations of international human rights and 
humanitarian law.2 His successor, Secretary-General Antonio Gutierrez, appears determined to 
continue the initiative, with regard to the explicit reference in his vision statement3 and congratulating 
his predecessor in general terms on HRUF in his remarks on taking the oath of office.4
Given the confidentiality that surrounds the initiative arising from fear of adverse Member 
States’ reaction, it remains difficult to identify all of its elements and assess its current status of 
implementation. However, based on publicly available UN documents, recent academic writing5 
and public statements by UN officials, it is possible to attempt a preliminary evaluation of the 
impact of the HRUF initiative and its potential contribution to the prevention of genocide and 
other mass atrocity crimes.6 
Context
Past UN Action in Situations of Mass Atrocities
According to Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson (DSG), the HRUF initiative is closely related 
to the recommendations, which derived from past reports reviewing UN action in situations of 
serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law, particularly the 1994 Rwandan Genocide.7 
Secretary-General Ban made an explicit reference to the initiative in his remarks at the occasion of 
the 20th anniversary of the genocide in Kigali in 2014. Thus, as a starting point for evaluating the 
possible impact of the HRUF initiative on the prevention of and response to, mass atrocity crimes, 
the main findings and recommendations of relevant reports will be reviewed.
1 The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations.
2 Ban Ki-moon, “Renewing Our Commitment to the Peoples and Purposes of the United Nations” (speech, New York, 
November 22, 2013), accessed December 30, 2017, https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2013-11-22/
renewing-our-commitment-peoples-and-purposes-united-nations-scroll.
3 António Guterrez, Challenges and Opportunities for the United Nations, (remarks, New York, April 4, 2016), accessed 
December 30, 2017, http://www.un.org/pga/70/wp-content/uploads/sites/10/2016/01/4-April_Secretary-General-
Election-Vision-Statement_Portugal-4-April-20161.pdf#page=4. 
4 António Guterres, “Secretary-General-Designate Remarks to the General Assembly on Taking the Oath of Office” 
(speech, New York, December 12, 2016), accessed December 30, 2017, https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/
speeches/2016-12-12/secretary-general-designate-ant%C3%B3nio-guterres-oath-office-speech.
5 Andrew Gilmour, “The Future of Human Rights: A View from the United Nations,” Ethics & International Affairs, 28, 
no. 2 (2014), 239–250; Gerrit Kurtz, With Courage and Coherence. The Human Rights Up Front Initiative of the United 
Nations, (Berlin: Global Public Policy Institute, July 2015); Kristen Boon, “Assessing the UN’s new ‘Rights Up Front’ 
Action Plan,” Opinio Juris, February 27, 2014, accessed December 30, 2017,  http://opiniojuris.org/2014/02/27/assessing-
uns-new-rights-front-action-plan/; Jan Eliasson, “The United Nations’ Human Rights Up Front Initiative,” ACUNS 
Quarterly Newsletter 1 (2015), 3-4, 9.
6 “Mass atrocity crimes” are understood as serious violations as described in para. 138 of the World Summit Outcome 
Document. United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome, October 24, 2005 (UN Doc. 
A/RES/60/1). The objective to prevent exceptional grave crimes addressed by the R2P has also a moral and value-
based dimension, which cannot be described in exact legal terms. Mass atrocities crimes encompass the main elements 
of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, see David Scheffer, “Genocide and Atrocity Crimes,” Genocide 
Studies and Prevention: An International Journal, 1, no. 3 (2006), 229-250. 
7 Jan Eliasson, Letter to Special and Personal Representatives, Envoys, Advisers and Coordinators of the Secretary-General, 
Heads of Mission, May 7, 2014, accessed December 30, 2017, https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/system/
files/documents/files/013_fact_sheet_-_rights_up_frontin_the_field_draft_2014-08-21_2.pdf. See the link for other 
documents quoted in this document.
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Secretary-General Annan established the Rwanda Commission of Inquiry in March 1999 and 
he presented its report to the Security Council in December of that year.8 The Commission found 
that the failure of the United Nations to prevent and, subsequently, to stop the genocide in Rwanda 
was a failure of the UN system as a whole. The Commission sought to contribute to preventing 
similar tragedies in the future. The overriding failure the Commission established was a lack of 
both resources and will to take on the commitment necessary to stop or prevent the genocide. The 
sequence of events the Commission established in the interaction between the Secretariat, the 
Security Council and a peacekeeping operation on the ground has been similar in other emergency 
situations. The Commission looked at the actions of the United Nations Assistance Mission for 
Rwanda (UNAMIR) rather than any other UN actor present in Rwanda. The Commission found, in 
particular, inadequate peacekeeping resources and logistics, a lack of analytical capacity, a failure 
to protect political leaders and civilians and a flawed information flow as the main reasons for the 
UN’s “collective failure.”
Secretary-General Annan also submitted a report on the fall of Srebrenica in 1999, pursuant to 
General Assembly resolution 53/35.9 That report aimed at drawing lessons for the Secretariat and 
Member States from the UN’s response to the collapse of the former Yugoslavia, particularly its 
safe-area policy. While the report also reviewed humanitarian activities, it concentrated mainly on 
the functioning of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and the role of the Security 
Council. Similar to the Rwanda report, it noted the UN’s difficulty securing sufficient numbers of 
troops to protect the safe areas and the peacekeeping operation’s inadequate capacity, especially 
the reluctance of Member States to use air power to support the operation. It also deplored the 
lack of exchange of intelligence information with Member States, which was needed to arrive at a 
shared analysis of the situation.  
The Kosovo Commission of Inquiry was an independent initiative led by Göran Person, 
then Prime Minister of Sweden. Its members were appointed in their personal capacity. The final 
report was handed over to Secretary-General Annan for further consideration.10 The Commission 
recommended closing the gap between legality and legitimacy and, with a view to the NATO 
intervention, called for a principled framework to guide future interventions. The Commission 
also recommended an increase in peacekeeping capacities to protect civilians on the ground. The 
Commission’s analysis went beyond the limited scope of the Rwanda Commission to include the 
role of humanitarian workers, NGOs and the media. In this regard the Commission noted a lack 
of coordination of mainly donor driven humanitarian action, institutional rivalries within the UN 
and a lack of sufficient high-level UN staff to address the diplomatic challenges. The media were 
not supporting the humanitarian interests, but reported on the details of violence. The Commission 
did not look at the role of other UN actors on the ground, such as development agencies.  
In order to respond more systematically and coherently to the recommendations regarding 
peacekeeping operations, the UN Secretariat initiated several broad reviews of UN doctrine and 
the functioning of its missions. 
In May 2000, Secretary-General Annan appointed a Panel to undertake a thorough review of the 
UN peace and security activities, and to present specific, concrete and practical recommendations. 
The Panel presented its report to the Security Council in November of that year.11 The report argued 
that the UN’s impartiality was based on the Charter, which includes a number of values and historic 
experience. Equal treatment of all parties irrespective of their roles as perpetrators or victims had 
damaged the UN’s credibility in the past. The report concluded that, following the experience in 
Rwanda and Srebrenica, UN troops and police who witness violence against civilians should be 
presumed to be authorized to stop it within their means, in support of basic UN principles. Any 
8 United Nations, Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, 
December 16, 1999 (UN Doc. S/1999/1257). 
9 United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/35: The Fall of  Srebrenica, 
November 15, 1999 (UN Doc. A/54/549).  
10 Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
11 United Nations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, August 21, 2000 (UN Doc. A/55/305 – S/2000/809). 
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UN peace operation must be able to pose a credible deterrent to potential spoilers and UN military 
units must be capable of defending themselves, other mission components, and the mission’s 
mandate. The report found that in most situations of large-scale violence, the Secretariat was likely 
to face the challenge of persuading Member States and the international community to step up 
their efforts. In this regard, pessimism about the lack of political will and strongly held perceptions 
about the interests of Security Council members were prevalent within the Secretariat and often 
lead to hesitation and self-censorship. The report recommended the creation of an Information 
and Strategic Analysis Secretariat to facilitate closer cooperation among the key departments and a 
more strategic UN approach to conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding.
Secretary-General Ban appointed a High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations 
in October 2014 to review the current state of UN peace operations. In its report, the Panel 
recommended shifting the UN’s focus and, giving primacy to politics, tailoring all missions to 
context, stronger partnerships with regional organizations, a stronger focus on enabling field 
missions, and a renewed resolve to serve and protect the people.12
The Impact of the Review of UN Action at the End of the Conflict in Sri Lanka
The HRUF initiative explicitly encompasses a series of steps foreseen by the 2012 Review Panel 
report on United Nations action in Sri Lanka13 to ensure that the lessons of that experience are fully 
learned and acted upon. 
The Secretary-General’s internal review panel on Sri Lanka was created in 2010 following the 
recommendation of the Panel of Experts on Sri Lanka the previous year, which had suggested that 
the UN review its own action during the end phase of the conflict between the government and 
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The internal review panel was requested to look in 
particular into implementation of the UN’s humanitarian and protection mandates and to make 
recommendations to strengthen UN country teams (UNCTs) and the UN as a whole to respond to 
‘escalated conflict’. The UN had been present in Sri Lanka throughout the conflict, which began in 
the 1970s, and worked on the basis of a joint United Nations Development Assistance Framework 
(UNDAF) and a Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP) and within established coordination 
and reporting structures with headquarters in a non-mission setting. 
The Panel reviewed rather comprehensively the history of the Secretariat’s internal decision 
making history, between agencies at headquarters and in the field, and the discussions within 
various governmental bodies such as the Security Council, the Human Rights Council and the 
General Assembly. Rather than analyzing the role of Member States, the Panel made an important 
contribution by identifying lacunae in the joint analysis and planning capacities at UN headquarters 
and in the field during crisis, the lack of a common sense of purpose between the different 
agencies, funds, and entities serving under the same UN flag, and the lack of an UNDAF analysis 
of government related root causes for conflict and crisis mainly due to institutional competition 
and narrow approaches to mandate implementation. 
The recommendations built explicitly on the Rwanda report and, not surprisingly, stressed 
the importance of its findings for non-mission settings. However, the report was the first review 
of UN action in a non-mission context during a situation of unfolding mass atrocity crimes. The 
vast majority of UN presences are organized in a similar operational setting and, thus, the main 
responsibility for the internal organization of their cooperation rests with the UNCT rather than 
Member States.14   
12 United Nations, High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, Uniting Our Strengths for Peace 
– Politics, Partnerships, and People, June 1, 2015, accessed December 30, 2017,  http://peaceoperationsreview.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/08/HIPPO_Report_1_June_2015.pdf.
13 United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General’s Internal Review Panel on United Nations in Sri Lanka, November 2012, 
accessed December 30, 2017,  http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Sri_Lanka/The_Internal_Review_Panel_report_on_
Sri_Lanka.pdf.
14 UNCTs exist in 131 countries, covering all 161 UN programming countries, compared to 16 peacekeeping operations 
and 26 special political missions.
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Following the report of the panel, the Secretary-General tasked the UN system to develop an 
action plan to ensure that the necessary lessons were drawn and that the UN was better positioned 
to deal with protection challenges during conflict. The HRUF policy is the direct result of these 
efforts.
The Human Rights Up Front Initiative 
Objectives
The HRUF initiative is essentially an internal UN Action Plan, based on the findings of the Sri 
Lanka report and building on recommendations emanating from previous reports on UN action in 
situations of serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law that amount 
to mass atrocity crimes. The objectives of the initiative are to introduce a cultural change within 
the UN, an operational change to bring the three pillars of the UN Charter, i.e. development, peace 
and security, and human rights closer together, and a change to UN engagement with Member 
States.15 These objectives are sought to be reached by undertaking a list of activities outlined in the 
Action Plan.
HRUF is primarily a prevention tool and aims at strengthening the link between early-warning 
and early-action. It includes procedures to more systematically review the unique information and 
analysis available from UN field presences, covering almost every country in the world. It is based 
on a general recognition that human rights violations are early indicators of a deteriorating situation 
and that field presences can observe changing events and discuss them with their counterparts on 
the ground. The initiative includes mechanisms for responding to crisis, but seeks to avoid the 
creation of new heavy structures and to remain cost neutral, in an attempt to remain below the 
level requiring Member States’ budget approval.16 
Different from past initiatives, HRUF seeks to ensure that the UN leverages the full breadth 
of its existing development, peace and security, and human rights mandates to protect people at 
risk, based on a collective and individual recommitment of its staff to their responsibilities under 
the Charter. The individual responsibility of staff members is put into the wider dictum that there 
can not be peace without development, no development without peace, and there can be neither 
without human rights.17 
Implementation
With a view to the limited implementation rate of recommendations contained in past panel 
reports, the most senior UN officials, namely Secretary-General Ban and the DSG, promoted and 
supported implementation of the initiative through heavy personal engagement.
As can be gathered from the documents available,18 implementation measures of the HRUF 
initiative since March 2014 has been considerable and has included measures to clarify the UN 
vision and responsibility for preventing and responding to serious violations of international 
human rights and humanitarian law, UN engagement with Member States, UN action at country 
level, and UN headquarters coordination, in an effort to anchor HRUF permanently in the UN.
Secretary-General Ban shared the renewed commitment to the peoples and purposes of the 
UN with Member States on different occasions. In December 2013, the DSG delivered remarks at 
a briefing of the General Assembly on HRUF19 and sought the views of Member States in Geneva 
15 United Nations, Human Rights Up Front: A Summary For Staff, accessed December 30, 2017, http://www.un.org/News/dh/
pdf/english/2016/Human-Rights-up-Front.pdf.
16 Bertrand G. Ramcharan, “Early-Warning at the United Nations: The First Experiment,” International Journal of Refugee 
Law, 1 (1989), 379, et seq. on the unsuccessful previous attempt to create UN early-warning and early-action 
mechanisms. 
17 Jan Eliasson and Helen Clark, Joint letter to Resident Coordinators, February 24, 2014. 
18 United Nations, “Human Rights Up Front. An Overview,” accessed December 30, 2017,  
https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/overview_of_human_rights_up_front_july_2015.pdf. This 
includes a link to the detailed Action Plan.
19 United Nations, “Deputy Secretary-General’s Remarks at Briefing of the General Assembly on Rights Up Front” 
(remarks, New York, December 17, 2013), accessed December 30, 2017,  https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/dsg/
statement/2013-12-17/deputy-secretary-generals-remarks-briefing-general-assembly-rights.
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in July 2014. The DSG updated Member States on the progress that had been made in his remarks 
during a panel discussion in commemoration of Human Rights Day 2015.20 In January 2016, he held 
an interactive dialogue with the General Assembly on HRUF.21 For the purposes of that briefing, 
the Secretary-General previously had summarized his interaction with Member States on HRUF in 
a letter to the President of the General Assembly.22
The DSG’s letter to Special Representatives and Envoys23 and the joint letter with the chair of the 
United Nations Development Group24 (UNDG)25 reflected the endorsement of the commitment by 
the different UN entities, defined their respective roles and responsibilities, and encouraged them 
to discuss the Action Plan with their senior staff. Resident Coordinators (RCs) were encouraged to 
undertake discussions with their country teams and share their suggestions. The joint letter with 
the chair of UNDG was also an attempt to reach out directly to local heads of agencies, funds and 
programmes, which are only under a limited supervision by the Secretary-General.
The commitment was also embedded in human resources management processes through 
including effective advocacy of human rights and other UN values, standards, principles and 
activities in the RC job description.26 Reportedly, 13,000 staff from across various UN entities 
attended a newly developed mandatory online training on human rights responsibilities.27 Senior 
UN staff is held accountable for fulfilling their responsibilities regarding the prevention of and 
response to, serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law through a 
revised performance appraisal system for UNCTs and RCs, which includes an annual evaluation 
with more systematic participation of the UN Office of the High Commission for Human Rights 
(OHCHR) and the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA) with regard to the evaluation of the 
human rights and political aspects of the revised RC job description.
The Secretariat engaged pro-actively with Member States in the Security Council on situations 
of serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. The Council’s Informal 
Expert Group on Protection of Civilians continued to meet regularly and was briefed on key 
protection concerns in country-specific situations, actions taken to address these concerns and 
suggestions for possible language to be incorporated in Security Council resolutions. Since the 
adoption of the HRUF initiative, the expert group has convened several times regarding the 
situations in Afghanistan, the Central African Republic (CAR), Darfur, the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC), Iraq, Mali, and Somalia.28 The DPA used a new informal meeting format, the 
“DPA briefing”, which has been considered by some a successor to the “horizon scanning” started 
in 2010.29 The use of the agenda items “any other business” has increased since the adoption of 
20 United Nations, ”Deputy Secretary-General’s Remarks at Panel Discussion in Commemoration of Human Rights 
Day” (remarks, New York, December 9, 2015), accessed December 30, 2017, https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/dsg/
statement/2015-12-09/deputy-secretary-generals-remarks-panel-discussion-commemoration. 
21 United Nations, “Deputy Secretary-General’s Remarks at Interactive Dialogue with the General Assembly on Human 
Rights Up Front” (remarks, New York, January 27, 2016), accessed December 30, 2017, https://www.un.org/sg/en/
content/dsg/statement/2016-01-27/deputy-secretary-generals-remarks-interactive-dialogue-general.
22 United Nations, Letter dated 24 December 2015 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the General Assembly, 
January 6, 2016 (UN Doc. A/70/656).
23 Eliasson, Letter to Special and Personal Representatives.
24 Eliasson and Clark, Joint letter to Resident Coordinators.
25 The United Nations Development Group (UNDG) unites the 32 UN funds, programmes, specialized agencies, 
departments, and offices that play a role in development. At the global level, the UNDG serves as a high-level 
forum for joint policy formation and decision-making. It guides, supports, tracks and oversees the coordination of 
development operations in 165 countries and territories: https://undg.org/about/undg-global/, accessed December 30, 
2017.
26 United Nations, Resident Coordinator Generic Job Description, approved on February 6, 2014, accessed December 30, 2017, 
https://undg.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/APPROVED-RC-Job-Descriptions.pdf.
27 United Nations Secretary-General, Mandatory Learning Programme: United Nations Human Rights Responsibilities, bulletin, 
November 8, 2016 (UN Doc. ST/SGB/2016/12).
28 Security Council Report, In Hindsight: The Informal Expert Group on the Protection of Civilians, August 2016 Monthly 
Forecast, accessed December 30, 2017, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2016-08/in_hindsight_
the_informal_expert_group_on_the_protection_of_civilians.php.
29 Security Council Report, Horizon-Scanning Briefings, January 2017, accessed December 30, 2017, http://www.
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the HRUF initiative and was used, inter alia, to discuss specific incidents in CAR, Guinea-Bissau, 
Libya, Mali, Burundi, Syria and Yemen.30
At the country level, the UNDG issued interim UNDAF guidance which aims at reflecting 
better human rights concerns in Common Country Assessments (CCA) and UNDAF processes, 
including the implementation of development and humanitarian activities.31 The UNDG Human 
Rights Working Group acts as the lead mechanism through which the UNDG can effectively 
deliver on the responsibilities and demands made on the UN development system by the HRUF 
initiative.32 So far, interdisciplinary light teams, mainly comprised of OHCHR, DPA and the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), were deployed to Lesotho, Burkina Faso and Nigeria 
in order to support UNCTs with conflict prevention and human rights capacity in critical moments 
of prevention.33
Some basic procedures and mechanisms were established for better coordination of early-
warning and early action at UN headquarters. In order to better organize its early warning 
and crisis management system, the HRUF initiative looks to develop strategies for different 
countries through a Regional Quarterly Review (RQR). The RQR is a mechanism through which 
representatives of UN system regional divisions at headquarters scan all countries in their respective 
region every three months for early warning signs (developmental, political, humanitarian, or 
explicitly human rights) and then discuss in more detail those situations that are “evolving” and 
can presage the risk of serious violations and crisis. Where there is a UN country presence, the 
senior UN official is consulted by the RQR co-chairs (DPA and Regional UNDG) on the situation. 
In case of a heightened risk of serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian 
law, the senior UN representative on the ground or headquarters can call for the establishment 
of an Inter-Agency Task Force (ITF), which will serve as the principal coordination platform 
at headquarters.
A Senior Action Group (SAG), which can be convened by the DSG, may provide guidance 
from executive heads of departments and agencies in situations of a high risk of or ongoing, serious 
violations. 
Reportedly, the response mechanism was activated in 2014 in response to developments in 
CAR and South Sudan. Early support from headquarters allowed the United Nations Mission in 
South Sudan (UNMISS) to continue its “open gate” policy, which succeeded in directly protecting 
75,000 people in December 2013.34
Perceptions by UN Staff
The DSG reported on the enthusiastic reception of the HRUF initiative by staff. At the same time, 
it can be perceived that staff at the country level and within small UNCTs may be less enthousiatic 
regarding their capacity to implement the initiative and may hope that business as usual will 
return, given the UN’s past track-record of change following similar initiatives. This likelihood has 
increased for  guidance material being available only in English; staff members in Arabic, French 
securitycouncilreport.org/un-security-council-working-methods/horizon-scanning-briefings.php.
30 Security Council Report, In Hindsight: Making Effective Use of “Any Other Business”, April 2016 Monthly Forecast, accessed 
December 30, 2017, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2016-04/in_hindsight_making_effective_
use_of_any_other_business_1.php.
31 United Nations Development Group, United Nations Development Assistance Framework Guidance, May 23, 2016, accessed 
December 30, 2017, http://procurement-notices.undp.org/view_file.cfm?doc_id=120296.
32 United Nations Development Group, “Human Rights Working Group,“ accessed November 15, 2017, https://undg.org/
about/undg-global/undg-working-groups/.
33 E.g. African Gong, “2015: UN to Deploy Human Rights Up Front Light Team to Nigeria,” blog post, January 5, 2015, 
accessed December 30, 2017, https://africangong.wordpress.com/2015/01/05/2015-un-to-deploy-human-rights-up-
front-light-team-to-nigeria/.
34 UN News Centre, “No One Could Have Predicted Scope Of South Sudan Crisis, Outgoing UN Envoy Says,“ June 30, 
2014, accessed December 30, 2017, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=48171#.WIT6dFN96M-; United 
Nations, “Secretary-General’s Briefing to the Security Council on South Sudan,“ (statement, New York, May 12, 2014), 
accessed December 30, 2017, https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2014-05-12/secretary-generals-briefing-
security-council-south-sudan.
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and Spanish speaking countries may not be able to study the related material themselves and will 
have to rely on summaries and oral presentations 
Heads of agencies at the country level are often unclear about the authority of the Secretary-
General versus their Executive Directors and may wait for more detailed instructions coming from 
their own headquarters. As past experience has shown, there is a general concern over the negative 
impact on their cooperation with their host governments if they started referring to human rights 
considerations. Moreover, they often lack the capacity to undertake this analysis. It may be difficult 
for development and humanitarian agencies to see a benefit for the implementation of their 
country programmes from the present guidance material on HRUF. Many UNCTs, including those 
involved in a RQR, may not feel sufficiently included in the discussions in New York. 
In addition, the perception of HRUF suffers from its unclear relationship with the Responsibility 
to Protect (R2P). While there is a clear parallel between the initiative and pillar 2 and the former 
could, in fact, contribute to the implementation of the latter, the policy does not clarify this 
relationship leaving it open to speculation in a difficult political environment for both policies.
Evaluation of the HRUF Initiative Regarding the Prevention of and Response to Mass Atrocity 
Crimes
General Observations
The HRUF initiative is an ambitious policy regarding the prevention of and response to, serious 
violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, which has already accomplished 
more than similar initiatives in the past. The Action Plan provides all of the elements of a 
comprehensive strategy for implementing R2P as it has been discussed since 2005, in particular 
clear leadership by the Secretary-General based on the Charter, a recommitment to the principles 
and purposes of the Charter in order to close the commitment gap, and steps to counter the 
resource gap tailored to align existing processes and structures with the overarching purpose of 
preventing people from mass atrocity crimes starting with those structures and processes under the 
authority of the Secretary-General.35 The “open gate” policy applied by UNMISS in South Sudan is 
an impressive example of the possibilities for the UN to physically protect people from violence.36 
Notwithstanding these first successful steps taken under the HRUF, it should be asked whether 
factors, which inhibited the implementation of past recommendations, have been adequately 
addressed under HRUF. In addition, the situation in Sri Lanka was characterized by a high level of 
public attention to the situation, but Member States in the Security Council, the General Assembly 
and the Human Rights Council, nevertheless,  were not able to agree on joint action. The prevailing 
deadlock led to increased self-censoring within the Secretariat and the UNCT as staff attempted 
to avoid contributing to the deadlock, while upholding their ability to deliver humanitarian relief. 
HRUF needs to be sufficiently specific regarding guidance and requires strong leadership from the 
Secretary-General when confronting this type of scenario. 
It should be noted that the documents and statements related to HRUF lack reference to the 
legal responsibilities of Member States regarding violations of international human rights and 
humanitarian law. Human rights accountability will need to be established more concretely in each 
country situation, taking into consideration the recommendations and findings of UN human rights 
mechanisms regarding the respective country and the general observations on the interpretation 
of particular rights and corresponding obligations in order to make the implementation appear 
impartial and non-politicized. Article VIII of the Genocide Convention37 could be used as an 
encompassing framework for the initiative, if the relationship between HRUF and R2P was clarified.
35 E.g. Ekkehard Strauss, The Emperor’s New Clothes? The United Nations and the Implementation Of The Responsibility To 
Protect (Berlin: Nomos, 2009), 122-137.
36 For more details e.g. UN News Centre, “UN Action Saved Thousands in South Sudan: Peacekeeping Chief,” April 
2, 2014, accessed December 31, 2017, https://ourworld.unu.edu/en/un-action-saved-thousands-in-south-sudan-
peacekeeping-chief.
37 United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 260, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
December 9, 1948 (UN Doc. A/RES/260(III)). 
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The Relationship Between HRUF and R2P
While in practice there is an overlap between the situations considered under the R2P and the 
HRUF, the relationship between “serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law” and 
mass atrocity crimes remains unclear. In addition, the whole history of HRUF, which is built  upon 
past reports of UN shortcomings, points towards a close relationship. Secretary-General Ban has 
referred to “atrocities and egregious crimes” in his presentations to Member States, which came 
very close to R2P language. This wording was later replaced for the more general and legalistic 
expressions of “serious violations of international human rights or humanitarian law”. It will be 
important to link “serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law” to mass atrocity 
crimes through a more concrete description of the scenarios the UN has committed to prevent or 
halt and link their different elements to HRUF and R2P.38 In general, R2P could provide arguments 
and approaches in cases, where early-warning indicators point towards mass atrocity crimes.  In 
addition, the application of R2P to the respective country situation could clarify responsibilities 
for taking action agreed in the ITF or SAG. Depending on the risk-level determined and the risks 
identified, action may be required by political bodies, UN entities - including the Special Adviser 
on the Prevention of Genocide - or remain at the country level, according to available genocide 
prevention methodology.
At the same time, HRUF could weaken the application of the R2P by the UN. While in the past 
the Secretary-General used the latter to call on Member States to provide the mandate and resources 
for the UN to intervene in situations of evolving mass atrocity crimes, HRUF offers a possibility to 
carve out space for UN entities sheltered from the political bodies. Given the considerable political 
investment of the Secretary-General in situations like Syria or Yemen and the negative impact on 
the authority of the UN of Member States not following his call, HRUF could lead the Secretary-
General in future situations to concentrate on internal coordination rather than pleading to non-
receptive Member States to uphold their R2P obligations.
The Institutional Commitment
The HRUF, like other initiatives for cooperation among UN entities, has to rely on an institutional 
commitment based on a limited legal basis for cooperation between specialized agencies and 
the Secretary-General in the Charter.39 Specialized agencies, and similarly other UN funds and 
programmes, were created for a greater independence in their operational activities in order 
to depoliticize certain areas of international cooperation. They are funded through voluntary 
contributions by Member States, are legally independent and supervised through specific Member 
States structures. Some of the executive heads of specialized agencies are appointed by the 
Secretary-General and members of the Chief Executive Board of Coordination (CEB), chaired by 
the Secretary-General. Thus, the cooperation of specialized agencies, funds and programmes are 
mainly based on the cooperation provision in the respective relationship agreement with the UN 
and, ultimately, the cooperation of Member States in their governing bodies.
On the implementation of HRUF, RCs, as representatives of the UNCT, should report to a 
joint cell in the EOSG rather than the head of UNDP in her capacity as head of UNDG, which 
creates a constant conflict of interest when the RC is also the UNDP resident representative. This 
would compensate for the lack of authority of the Secretary-General over agencies, funds and 
programmes outside the Secretariat, provide direct access to RCs and UNCTs and underline the 
centrality of HRUF at the field level.
In this regard, the present scope of HRUF may be generally too broad, as it applies a policy, 
which derived primarily from recommendations developed after reviewing the extraordinary 
circumstances of the end phase of the conflict in Sri Lanka to any country situation and applies 
38 For more details Ekkehard Strauss, “A Short Story of a Long Effort. The United Nations and the Prevention of Mass 
Atrocities,” in Reconstructing Atrocity Prevention, ed. Tibi Galis, Sheri P. Rosenberg, and Alex Zucker (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015), 428-449.
39 The Charter provisions relating to specialized agencies include arts. 63, 17 para. 3, 58, 60, 62, 64 and 70. For details: 
Klaus Hüfner, “Specialized Agencies,“ in: A Concise Encyclopedia of the United Nations, Second Revised Edition, ed. 
Helmut Volger (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 670-675.
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to all human rights violations. This can expose the UNCT and its members to criticism by the 
host government, whose cooperation many agencies and funds require for implementation of their 
country programmes. OHCHR, which suffers from considerable funding gaps, may soon find itself 
overstretched by its role in implementing the policy, which may lead to HRUF being ignored at the 
country level. Instead, the elements of HRUF should be implemented by every UNCT according to 
a central schedule and based on questionnaires and reporting guidance distributed by the EOSG. 
This exercise should benefit from the presence of OHCHR, but should not rely on OHCHR for its 
implementation.
When the DSG referred to human rights as the “lifeblood” of the UN, he pointed out an 
important difference between the UN system and, in particular, bi-lateral  development and 
humanitarian actors, i.e. the universal normative framework for all UN action. At the country level, 
each UN field presence accepted in general human rights and humanitarian law as a basis for joint 
planning and implementation. This institutional commitment will be sustainable if, inter alia, this 
position of the UN can be promoted at the country level without a major drop in funding compared 
to other multi-lateral and bi-lateral actors. UNCT members often compete for limited voluntary 
contributions by Member States for their activities and support for HRUF will depend in the long-
term on its impact on access to this funding. 
At the more practical level, HRUF will be difficult to sustain over time without a common 
information management system linking the field and headquarters, and headquarter entities. 
The Individual Commitment of Senior Managers and All Other Staff Members
Unlike past reforms, the HRUF initiative builds on explicit individual commitments of senior 
managers and all other staff members.
In addition to institutional and structural approaches, which have not lead to sustainable 
change in the past, HRUF emphasizes the responsibility of every UN staff member to protect 
human rights regardless of the field in which he or she is working. 
The individual responsibility placed on senior staff and each lower level staff member is meant 
to be compensated by headquarters. The letters of the DSG acknowledged that it was often difficult 
to choose between the wider humanitarian and development roles and raising serious human 
rights concerns. The DSG pledged that headquarters would take over the burden of raising serious 
concerns with state authorities.40 The use of Charter article 99 by the Secretary-General in a well-
documented and analysed case could encourage all staff members that the risks related to their 
individual commitment to speak out is equally shared by the Secretary-General himself. However, 
the structural and procedural distance between RCs, UNCTs and headquarters regarding the RQR 
and the coordination through the ITFs or SAG will hardly encourage UN staff in the field to raise the 
alarm, as the possibilities for the field to influence the analysis and its role in decision-making may 
be very limited and could create concerns of overriding political considerations at headquarters 
determining the response strategy. It could be preferable to apply the principle of subsidiarity to the 
response to country situations, i.e. to prioritize local action and participation of local stakeholders 
over headquarters and, first, target the impact level of violence and the immediate perpetrators 
and, second, the broader underlying economic and political interests at stake.
The individual commitment of each staff member could make a decisive contribution to the 
sustainability of HRUF, if the UN succeeded in an increasingly polarized world, united mainly 
in rejecting international human rights and humanitarian norms running counter to short-term 
political and economic interests, to bring its diverse work-force behind a commitment that puts 
them in conflict with many Member States as donors, host-countries or members of mandating 
bodies. The policy and the accompanying material must be translated into all six UN languages 
as soon as possible and new material should not be distributed before it exists at least in English, 
French, Spanish and Arabic. This will avoid the impression in the field that HRUF is an initiative 
promoted mainly by a former Secretary-General, which will go away over time as similar initiatives 
in the past. 
40 United Nations, Human Rights Up Front: A Summary For Staff.
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The individual commitment of all staff and its inclusion in personnel management tools aims 
at mainstreaming its content into day-to-day action by individual staff members. The approach 
of mainstreaming the objectives of HRUF may suffer from the same deficits observed regarding 
the mainstreaming of other cross-cutting issues in the past, including gender, HIV/AIDS and 
human rights, unless this general approach is broken down into a list of implementable practical 
and compulsory activities summarized in a thematic compendium with proposed forms and 
concrete language. The individual commitment can be translated into individual action only if 
the respective staff member had simple and practical tools available for the application of the 
HRUF and understood his/her role in the context of the broader early-warning and early-action 
methodology applied. The repeated assertion by the DSG that human rights violations are often a 
precursor to mass atrocities remains too general. The connection between the violation of particular 
rights and their impact on specific risk factors in a particular country situation remains too vague 
and requires fine tuning for each country. While any risk analysis will become more reliable after 
a long-term process of data collection over several years, the expectations towards HRUF are very 
high. Thus, there is a need to design a strategy for the application of different methodologies of 
data collection and analysis over the coming years. In addition, detailed analysis could be limited 
initially to a number of countries, while undertaking more of a screening for others until they pass 
a particular threshold, i.e. if a ‘real risk’ of mass atrocity crimes actually appears.41
Regarding senior managers, annual instructions, including generic elements for the inclusion 
in annual work-plans of RCs and UNCTs, should be developed by the EOSG as a constant reminder 
of HRUF. 
Implication of Member States
Unlike past reforms, the implementation of the HRUF Action Plan does not depend entirely on 
Member States’ prior approval.
Notwithstanding its focus on elements under the prerogative of the Secretary-General, 
ultimately, for the different reasons stated above, HRUF will depend on the cooperation of 
Member States to become sustainable. Thus, it will be important to navigate the different political 
sensitivities by using all existing tools with great flexibility and to time interventions carefully.
Given its connection to the UN’s failure to respond adequately to the situation in Sri Lanka, 
the HRUF initiative will have to prove its impact on other situations where no UN peace mission 
is on the ground and which are not on the Security Council’s agenda. While Member States have 
reiterated the importance of early-warning and discussed possible procedures in the Security 
Council, general sensitivity of early-warning briefings has not been overcome. This suggests that 
there will continue to be limitations to the enhancement of cooperation with Member States on 
situations of serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. 
Conclusion
The HRUF initiative is a promising new attempt to reinforce the UN’s capacity to prevent and 
respond to, serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law. It encompasses the lessons-
learned from past failure and translates them into realistic and modest new processes and structures. 
Given the difficult global environment for the protection and promotion of human rights, it is yet 
to be seen whether the organization will be granted the time and space required for the initiative to 
be fully implemented. Much will depend on whether the Member States are prepared to promote 
in practice early-warning and conflict prevention as main elements of a collective a norms-based 
international order.
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Introduction
The prevention of genocide and mass atrocities involves normative as well as practical challenges. 
To motivate effective action to deter or halt mass killings of civilians, it is first necessary to persuade 
the relevant actors of the legitimacy and necessity of such a policy. The struggle to implement robust 
atrocity prevention measures is often lost at the normative level. Key government decision-makers 
may decide that the prevention of atrocities is peripheral, or even antithetical, to “core national 
security interests.”1 Conversely, when the United States or other great powers do intervene to 
protect civilians, they may arouse suspicion from other parties. As the Albright-Cohen Genocide 
Prevention Task Force observed in 2008, many governments “regard assertive U.S. policies as 
ultimately self-interested, even or perhaps especially when framed in terms of humanitarian 
purposes.”2
Comprising fifty-seven participating States “from Vancouver to Vladivostok,”3 the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) provides a particularly salient case 
study of the normative dimension of atrocity prevention efforts.  The OSCE is the successor to the 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), established by the Helsinki Final Act 
of 1975 with the goal of finding “common ground through a process of dialogue, norm-setting, and 
consensus” among the member states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The CSCE was “designed 
as a process, with an informal structure that could provide flexibility” in promoting “common and 
comprehensive” security.4 In the words of former OSCE Secretary-General Wilhelm Höynck, “[T]
he Final Act affirmed that the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is an essential 
factor for the peace, justice, and well-being, necessary to ensure the development of friendly 
relations and cooperation.”5 
The end of the Cold War brought fundamental changes both to the structure and mission of 
the CSCE. Between 1990 and 1992, the organization established a formal institutional structure 
including a Secretariat, a Permanent Council of ambassadors from all participating States, the 
Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC), the Office for Free Elections (later to become the Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights or ODIHR), the Forum for Security Co-operation, and 
the Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM).6 In 1995, the CSCE was 
renamed the OSCE, reflecting this formalization of its institutional structure.
With an annual operating budget for 2017 of EUR 139 million (including EUR 4.7 million for 
Conflict Prevention and EUR 3.4 million for the HCNM), the OSCE has been described as a “flea” 
in comparison to the “elephant” of the European Union (EU), whose 2017 budget was more than 
a thousand times larger.7 Despite its limited resources and lack of coercive power, the OSCE has 
1 Samantha Power, “A Problem From Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 504; Madeleine 
Albright and William S. Cohen, Preventing Genocide: A Blueprint for U.S. Policymakers, Report of the Genocide 
Prevention Task Force (Washington, DC: United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, The American Academy 
of Diplomacy, and The Endowment of the United States Institute of Peace, 2008), 1-3; Matthew Levinger, “A Core 
National Security Interest: Framing Atrocities Prevention,” Politics and Governance 3, no. 4 (2015), 26-43.
2 Albright and Cohen, Preventing Genocide, 95.
3 Government of Canada, Global Affairs, “Delegation to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe,” July 
11, 2017, accessed December 20, 2017, http://www.international.gc.ca/osce/index.aspx?lang=eng.
4 Connie Peck, Sustainable Peace: The Role of the UN and Regional Organizations in Preventing Conflict (Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 1998), 118.
5 Quoted in Peck, Sustainable Peace, 118.
6 Ibid., 120-21; David Galbreath, “Convergence Without Cooperation? The EU and OSCE in the Field of Peacebuilding,” 
in The European Union and Peacebuilding: Policy and Legal Aspects, eds. Steven Blockmans, Jan Wouters, and Tom Ruys 
(Leuven: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2010), 177.
7 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Permanent Council, Decision No. 1252: Approval of the 2017 Unified 
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played a critical role in preventing or containing violence against civilians in numerous regions of 
Europe and Central Asia. As Gregory Flynn and Henry Farrell argued in a 1999 essay, the CSCE/
OSCE mechanisms for preventive diplomacy 
have proven to be the real workhorses of the international community in its attempts to 
control substate conflict in post-Cold War Europe…. CSCE mechanisms have been involved 
in managing far more potential substate conflict situations that either [NATO or the EU]… 
Moreover, nearly all of these missions involved circumstances where it would have been 
impossible for states to have used either of the other two institutions for collective intervention, 
because neither had been endowed with the instruments to deal with prevailing conditions.8
In recent years, however, some observers have questioned the effectiveness of the OSCE’s 
work, remarking on the “growing futility”9 of the OSCE as the EU has expanded its political and 
security-related missions. During the Cold War, a clear demarcation existed between the structure 
and function of the European Economic Community (EEC) and that of the CSCE: the EEC was a 
regional organization focusing on the economic integration of Western Europe, whereas the CSCE 
was an informal dialogue process promoting cooperative security measures between NATO and 
the Warsaw Pact. In 1993, the EEC was subsumed under the EU, which had a more comprehensive 
mission including a Common Foreign and Security Policy. Over the past quarter-century, a 
“functional convergence” has occurred between the EU and OSCE. Not only has the EU expanded 
eastward into the former Warsaw Pact region, it has increasingly taken on political and security 
functions, such as election monitoring and security sector reform, that had previously been the 
province of the OSCE.10 The eastward expansion of NATO and the EU has also put the Russian 
Federation on the defensive. Russian leaders have argued that “instead of acting as a genuine 
transatlantic organization, the OSCE has evolved into an institution that seeks to act as a tool of 
Western influence, pushing forward an agenda of excessive intrusion and potential destabilization 
in Russia’s neighborhood.”11 As long ago as 2006, one expert asserted: “The OSCE is in crisis. . . . 
There can be no doubt but that the OSCE today, as compared to its heyday during the Cold War, is 
a far less visible landmark on the European institutional landscape than was formerly the case.”12
This essay will argue that the OSCE continues to play a unique and vital role in preventing and 
containing ethnic conflict in Europe and Central Asia, but that its greatest distinctive strength—
the capacity to help foster shared political norms supporting “common and comprehensive 
security”—has eroded since the late 1990s. Part I of the essay will discuss the original operating 
concept of the CSCE and OSCE, which sought to constitute a cooperative transatlantic security 
community through the promulgation of shared norms. Part II will examine the erosion of the 
normative consensus between the Eastern and Western participating States of the OSCE since the 
late 1990s, focusing on some Eastern states’ distrust for the Western democracy promotion agenda. 
Finally, Part III will examine the prospects for a more robust role of the OSCE in protecting civilians 
from violent conflict and mass atrocities, given the increasing tensions among Eastern and Western 
OSCE participating States in recent years.
Budget, June 1, 2017, (OSCE Doc PC.DEC/1252/Corr.1), accessed December 8, 2017, http://www.osce.org/permanent-
council/321931?download=true; European Council, “EU Budget for 2017,” November 28, 2016, accessed December 
8, 2017, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-annual-budget/2017/#; Galbreath, Convergence Without 
Cooperation?, 189.
8 Gregory Flynn and Henry Farrell, “Piecing Together the Democratic Peace: The CSCE, Norms, and the ‘Construction’ of 
Security in Post-Cold War Europe,” International Organization 53, no. 3 (1999), 507.
9 Galbreath, Convergence Without Cooperation?, 189.
10 Ibid., 175, 189; see also Emma J. Stewart, “European Union Conflict Prevention and the European Security Architecture,” 
in EU Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management: Roles, Institutions, and Policies, eds. Eva Gross, et al. (London: 
Routledge, 2011), 41-45.
11 Alexandra Gheciu, Securing Civilization? The EU, NATO, and the OSCE in the Post-9/11 World (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), 171.
12 Pál Dunay, “The OSCE in Crisis,” Chaillot Paper, no. 88 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, April 2006), 7.
Assessing the Record of the OSCE
©2018     Genocide Studies and Prevention 11, no. 3 http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.11.3
62
The OSCE Ideal: Community Building Through Norm Formation
Emanuel Adler has evocatively termed the OSCE an “imagined security community,” describing 
the logic of the organization’s founders as follows:
[T]he OSCE has adopted the view that you must first let the largest number of people from 
different states imagine that they are part of a community; only then, when all have formally 
and instrumentally accepted the institution’s shared normative structures and practices, do 
you socialize their elites and peoples by means of continual diplomatic interaction and a 
wide range of community-building practices.13
Adler’s description of the OSCE community-building enterprise points to the power of norms not 
only to constrain or regulate behavior but also to constitute new communal identities:
When assessing and measuring the influence of OSCE’s practices, we cannot simply look at 
this institution’s regulative tasks or short-range activities, because what matters most is the 
long-range effectiveness of its practices and activities as constitutive of community identity 
and bonds . . . [W]hat matters most is not the short-range success of the mission, seminar, 
or inspection, but the construction of a foundation for community practice and behavior.14
Although it might be tempting to dismiss the OSCE’s “seminar diplomacy” as an elaborate 
sleight of hand, conjuring the illusion of a transatlantic community that remains purely imaginary, 
this would ignore the real historical impact of the CSCE/OSCE enterprise. During the 1970s and 
1980s, the Helsinki Process created a space for the articulation of human rights claims by dissident 
groups in the Warsaw Pact, which played a role in facilitating a peaceful end to the Cold War. Since 
the early 1990s, the HCNM and other OSCE institutions have sought to foster “an environment 
characterized by shared meanings, trust, increased cooperation, and a sense of common identity.”15 
For all the frustrations and setbacks involved in this project, there have also been important 
successes.
Of the various component institutions of the OSCE, two are particularly relevant to the mission 
of atrocity prevention: the Conflict Prevention Center (CPC), along with the field operations that it 
supports, and the Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM). These will be 
the focus of analysis for this paper.
Created in 1990, the CPC “acts as an OSCE-wide early warning focal point, facilitates 
negotiation, mediation, and other conflict prevention and resolution efforts, and supports regional 
co-operation initiatives.”16 In its initial years, the CPC focused principally on reducing risks of 
interstate conflict among the OSCE participating States, for example by promoting Confidence and 
Security Building Measures such as exchange of military information. 
Over the past two decades, the mandate of the CPC has expanded to include early warning, 
situation monitoring, mediation and dialogue facilitation, and support for OSCE field operations, 
among other roles. It supports mediation initiatives in Ukraine, Nagorno-Karabakh, Transdniestria, 
and Georgia.17 The OSCE also currently deploys sixteen field operations in South-Eastern Europe, 
Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia, addressing issues including reconciliation 
and human rights protection in the Balkan states, conflict monitoring in Ukraine, and the monitoring 
13 Emanuel Adler, “Imagined (Security) Communities,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 26, no. 2 (1997), 249-
277; Emanuel Adler, “Seeds of Peaceful Change: The OSCE’s Security Community Building Model,” in Security 
Communities, ed. Emanuel Adler et al. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 133.
14 Adler, Seeds of Peaceful Change, 121; see also Flynn and Farrell, Piecing Together the Democratic Peace, 510.
15 Gheciu, Securing Civilization, 122.
16 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Secretariat, “Conflict Prevention and Resolution,” accessed 
August 27, 2016, http://www.osce.org/secretariat/conflict-prevention.
17 Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe, “What We Do: Conflict Prevention and Resolution,” accessed 
December 10, 2017, http://www.osce.org/what/conflict-prevention.
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and prevention of ethnic conflict in Kyrgyzstan.18
The HCNM, which was created in 1992 in response to the outbreak of war in Yugoslavia, has 
played the most robust role within the OSCE in the prevention of mass atrocities and other forms of 
ethnic conflict. In the 1990s alone, the HCNM was involved in mediations in thirteen states, and the 
OSCE deployed thirteen missions of long duration in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central 
Asia.19 OSCE interventions helped prevent conflict or defuse political crises in Estonia, Latvia, the 
Crimea, and Albania. In other regions such as Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgia, and Moldova, the OSCE 
was unable to facilitate negotiated settlements to the conflicts. Nonetheless, even there its missions 
may have “made important contributions by keeping negotiations open and by preserving the 
cease-fires that… prevented large-scale violence from reappearing.”20 In recent years, the HCNM 
has continued its intensive and wide-ranging activities. In May 2016, High Commissioner Astrid 
Thors reported that over the past six months, she had traveled to ten countries—Kyrgyzstan, 
Serbia, Ukraine, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Croatia, Hungary, Slovakia, Moldova, and 
Macedonia—for consultations on issues related to national minorities.21
According to the 1992 Helsinki Document, the HCNM was intended to “be an instrument of 
conflict prevention at the earliest possible stage.” The office’s mandate was described as follows:
The High Commissioner will provide “early warning” and, as appropriate, “early action” 
at the earliest possible stage in regard to tensions involving national minority issues which 
have not yet developed beyond an early warning stage, but, in the judgment of the High 
Commissioner, have the potential to develop into a conflict within the OSCE area, affecting 
peace, stability or relations between participating States.22 
Under the mandate established by the Helsinki Document, the HCNM has the authority to 
act independently, without approval either from other OSCE authorities or from the concerned 
state, in order to address situations involving national minorities that have the potential to 
escalate into violence. Max van der Stoel, a former Dutch foreign minister who served as the first 
High Commissioner, has described the HCNM as “an independent, nonstate entity but with the 
political support of member-states… This depoliticized, multilateral approach allows the High 
Commissioner to employ cooperative, noncoercive problem-solving techniques…”23 
In describing the early work of the HCNM in preventing ethnic violence in post-Cold War 
Europe, Van der Stoel emphasized the normative foundations of his office’s authority. In a 1999 
article, he asserted that
the HCNM’s independence follows naturally from the logic of international public interest 
that underlies the concept of comprehensive security. Indeed, I believe it is now well 
established that the multilateralism that created and sustains the HCNM offers opportunities 
to address highly charged and potentially violent situations in a somewhat depoliticized 
manner—at least at arm’s length through an impartial intermediary.24
18 Alice Ackermann, “Strengthening the OSCE’s Capacities in Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management, and Conflict 
Resolution” Security and Human Rights 23, no. 1 (2012), 11-18; Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe, 
“Where We Are,” accessed December 10, 2017, http://www.osce.org/where; Organization for Security and Co-
Operation in Europe, Conflict Prevention Center, Survey of OSCE Field Operations (Vienna: OSCE, October 2017, OSCE 
Doc. SEC/GAL/27/16), accessed December 10, 2017, http://www.osce.org/secretariat/74783?download=true.
19 Flynn and Farrell, Piecing Together the Democratic Peace, 507.
20 P. Terrence Hopmann, “Building Security in Post-Cold War Eurasia: The OSCE and U.S. Foreign Policy,” Peaceworks, no. 
31 (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, September 1999), 45.
21 Astrid Thors, “Address by Astrid Thors, OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, to the 1102nd Plenary 
Meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council” (speech, Vienna, June 2, 2016) OSCE.
22 Quoted in Max Van der Stoel, “The Role of the OSCE High Commission in Conflict Prevention,” in Herding Cats: 
Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World, ed. Chester A. Crocker et al. (Washington, DC: United States Institute of 
Peace Press, 1999), 68.
23 Van der Stoel, The Role of the OSCE High Commissioner, 65.
24 Ibid., 70.
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Although van der Stoel saw the HCNM’s independence as a critical prerequisite for its success, he 
also stressed that the High Commissioner “could not function properly without the political support 
of the participating States.”25 He declared:
Durable solutions are possible only if there is a sufficient measure of goodwill and consent 
from the parties directly involved. I always endeavor to find such solutions and to bring 
the parties to a consensus. I always try to find mutually agreeable solutions and to offer my 
assistance in implementing measures. I am there to assist OSCE participating States that are 
experiencing difficulties, and I work together with the parties on the basis of their good faith 
and their mutual interest in settling difficulties with a view to enjoying a more peaceful and 
prosperous life together.26
Thus, for example, he stressed that “the protection of persons belonging to national minorities has 
to be seen as essentially in the interest of the state”; and conversely, that “solutions that allow for 
the full realization of the aspirations of persons belonging to minorities should be sought as much 
as possible within the framework of the state itself.”27
Van der Stoel was careful to emphasize the convergence of shared values and interests that 
motivated the members of the OSCE community. This convergence was emphasized by the 
very blandness of his own professional title: he was not the “High Commissioner for National 
Minorities”—an advocate or ombudsman for threatened ethnic groups—but rather the “High 
Commissioner on National Minorities,” charged with preventing and managing substate conflicts 
related to minority rights. 
From the outset of the Helsinki Process, there have been normative tensions within the OSCE 
community-building enterprise. The Helsinki Final Act recognized not only the inviolability of 
European borders but also the principle of self-determination—which had the potential to redraw 
borders. Likewise, it asserted the principle of noninterference in states’ internal affairs while 
also guaranteeing respect for human rights—which legitimated human rights monitoring of the 
Warsaw Pact states. In addressing conflicts over minority rights, the OSCE has emphasized the 
importance of resolving such conflicts without disrupting existing borders. In OSCE practice, write 
Flynn and Farrell,
The norm of self-determination was not only subordinated to the norm of inviolability of 
borders; it was also effectively removed as an independent principle of international relations 
in Europe separable from the norm of democracy. Self-determination was to be directly and 
exclusively related to creating political institutions that would protect cultural and ethnic 
differences within common frameworks, rather than using these differences as a basis in 
themselves for separation.28
In the next section, we will examine several case studies that illustrate how the normative authority 
of the OSCE has played a role in preventing or containing ethnic violence in Europe and Central 
Asia, as well as how that authority has eroded since the late 1990s.
Case Studies: The Declining Normative Authority of the OSCE
Although the OSCE’s mandate contains no formal provision referring to the prevention of genocide 
or mass atrocities, several of its diplomatic interventions during the 1990s played an important 
role in defusing crises that had the potential to result in large-scale violence against civilians. Its 
efforts were generally more effective in regions that had not yet reached the boiling point—such as 
 
25 Ibid., 70-71.
26 Ibid., 72-73.
27 Ibid., 73.
28 Flynn and Farrell, Piecing Together the Democratic Peace, 527.
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Estonia, Latvia, and Crimea—than in active conflict zones such as Bosnia, Chechnya, or Nagorno-
Karabakh.
After the Soviet Union annexed Estonia and Latvia in 1940, significant Soviet military bases 
were established in both republics, and large numbers of ethnic Russians moved into the region. 
By 1989, a third of the population of Estonia and 42 percent of the population of Latvia consisted 
of Russians and other Slavic nationalities. When the Baltic states achieved their independence in 
1991, tensions intensified between the Baltic and Slavic ethnic groups, particularly in Estonia and 
Latvia. Ethnic Estonians and Latvians, resenting the half-century-long Soviet “occupation” and 
the accompanying suppression of their national languages and cultures, denied citizenship rights 
to ethnic Russians who had entered the country after 1940. The countries’ Russian minorities, 
many of whom had supported independence, felt betrayed by the restrictive citizenship laws. The 
Russian government weighed in by vocally supporting the Russian minorities; and, in October 
1992, it suspended the withdrawal of Russian military forces from the Baltics, citing its concern 
for the violation of Russian minority rights. Outside observers grew concerned that Russia might 
capitalize on the crisis to justify military intervention in the Baltic states.29
The OSCE’s conciliation efforts between the Baltic governments and their Russian minorities 
included the establishment of missions of long duration in Estonia (1992-2001) and Latvia (1993-
2001), along with numerous visits by the HCNM, Max Van der Stoel. The OSCE missions steered 
clear of recommending wholesale revisions to the countries’ restrictive citizenship laws, but 
encouraged them to implement the laws with greater lenience and to make it easier for members of 
minority groups to pass the citizenship tests, for example by expanding access to language classes 
to enable Russian speakers to pass language exams. At the same time, the missions consulted 
extensively with the leaders of the minority communities in both countries, urging them to accept 
and cooperate with the national governments, rather than taking destabilizing actions that might 
have provoked Russian military intervention.30
The Crimean Peninsula, whose population was about 67 percent ethnic Russian, had been 
transferred as a “gift” to the Soviet Republic of Ukraine by Nikita Khrushchev in 1954. The 
issue of the Crimeans’ national identity became salient only after 1991, when Ukraine achieved 
independence. When a nationalist Russian was elected the first president of Crimea in 1994, he 
proposed secession from Ukraine, provoking a political crisis. As in Estonia and Latvia, the OSCE’s 
intervention involved the establishment of a mission of long duration (1994-1999) and a series of 
visits by the HCNM. Van der Stoel’s office also organized several conferences and seminars that 
successfully sought to harmonize the constitutions of Crimea and Ukraine, establishing a special 
status for Crimea as an autonomous region within Ukraine.31
In describing the OSCE’s approach to addressing the crises in Estonia, Latvia, and Crimea, 
Terrence Hopmann observes:
Issues of identity are virtually impossible to settle through negotiations based on a traditional 
bargaining process. Instead, they require what has become known as a problem-solving 
approach to negotiations. This negotiation process prescribes a number of negotiating 
behaviors that are quite different from traditional, confrontational bargaining. The parties 
should approach the conflict as a problem to be solved jointly rather than as a conflict to be 
“won.” They should treat the dispute essentially as a “non-zero-sum” game, in which both 
parties stand to lose from escalation while both may gain from mutual accommodation.32 
Several features of the geopolitical context of these conflicts were favorable to this 
problem-solving approach. The Russian government of Boris Yeltsin actively supported the 
29 Hopmann, Building Security, 16; Flynn and Farrell, Piecing Together the Democratic Peace, 508; Natalie Mychajlyszyn, “The 
OSCE and Conflict Prevention in the Post-Soviet Region,” in Conflict Prevention: Path to Peace or Grand Illusion, ed. 
David Carment et al. (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2003), 135-36.
30 Hopmann, Building Security, 17-18; Flynn and Farrell, Piecing Together the Democratic Peace, 508.
31 Hopmann, Building Security, 24-25.
32 Ibid., 26.
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OSCE’s diplomatic engagement in Estonia and Latvia, because Yeltsin saw the missions as 
a means of protecting the rights of Russian minorities in both countries while defending his 
credibility against his own nationalist domestic critics. Government officials in Estonia, Latvia, 
and Ukraine, by contrast, viewed the OSCE’s involvement as a means of strengthening their 
countries’ ties to the West and breaking their dependence on Russia. These governments’ 
desire to join the EU provided leverage to OSCE mediators, who were able to sustain their 
conflict prevention efforts even in the face of staunch criticism from nationalist leaders in 
the Baltics, who denied that there was any conflict to prevent. Finally, the United States was 
itself able to exercise coercive leverage on behalf of the OSCE’s efforts: in 1994, the U.S. Senate 
voted to suspend all aid to Russia until it completed the withdrawal of its military forces from 
Estonia.33
Since the late 1990s, however, the OSCE has rarely been able to rely on such a supportive context 
for its mediation efforts. For example, the carrot of potential EU membership, which provided a 
powerful motivation for leaders of the Baltic states, has not been available to bolster mediation 
efforts in Central Asia or the Caucasus. To the contrary, writes one commentator, the presence 
of an OSCE mission “is often unfavorably perceived as an indication of an unstable area, thereby 
warding off necessary foreign investment and weakening the country’s economic development in 
these areas.”34
A greater challenge to the OSCE collaborative problem-solving efforts has been the rising 
tension between Russia and the West. During the early 1990s, Yeltsin and other Russian leaders 
embraced the organization as the potential centerpiece for a future collaborative European security 
architecture. In subsequent years, however, the Western participating States placed increasing 
emphasis on expanding NATO and the EU, to the detriment of the OSCE. The expansion of 
NATO to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in 1999, and an additional seven 
states including the Baltic republics in 2004, drove home the view among Russian leaders that the 
OSCE was “erecting a wall within itself, artificially dividing its members into the NATO and EU 
members, and the rest.” Under these new conditions, declared Russian Foreign Minister Sergei 
Lavrov, “NATO deals with security issues, the EU with economic issues, while the OSCE will only 
monitor the adoption of these organizations’ values by countries that have remained outside the 
EU and NATO.”35
In the late 1990s, Western criticisms of Russia’s military campaign in Chechnya, along with 
Russian unhappiness over NATO’s bombing of Kosovo and Serbia, created further frictions, which 
intensified after the election of Vladimir Putin as President of the Russian Federation in 2000. 
Russia’s leaders increasingly expressed suspicions that the OSCE agenda was “destabilizing its 
neighborhood and in the long run potentially also Russia itself.”36 They were particularly unhappy 
with the work of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), which they 
saw as “regionally biased against the East.”37 Beginning in 2002, Russia sent its own observers to 
monitor elections in the post-Soviet states, alongside monitors from the OSCE and EU, in order 
to counter the “Western bias” in ODIHR’s conclusions. On Russia’s insistence, the OSCE also 
sent observers to monitor elections in Western participating States, including Canada and the 
United States.38 Russian leaders accused the OSCE of being a tool of Western interests in Ukraine 
both during the Orange Revolution of 2004 and during the political crisis of 2014, and bridled at 
ODIHR’s repeated criticisms of election irregularities in Belarus. Unnamed Western states, claimed 
33 Ibid., 17; Mychajlyszyn, The OSCE and Conflict Prevention, 148; Heather Hurlburt, “Preventive Diplomacy: Success in 
the Baltics,” in Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World, ed. Bruce W. 
Jentleson (New York: Carnegie Corporation of New York, 2000), 103.
34 Mychajlyszyn, The OSCE and Conflict Prevention, 140.
35 Sergei Lavrov, “Democracy, International Governance, and the Future World Order,” Russia in Global Affairs 3, no. 1, 
(2005) 151-52, quoted in Dunay, The OSCE in Crisis, 70; see also Gheciu, Securing Civilization, 171.
36 Dunay, The OSCE in Crisis, 71; see also Stewart, European Union Conflict Prevention, 42.
37 Galbreath, Convergence without Cooperation?, 179.
38 Ibid.; Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 
“General Elections, 8 November 2016,” accessed December 10, 2017, http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/usa/246356.
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Putin in 2007, were “trying to transform the OSCE into a vulgar instrument designed to promote 
the foreign policy interests of one or a group of countries.”39
Over the past decade, the OSCE has been largely stalemated in its efforts to resolve many 
protracted conflicts on the periphery of the Russian Federation, including Nagorno-Karabakh, South 
Ossetia, and Transdniestria; and it has struggled to respond to Russia’s military interventions in 
Georgia and Ukraine. In dealing with the crisis in Syria since 2011, the OSCE’s response has largely 
been confined to a few statements addressing the refugee crisis. Syria is not a state partner of the 
OSCE, so the organization has no official mandate vis-à-vis events in that country. Moreover, as 
Alice Ackermann points out, the EU and OSCE sometimes establish an informal “division of labor” 
in their efforts: for example, the OSCE has taken the lead role in addressing the conflict in Ukraine, 
while the EU and UN have played more prominent roles with respect to Syria.40 Nonetheless, given 
the profound implications of the Syrian civil war for international security within the boundaries 
of both Eastern and Western participating States of the OSCE, a more robust joint response would 
have been desirable.41
The Path Forward: Building Cooperative Capacity for Atrocity Prevention
In an October 2016 interview, OSCE General Secretary Lamberto Zannier observed that “the OSCE 
as a security organization is facing a very complicated environment,” because of the “return of 
geopolitics” involving “divisions in Europe that we haven’t seen in a long time,” aggravated by 
global challenges including terrorism along with migration stemming from violent conflicts and 
the effects of climate change. Zannier observed:
As the OSCE was built in a divided environment to bridge the gulf between opposing sides, 
today the convergence of all these problems is eroding the effectiveness of the tools that 
were created at that time. So we are facing a situation where we may have more division, 
and the tools that we developed to address the problems coming with the divisions are not 
functioning… as well as they were. So engagement, creating a space of dialogue in spite of 
the differences and the bitter debates… remains the key task for all of us.42
In the bitter aftermath of the 2016 presidential election in the United States, where the Russian 
intelligence services allegedly sought to undermine the campaign of Democratic candidate Hillary 
Clinton in order to tip the result to Republican candidate Donald Trump, such constructive 
dialogue has become more challenging than at any time since the end of the Cold War. Having 
long complained of Western meddling in Russia’s “near abroad” through democracy promotion 
initiatives and support for the “Color Revolutions,” the Putin regime has effectively turned 
the tables on its Western counterparts. Russia is alleged to have “cultivated an opaque web of 
economic and political patronage” throughout much of Central and Eastern Europe,43 as well 
as to have forged connections with right-wing parties in Western Europe including the UKIP in 
Britain and the National Front in France.44 The heated accusations of ill will on both sides have 
further narrowed the already constricted avenues for cooperation between the OSCE’s Eastern and 
Western participating States.
39 Quoted in Martin Nilsson, “Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe,” in International Organizations and 
the Implementation of the Responsibility to Protect: The Humanitarian Crisis in Syria, ed. Daniel Silander et al. (New York: 
Routledge, 2015), 182.
40 Alice Ackermann, personal communication, October 2016.
41 Nilsson, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 180-183.
42 Lamberto Zannier, “Unsere Instrumente funktionieren nicht mehr so gut.” Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft 
Journal, October 2016, accessed December 10, 2017, http://www.ipg-journal.de/videos/artikel/unsere-instrumente-
funktionieren-nicht-mehr-so-gut-1506/. 
43 Heather A. Conley, The Kremlin Playbook: Understanding Russian Influence in Central and Eastern Europe (Washington, 
DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 2016), accessed December 20, 2017, https://www.csis.org/
analysis/kremlin-playbook.
44 Fredrik Wesslau, “Putin’s Friends in Europe,” European Council on Foreign Relations, October 19, 2016, accessed 
December 20, 2017, http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_putins_friends_in_europe7153.
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As one scholar has written, the OSCE is “par excellence, a ‘soft security’ institution with 
extremely few material resources at its disposal.” Unlike other regional organizations such as 
the EU and NATO, the OSCE cannot exercise coercive power by imposing economic sanctions or 
threatening the use of military force. Nor, in the current geopolitical environment, can it credibly 
offer material rewards such as the prospect of EU membership, which served as a powerful incentive 
for cooperation by the Baltic governments in the 1990s.  The effectiveness of the OSCE depends on 
its ability to “use its moral authority as a principled organization and its limited amount of cultural 
capital (e.g. technical expertise) to exercise symbolic power.”45
In the current polarized international security environment in Eurasia, it is increasingly 
difficult for the OSCE to assert universally recognized moral authority. During the 1970s and 1980s, 
the CSCE took shape as a dialogue process between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in a period of high 
international tension and distrust, which eased temporarily during the decade after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall. To some degree, the rising frictions between the Russian Federation and its Western 
counterparts have returned Europe full circle to the geopolitical atmosphere that surrounded the 
CSCE’s founding.
Even in an inhospitable geopolitical context, the OSCE can make several valuable 
contributions to protecting civilians threatened by violent conflict in Eurasia: conflict prevention, 
crisis management, cooperative problem-solving, and the promotion of norms favoring peaceful 
coexistence of diverse ethnic and national groups. The remainder of this essay will address each of 
these aspects of the OSCE’s work in turn.
Conflict Prevention. During the recent period of rising tensions between the Eastern and 
Western factions of the OSCE, a number of efforts have been made to bridge this geopolitical 
divide and develop more constructive strategies for mitigating threats of violent conflict. In 
2008, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and French President Nicolas Sarkozy called for a 
new European security dialogue to discuss post-Cold War security arrangements.46 In 2009, the 
Greek Chairmanship of the OSCE launched a series of dialogues known as the “Corfu Process,” 
which sought “to strengthen the Organization’s responsiveness to conflict in all its phases,” 
including “early warning, early action, dialogue facilitation and mediation support, and post-
conflict rehabilitation.”47 These dialogues culminated in 2011, under the OSCE’s Lithuanian 
Chairmanship, in Ministerial Decision No. 3/11 on Elements of the Conflict Cycle, which affirmed 
“the Organization’s commitment to revisiting its approaches to conflict prevention and conflict 
resolution for the twenty-first century.”48 Among other things, Ministerial Decision No. 3/11 called 
for the establishment of a systematic conflict early warning system and a more robust mediation-
support capacity. Unfortunately, there has been limited practical follow-through on many of its 
recommendations.49
Crisis Management.  Some of the most intractable conflicts in the OSCE region—e.g. those 
in Ukraine, the South Caucasus, Moldova, and Nagorno-Karabakh—are located in areas on the 
periphery of the Russian Federation where Russia has a strong vested interest in the outcome. 
Given the OSCE’s lack of material instruments of leverage, the organization is unlikely to be able 
to successfully mediate such conflicts that have become locked into a “security competition” 
frame.  Nonetheless, it can help contain violence by focusing international attention on events in 
the conflict zones, monitoring developments, and providing early warning of potential escalation. 
The presence of an OSCE field mission or visits by the HCNM may also provide channels of 
45 Gheciu, Securing Civilization, 149.
46 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, “Restoring Trust: The Corfu Process,” December 1, 2010, 
accessed December 20, 2017, http://www.osce.org/mc/87193.
47 Alice Ackermann, “Forty Years of the Helsinki Final Act – Forty Years of Conflict Management,” in Četrdeset godina 
od potpisivanja helsinškog završnog akta / Forty Years Since the Signing of the Helsinki Final Act, ed. Mina Zirojević et al. 
(Belgrade: Institute of Comparative Law, 2015), 46; Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe, Ministerial 
Council, Decision No. 3/11 – elements of the conflict cycle, related to enhancing the OSCE’s capabilities in early warning, early 
action, dialogue facilitation and mediation support, and post-conflict rehabilitation, (Vilnius: OSCE, December 7, 2011, OSCE 
Doc. MC.DEC/3/11).
48 Ackermann, Forty Years, 46-47.
49 Ibid.
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communication between leaders of rival groups, which may help keep a lid on violence even in the 
absence of a formal settlement.
In Ukraine, for example, the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) has tracked the 
living conditions of the 1.8 million IDPs from Crimea and Eastern Ukraine since 2014, offering 
recommendations for how the government of Ukraine and international donors can meet the 
needs of IDPs and enhance relations between IDPs and host communities.50 The SMM issues 
daily spot reports on security conditions in Eastern Ukraine, monitoring compliance with the 
Minsk ceasefire agreements, and “engages with authorities at all levels, as well as civil society, 
ethnic and religious groups and local communities to facilitate dialogue on the ground.”51 Astrid 
Thors, who served as High Commissioner on National Minorities from 2013 through 2016, 
also engaged in efforts to “facilitate a dialogue between national minorities and the Ukrainian 
authorities on issues of common concern.” For example, she co-hosted a 2016 roundtable in Kyiv 
on “Strengthening the Institutional Framework Related to Inter-ethnic Relations in Ukraine in 
the Context of Decentralization.” Asserting that “improved policies in the field of inter-ethnic 
relations would help to consolidate Ukrainian society and would increase stability in the country 
as a whole,” the HCNM has worked to provide a platform for Russian and other minority 
communities in Ukraine to express concerns about the protection of their language and cultural 
identities.52
In less geopolitically sensitive regions, such as Central Asia and the Balkan states, the OSCE 
may have greater potential for robust conflict prevention and crisis response—but its record 
in achieving this potential has been uneven. For example, in May and June 2010, HCNM Knut 
Vollebaek issued urgent warnings to the OSCE Permanent Council on the risk of interethnic violence 
in Kyrgyzstan, asserting that the situation represented “one of the OSCE’s biggest challenges since 
the 2008 war in the Caucasus.”53 When violence between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks erupted in 
southern Kyrgyzstan that June, however, the OSCE Permanent Council displayed no appetite for a 
robust response. In the words of one commentator, “The lack of collective will by the participating 
States and the Kyrgyz interim government’s inability to take substantial steps in managing the 
conflict in Kyrgyzstan significantly curbed the OSCE’s room for maneuver.”54
Cooperative Problem-Solving. Even in geopolitically contested settings where a comprehensive 
settlement remains elusive, the OSCE may be able to promote incremental progress toward peaceful 
coexistence of rival groups. For example, in Georgia, where the OSCE field mission was closed 
down on Russia’s insistence in 2008, the HCNM has “encouraged the effective implementation 
of the State Strategy for Civic Equality and Integration for 2015-2020 and Its Action Plan,” and 
has “continued to support a project to facilitate interaction between the political parties in the 
country and national minority representatives, including by bringing them together to discuss 
topical issues on televised talk shows.”55 In Moldova, High Commissioner Thors worked with 
the parliament to establish a “joint working group with members of parliament and the People’s 
Assembly of Gagauzia” to improve “the functioning of the Gagauz autonomy,” and she has worked 
with the OSCE Mission to Moldova to address cultural and linguistic issues surrounding the 
status of Transdniestria.56 Thors also remained engaged in addressing issues related to citizenship 
rights, political representation of ethnic minorities, and protection of minority languages in a wide 
50 Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe, Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, Conflict-related 
Displacement in Ukraine: Increased Vulnerabilities of Affected Populations and Triggers of Tension within Communities 
(Vienna: OSCE, August 26, 2016), accessed December 10, 2017, http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/261176.
51 Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe, Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, “Mandate,” accessed 
December 10, 2017, http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/117729.
52 Thors, Address to the 1102nd Plenary Meeting, 4.
53 Knut Vollebaeck, “Early Warning to the (Special) Permanent Council on 14 June 2010” (statement, Vienna, June 14, 
2010), OSCE, 2; Frank Evers, “OSCE Conflict Management and the Kyrgyz Experience in 2010: Advanced Potentials, 
Lack of Will, Limited Options,” CORE Working Paper 24 (Hamburg: Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at 
the University of Hamburg, March 2012), 32.
54 Evers, OSCE Conflict Management, 40.
55 Ibid., 6-7.
56 Ibid., 10-11.
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range of other countries including Kyrgyzstan, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia-Hezegovina, Macedonia, 
Hungary, and Slovakia.57
Norm Promotion. Over the past twenty years, the OSCE has issued a number of statements 
of principles regarding the protection of minority rights, including the Hague Recommendations 
Regarding the Education Rights of National Minorities (1996), the Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations 
on National Minorities in Inter-State Relations (2008), and the Ljubljana Guidelines on Integration 
of Diverse Societies (2012).58 In documents such as the Charter for European Security, adopted at 
the Istanbul summit of 1999, it has also reaffirmed its commitment to “preventing the outbreak of 
violent conflicts wherever possible” and “to settle conflicts and to rehabilitate societies ravaged 
by war and destruction.”59 Beyond affirming these principles related to human security, the OSCE 
has sought to memorialize its operational approach to conflict prevention in documents including 
“The OSCE Concept of Comprehensive and Co-operative Security” (2009) and the Ministerial 
Decision No. 3/11 on Elements of the Conflict Cycle (2011).60 
Scholars disagree about the efficacy of the OSCE’s efforts to transform norms governing 
relations among diverse ethnic groups in Eurasia. Some observers, such as Wolfgang Zellner, have 
argued that the HCNM has been relatively successful in “de-securitizing” relationships between 
states and minority groups by “introducing international minority rights standards as the frame 
of reference for majority, minority and kin-States.” The HCNM, Zellner asserts, has facilitated 
“substantive short-term solutions with a view towards sustainable long-term solutions under local 
ownership.”61 Others have taken a more skeptical view: David Galbreath and Joanne McEvoy 
contend that “the HCNM’s role in societal security often appears to maintain the status quo ‘state 
vs. minority’ logic of the European minority rights regime,” and that the OSCE as a whole has been 
unable to transform the “zero-sum context” of interethnic relations in Eurasia.62
Despite the sometimes disappointing results of its conflict prevention and crisis management 
initiatives, the OSCE remains a vital component of the Eurasian security architecture, both because 
of its inclusive membership structure and because of its core mission to advance “common and 
comprehensive security” through a consensus-based approach. Yet, for the organization to play 
a robust role in addressing the urgent security challenges in contemporary Eurasia, it is essential 
that its participating States share a genuine consensus about the importance of protecting civilians 
threatened by violent conflict. 
One stumbling block to productive cooperation between the Eastern and Western participating 
States of the OSCE has been mutual suspicion over the other side’s motives. In Zellner’s words, 
“what the U.S. regards as democratization, Russia takes as destabilization.”63 As Alistair Miskimmon 
and Ben O’Loughlin have observed, a profound misalignment has emerged between Russian and 
57 Thors, Address to the 1102nd Plenary Meeting, 2-10.
58 Ibid., 13-16; Jennifer Jackson-Preece, “The High Commissioner on National Minorities as a Normative Actor,” Journal 
on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe 12, no. 3 (2013), 77-82; Organization for Security and Co-Operation in 
Europe, High Commissioner on National Minorities, The Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations on National Minorities in Inter-
State Relations & Explanatory Note (Vienna: OSCE, June 2008); Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe, 
High Commissioner on National Minorities, The Ljubljana Guidelines on Integration of Diverse Societies & Explanatory 
Note (Vienna: OSCE, November 2012).
59 Quoted in Nilsson, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 176.
60 Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe, Conflict Prevention Centre, The OSCE Concept of Comprehensive 
and Co-operative Security: An Overview of Major Milestones (Vienna: OSCE, June 17, 2009, OSCE Doc. SEC.GAL/100/09); 
Ackermann, Forty Years, 46-47.
61 Wolfgang Zellner, “Working without Sanctions: Factors Contributing to the (Relative) Effectiveness of the OSCE High 
Commissioner on National Minorities,” Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe 12, no. 3 (2013), 30. See 
also Knut Vollebaeck, “The Challenge of Diversity: Is Integration an Answer?” Security and Human Rights 21, no. 3 
(2010), 213-219; Franzisca Zanker, “Integration as Conflict Prevention: Possibilities and Limitations in the experience 
of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities,” Security and Human Rights 21, no. 3 (2010), 220-232.
62 David Galbreath and Joanne McEvoy, “European Organizations and Minority Rights in Europe: On Transforming the 
Securitization Dynamic,” Security Dialogue 43, no. 3 (2012), 274, 281.
63 Wolfgang Zellner, “Managing Change in Europe: Evaluating the OSCE and its Future Role: Competencies, Capabilities, 
and Missions,” CORE Working Paper 13 (Hamburg: Center for OSCE Research, 2005), 13; see also Dunay, The OSCE in 
Crisis, 73.
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Western narratives about the post-Cold War order. Rather than being recognized as “co-constitutor 
of this emerging system,” since the early 1990s “Russia has complained of being excluded from 
the major decisions affecting it.” Consequently, Russia “feels mis-recognized,” driving a “cycle of 
miscommunication, generating frustration on all sides and restricting the scope for cooperation.”64
During the 1970s and 1980s, the CSCE explicitly avoided establishing a democratization agenda, 
which the Western participating States recognized as a bridge too far for their Soviet counterparts. 
Instead, participants in the Helsinki dialogue process focused on promotion of human rights and 
other aspects of the “human dimension” of security, in an effort to build mutual trust and lay a 
foundation for a broader range of security cooperation activities.
In the current period of retrenchment in relations between NATO and the Russian Federation, 
it is essential for the OSCE to seek areas of common ground that can serve as a focal point for 
constructive engagement. A narrowing and deepening of the OSCE’s mission, refocusing on the 
objectives of promoting human security in regions afflicted by conflict, might help rebuild the 
normative consensus between Eastern and Western participating States and increase the OSCE’s 
operational effectiveness.
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Introduction
Slowly opening up to the rest of the world at the end of the Cold War, Switzerland has been active 
in various countries and context to deal with the past and prevent mass atrocity crimes as well 
as genocide for many years. These activities have been institutionalized by the establishment in 
2011 of a cross-departmental entity, the Task Force for Dealing with the Past and Prevention of 
Atrocities. Part of the wider peace promotion policy, the Task Force activities are thus a specialized 
area of activities in Switzerland’s foreign policy. As a consequence, they are influenced by the way 
foreign policy is shaped and by prominent political features of the country. 
The present article aims to confront the Swiss practice regarding the prevention of genocide 
and mass atrocities in Swiss foreign policy and its particularities shaping its international 
relations. Neutrality, a core part of Switzerland’s identity on both the internal political level and 
the international level, will be at the center of our analysis. Indeed, how can a country engage in 
prevention activities while keeping its neutral status? How does neutrality influence these activities 
across time? What foreseeable impact could neutrality have on them? 
Despite the institutionalization of prevention of mass atrocities and genocide several years ago, 
the Swiss government did not define in precise terms what falls under the label of mass atrocities 
and genocide, nor under the label of prevention. As we will see throughout our analysis, the lack 
of clear and precise definition is a constant in Switzerland’s foreign policy concepts and goals. 
While this can be easily explained (it allows the government some leeway in its actions following 
international and internal political circumstances as it is not bound by a precise wording) this 
shortcoming is a challenge to the present article. In order to remedy to this situation and better 
frame what shapes prevention activities regarding mass atrocities and genocide, the article will be 
divided following a macro to micro logic, going from Switzerland’s political and foreign policy key 
yet general features and principles, before addressing peace promotion, and finally mass atrocities 
and genocide prevention.
The present article will thus be divided as follow: the first part will be an overview of the Swiss 
government and the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (A). We will then lay out Switzerland’s 
characteristics shaping its international relations (B), especially neutrality, before presenting its 
foreign policy principles and objectives (C), with a special focus on peace promotion policy (D). This 
contextualization of Swiss institutions and foreign policy aims to enable a better understanding of 
how activities pertaining to the prevention of mass atrocity crimes and genocide are embedded in 
Switzerland’s political environment. The following part will present the evolution of Switzerland’s 
activities regarding prevention of genocide and mass atrocities, as well as the actual mechanism—
the Task Force Dealing with the Past and Prevention of Atrocities (E). We will consider how the 
Task Force is related to other areas of the government and the international community, what 
are its areas and countries of activities, which procedures it follows to start a project as well as 
the challenges it ought to overcome in the future. Finally, the last part of this article will present 
a critical analysis of the Swiss mechanism through the lens of its foreign policy and neutrality, to 
establish if—and how it is compatible with Switzerland’s neutral status (F). From the conclusion 
reached, the article will flesh out the future of the Task Force’s work in light of potential evolutions 
of Switzerland foreign policy and neutrality. 
A. Swiss Government and Federal Department of Foreign Affairs: A Brief Overview
In order to better understand the place of mass atrocity prevention activities in the Swiss context, 
it is necessary to step back and give an overview of Swiss characteristics likely to influence any 
foreign policy decision. These factors can be internal, namely the Swiss political system, or external, 
the Swiss key characteristics in the international realm. The following part gives a brief overview of 
the Swiss political system and government. 
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Since 1848, Switzerland has been a democratic federal state composed of 26 regional states 
called cantons. Its political form is a direct consequence of the country’s heterogeneous nature: with 
four national languages (German, French, Italian and Romansch), different cultures and religions, 
Switzerland’s population is extremely diverse. The Swiss political system is thus a multi-ethnic 
federalism, an alternative to the nationalist integration strategy that prevailed in Europe during 
the 19th century.1 Similar to the American model, the Parliament follows a bicameral system. It is 
composed of two chambers (the National Council and the Council of States), both representing the 
cantons.2 The executive branch of the government, however, differentiates itself from the United 
States: instead of having a government lead by a powerful single presidential figure, the leadership 
of the country is assumed by a council composed of seven equally powerful ministers, elected by 
the Parliament every four years.3 Each year, one of its member assumes the role of President of 
the Federation. However, while they are considered head of state, they enjoy no special political 
privileges.4 
Democracy in Swiss political culture is not perceived as a majoritarian democracy but as a 
consensus democracy. Thus the Swiss perceive that “[...] conflicts are resolved not on the basis 
of narrow and shifting majorities, but rather through negotiations leading to a clear majority or 
even total consensus.”5 Conceptualizing politics this way yields two consequences. First, political 
bodies should be drawn from all important groups (linguistic, geographic, etc.).6 Secondly, Federal 
Council decisions should be taken collegially. As such, deliberations within the Council should be 
led jointly, aiming for consensus.7 If consensus is unachievable, then the decision should be taken 
following the majority principle. However, once the decision is made, each Councilor must back it 
even if they originally adhered to the overruled minority.8 
Another strong political feature of the Swiss system is direct democracy. At the federal level, 
referenda are mandatory for all constitutional amendments, as well as the ratification of treaties 
concerning membership in international collective security organizations or supranational bodies.9 
The system also allows in the case of federal legislation, or permanent international treaties that 
provide an accession to an international organization, that contain important legislative provisions 
or whose implementation requires the enactment of additional federal legislation, for an optional 
referendum when requested by 50,000 citizens or eight cantons.10 If the voting population rejects the 
act or treaty, it cannot be passed or ratified. In addition to this post-facto procedure of democratic 
control, Swiss citizens also possess a right of initiative to modify the Federal Constitution.11 One-
hundred thousand citizens have to petition for the initiative to be put to vote.12 
These features have a strong impact on foreign policy making. Within the government, the 
lack of outright opposition, as well as the lack of election of individuals based on specific foreign 
policy goals, and the slow decision-making process inherent in collegiality help shape the way the 
1 Adrian Vatter, “Federalism,” in Handbook of Swiss Politics, ed. Peter Knoepfel et al., 2nd ed. (Zürich: Neue Zürcher Zeitung 
Publishing, 2007), 78-79.
2  Ibid., 78.
3 Government of Switzerland, Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation, 18 April 1999, as of 1 January 2016, RS 101, art. 
174 and 175 (hereinafter FC). An official English version is online, accessed December 28, 2017, https://www.admin.ch/
opc/en/classified-compilation/19995395/index.html.
4 Ülrich Klöti, “The Government,” in Handbook of Swiss Politics, ed. Ülrich Klöti, 2nd ed. (Zürich: Neue Zürcher Zeitung 
Publishing, 2007), 145.
5 Ibid., 149.
6 Ibid. 
7 FC, Art. 177.
8 Klöti, The Government, 155-156.
9 FC, Art. 140.
10 FC, Art. 141.
11 FC, Art. 138 – 139.
12  For more on Swiss direct democracy: Wolf Linder, “Direct Democracy,” in Handbook of Swiss Politics, ed. Peter Knoepfel 
et al., 2nd ed. (Zürich: Neue Zürcher Zeitung Publishing, 2007), 101-119.
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country is run.13 Moreover, referendum and initiatives can modify Swiss foreign policy, more often 
than not impeding a possible active and integration-based role in favor of a more protectionist 
approach.14 Swiss citizens strongly identify with the state’s emblematic political specificities 
(namely federalism, collegiality, concordance and direct democracy). They want to preserve this 
combined approach and are extremely reluctant to change it, especially when they feel pressured 
to do so by a foreign interference.15 
In Switzerland, state competences are divided between cantons and federal authorities, which 
are called the Confederation, on the basis of the Federal Constitution (hereinafter cited as FC). The 
Confederation’s executive branch has the task of implementing the law enacted by the legislature 
and is divided into seven Departments, each led by a member of the Federal Council: the Federal 
Department of Foreign Affairs, the Federal Department of Home Affairs, the Federal Department 
of Justice and Police, the Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection and Sport, the Federal 
Department of Finance, the Federal Department of Economic Affairs, Education and Research, and 
the Federal Department of the Environment, Transport, Energy and Communications.16 
Mass atrocities and genocide prevention activities fall within the competence of the Federal 
Department of Foreign Affairs (hereinafter FDFA). The FDFA is responsible for implementing 
Switzerland’s foreign policy and for protecting its interests abroad.17 In addition to its network of 
Missions, embassies and other representations abroad, the head office of the FDFA is subdivided 
into eight departments, each pertaining to a special theme. The State Secretariat is responsible 
for the maintenance, development and coordination of Switzerland’s bilateral relations with 
other States, as well as its multilateral foreign policy. The background work central to the proper 
running of the FDFA such as the development of foreign policy goals and strategies, as well as 
the identification of the current trends, challenges and risks is done by the Directorate of Political 
Affairs. The Directorate itself is organized into sections focusing on bilateral relations, multilateral 
relations, sectoral foreign policies, security policy and human security. Given the importance that 
Switzerland attaches to the European Union, a special Directorate for European Affairs has also been 
established. In addition to this political core, the FDFA also encompasses of the Swiss Agency for 
Development and Cooperation, which is responsible for the coordination of development activities 
and cooperation Switzerland undertakes, as well as for the humanitarian aid; the Directorate 
of International Law; the Consular Directorate; the General Secretariat; and the Directorate for 
Resources.18 
B. Key Characteristics of Switzerland’s International Relations
As stated above, while collegiality, consensus and direct democracy have an impact on foreign 
policy decision, the Swiss government is influenced by several other external factors. The section 
below addresses three key characteristics likely to shape foreign policy either during its decision-
making phase: Switzerland’s small state status; neutrality; and/or during its implementation, a lack 
of colonial past. 
Within the international community, Switzerland is distinguished from other states by several 
characteristics. First, Switzerland is a relatively small state. Surrounded by big European powers 
such as France or Germany, Switzerland has, from its historical creation in 1291 until today, been 
“a small state surrounded by much larger nations” whose “existence depended on the good will 
13 Jürg Martin Gabriel, “The Price of Political Uniqueness: Swiss Foreign Policy in a Changing World,” in Swiss Foreign 
Policy 1945-2002, eds. Gabriel, Jürg Martin et al. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 9.
14 The paramount example is Switzerland’s integration to the European Union: while it was a goal for the Federal Council 
to integrate the EU, repetitive plebiscites made it clear that Swiss citizens were against it. The Swiss government had 
to modify its approach and chose to pursue strong bilateral agreements instead.
15 Gabriel, The Price of Political Uniqueness, 8.
16 Government of Switzerland, Ordonnance sur l’organisation du gouvernement et de l’administration, 25 November 1998, as of 1 
August 2016 (RS 172.010.1), Annex 1.
17 Government of Switzerland, Ordonnance sur l’organisation du Département fédéral des affaires étrangères, 20 April 2011, as of 
24 March 2015 (RS 172.211.1), art. 1.
18 Ibid., art. 7-11; Government of Switzerland, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, “Organisation of the FDFA,” March 
10, 2016, accessed September 4, 2016, https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/fdfa/organisation-fdfa.html.
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of these neighbours.”19 The potentially threatening bigger neighbors have had a large impact 
in shaping the Switzerland’s foreign policy. That policy simultaneously pursued two different 
aims: to guarantee the collective defense of the Confederation against intruders while remaining 
neutral, and to ensure that its powerful neighboring states would not view its defensive policies as 
provocative.20 According to Graf and Lanz, “the two World Wars, in which Switzerland remained 
uninvolved, solidified the image that Switzerland, being smaller and less powerful than its 
neighbours, should refrain from competing with the big powers but adopt a niche foreign policy in 
order to maintain its independence.”21 
Secondly, and as a consequence of its small-state status and geographical situation, Switzerland 
has chosen to remain neutral when faced with conflicts throughout Europe.22 Neutrality was the 
political response Switzerland devised to counter its vulnerability among European greater powers: 
it allowed the country to protect its sovereignty and placed the principle of non-interference, the 
fundamental mantra of small-state diplomacy, at the core of Swiss foreign policy.23 Some have 
argued that neutrality stood for the absence of foreign policy.24 But Goetschel was probably more 
accurate when he underlined that “neutrality was actually a strategy for survival.”25 
It is not evident to establish prima facie how neutrality affects Switzerland’s foreign policy, 
and, in extenso, its mass atrocities prevention activities. In order to do so, it is necessary to layout 
what entails neutrality for the Swiss government, and how it evolved through time according to 
the international circumstances. In subsequent section (F), Switzerland’s approach to mass atrocity 
and genocide prevention will be analyzed through the lens of this conceptual framework. 
Swiss neutrality can be traced back to the battle of Marignano in 1515, however its status as a 
permanent neutral state has been formally recognized by the international community only since 
the Congress of Vienna in 1815.26 Since then, Switzerland has ratified in 1910 the two international 
19 Laurent Goetschel, Magdalena Bernath, and Daniel Schwarz, Swiss Foreign Policy: Foundations and Possibilities (Milton 
Park: Routledge, 2005), 14.
20 These two ideas can still be found today in FC, Art. 173 and Art. 185.
21 Andreas Graf and David Lanz, “Conclusions: Switzerland as a Paradigmatic Case of Small-state Peace Policy?” Swiss 
Political Science Review 19 (2013), 412.
22 Laurent Goetschel, “Foreign Policy,” in Handbook of Swiss Politics, ed. Peter Knoepfel et al., 2nd ed. (Zürich: Neue Zürcher 
Zeitung Publishing, 2007), 573.
23 Andrew Cooper and Timothy Shaw, “The Diplomacies of Small States at the Start of the Twenty-first Century: How 
Vulnerable? How Resilient?” in The Diplomacies of Small States: Between Vulnerability and Resilience, ed. Andrew Cooper 
et al. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 5.
24 Gabriel, The Price of Political Uniqueness, 15.
25 Goestchel, Foreign Policy, 573.
26 Stefan Aeschimann et al, Swiss Neutrality, 4th ed. (Bern: Communication DDPS, 2004), 10.
Figure 1. The full-size version of this figure can be downloaded at http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-
9933.11.3.1507.
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conventions respecting the rights and duties of neutral Powers. The status of a neutral state invokes 
rights and duties for both the neutral state and the belligerents states in times of conflict.27 While 
it is a political choice to abide by neutrality law, its consequences are of a legal nature.28 Neutrality 
law can be summed up as follow: as long as the actions of the neutral state do not interfere with an 
armed conflict, impeding or giving an advantage to one side or the other, the neutral state benefits 
from a special protection from the consequences of the conflict (such as the interdiction for the 
belligerents to militarily use its territory).29 Moreover, any action taken by a neutral state in order 
to protect its neutrality cannot be qualified as a hostile act by parties to the conflict.30 
A State can decide to stay neutral with regard to a specific and delimited armed conflict 
(occasional neutrality achieved by an ad hoc declaration), however Switzerland has chosen to remain 
permanently neutral. This implies that it stays neutral at all times, with respect to all conflicts. 
Although ad hoc neutrality applies only in times of war, permanent neutrality also creates duties 
for neutral state in times of peace: the neutral state cannot bind itself to any military obligations 
nor act in a way that would impede the realization of its duties if an armed conflict were to arise.31 
In other words, a permanent neutral state promises not to enter into preventive alliances,32 and can 
only enter a defensive alliance in reaction to a perceived threat.33 
Conceptually, neutrality has served two security purposes for Switzerland. On the one hand, 
it has protected the country from foreign interference. On the other hand, it has also proved useful 
to achieve domestic stability.34 As mentioned above, Switzerland is a heterogeneous country 
composed of several religions, languages and cultures. Given its lack of common identity, internal 
cohesion has never been set in stone, especially in times of European tension. For instance, the 
Swiss population was divided over whom to follow during the 16th century’s era of religious 
conflicts, as well as during the two World Wars. Picking a side would have led to internal crisis. 
Thus, neutrality avoided a potential national implosion.35 
It is worth noting that while the security and the independence of the country are mentioned 
in Article 2(1) of the FC, which specifies the aims of the Confederation, neutrality has been 
purposely left out. Neutrality actually only appears twice within the federal Constitution: Articles 
173(1) and 185(1) give to the Federal Council and to the parliament the power and duty to take 
“measures to safeguard external security and the independence and neutrality of Switzerland.” As 
a consequence, though neutrality is a central maxim that shapes Swiss foreign policy, it has to be 
considered not as an aim per se but as a flexible tool which can be used to foster its independence 
and security.36 
This flexibility is made possible by the distinction between neutrality law and policy of 
neutrality. All measures taken by the Swiss government that exceed its legal duties as enshrined 
in neutrality law are defined by its policy of neutrality.37 A neutral state must a minima ensure the 
respect of the relatively narrow neutrality law, but can make a political choice to go further. In 
27 Michael Bothe, “The Law of Neutrality,” in The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law, ed. Dieter Flecker, 3rd ed. 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 549.
28 Ibid., 554.
29 Leslie Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict, 3rd ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008), 297.
30 Ibid., 305.
31 Ibid.
32 For instance, a neutral State cannot enter a military alliance such as NATO. The principle of collective defence as 
enshrined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty would go against its neutral state duties in case of an aggression.
33 The threshold that allows the shift between preventive and reactive alliance is the gravity of subjective notion of the 
perceived threat. If it is considered as grave, “[...] caution would dictate the planning of a preventive alliance and the 
establishing of first (and secrets) contacts. The Swiss did just that in two World Wars [...].” Gabriel, The Price of Political 
Uniqueness, 11.
34 Aeschimann et al., Swiss Neutrality, 3.
35 Ibid.; Gabriel, The Price of Political Uniqueness, 9.
36 Government of Switzerland, Federal Council, White Paper on Neutrality, Annex to the Report on Swiss Foreign Policy for the 
Nineties, November 29, 1993 (FF 1994 I 150), 7.
37 Ibid., 8.
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this regard, “neutral politics have the function of protecting the credibility of neutral law.”38 For 
the Federal Council, this possibility gives to Switzerland a large freedom of action.39 The Council 
even considers that there is only one immutable principle in regard to its neutral status: the non-
involvement in an international armed conflict.40 
For the Swiss government, neutrality is a flexible instrumental concept that should be used 
to best serve the country’s interests, namely its independence and security.41 In that regard, the 
Federal Council considers it necessary to adapt its policy of neutrality to changing international 
circumstances. The Council justifies this approach not as a case of opportunism but as a way to 
preserve Switzerland’s stability and predictability.42 This concept implies that if neutrality were to 
be unable to best protect and preserve the country’s independence and security, Switzerland could 
renounce to its neutral status. 
From the Second World War until the end of the Cold War, Switzerland has followed a strict 
policy of neutrality, going so far as to refuse, in the name of neutrality, to adhere to international 
economic sanctions for a limited amount of time.43 Perceived by the population as the reason why 
the country made it out of the Second World War relatively unscathed, neutrality was more and 
more considered as an end unto itself rather than as an instrument of foreign policy.44 Despite the 
weakening of the nation-state era and the beginning of a new trend towards multilateralism and 
integration, as well as the radical power balance shift brought on by the end of the Second World 
War, this conception remained unquestioned for more than four decades. 
From the end of the Cold War, the shift from a bipolar to a multipolar world with the rise of 
new kinds of cross-border threats such as international terrorism, organized crime, environmental 
issues, etc., the strict understanding of neutrality that prevailed was no longer considered 
sufficient to ensure Switzerland’s independence and security. In 1993, reconsidering its foreign 
policy according to the changes occurring since 1945, Switzerland shifted from its traditional, 
more isolationist interpretation of neutrality to a more flexible approach.45 This new approach, 
called active neutrality, allowed for expanding its humanitarian activities and security policy, 
namely by increasing its cooperation with other states in order to fight and prevent these new 
threats.46 Two consequences arose from the government’s 1993 White Paper on Neutrality: first, 
it somewhat reduced the importance of neutrality.47 Secondly, it subordinated neutrality to the 
principle of solidarity.48 Indeed, according to the White Paper, for Switzerland to stay useful to 
the international community, “neutrality needs to be interpreted in light of the requirements of 
international solidarity and should be used to serve of the international community and world 
peace.”49 
Despite this redefinition, Swiss neutrality still plays an important role nowadays. While the 
obligations deduced from its neutrality policy have been gradually scaled back in the wake of the 
Cold War, Switzerland’s status as a neutral state was publicly reaffirmed by the Federal Council.50 
This apparent dichotomy can be explained by the role of neutrality as a cohesion factor: as Goetschel 
argues, “[neutrality’s] role as an identity provider has become neutrality’s most important function 
38 Gabriel, The Price of Political Uniqueness, 10.
39 Switzerland, Federal Council, White Paper on Neutrality, Annex to the Report , 7.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid., 9.
42 Ibid., 7.
43 Aeschimann et al., Swiss Neutrality, 6.
44 Gabriel, The Price of Political Uniqueness, 12.
45  The 1993 White Paper on Neutrality from the Federal Council brought Swiss foreign policy in line with both 
multilateralism and collective security. Gabriel, The Price of Political Uniqueness, 20. 
46 Switzerland, Federal Council, White Paper on Neutrality, Annex to the Report, 27.
47 Jürg Martin Gabriel, “Neutralität für den Notfall: Der Bericht des Bundesrats Zur Aussenpolitik der Schweiz in den 90er 
Jahren,” Swiss Political Science Review 1 (1995), 129-158.
48 Switzerland Federal Council, White Paper on Neutrality, Annex to the Report, 27.
49 Ibid., 11.
50 Goetschel, Foreign Policy, 574.
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since the end of the Cold War.”51 Indeed, a large majority of the population still continues to believe 
that the country’s foreign policy should be based on neutrality.52 Direct democracy ensures that 
Swiss foreign policy makers do not stray too far away from this popular conception, including in 
peace promotion and prevention activities. 
As popular but also foreign policy makers conception of neutrality and Switzerland’s role in 
the international realm does not always equate to the legal definition of neutrality, it is necessary 
to ask oneself how this Switzerland’s characteristics are likely to influence its foreign policy. 
Drawing on Holsti typology,53 Graf and Lanz consider the tendency to isolationism, a corollary 
to Switzerland’s small and neutral state status, as one of its national role conception—which they 
define as a “state’s self-image as well as the expectations it perceives from the outside world [that] 
are incorporated into the foreign policy-making process.”54 According to Holsti, “the national role 
of the isolate demands [...] a minimum of external contacts of whatever variety. [It] reveals fears of 
external involvements of any kind and emphasizes self-reliance.”55 Switzerland’s isolate national 
role conception should however be nuanced. While neutrality may play a great part in shaping a 
protectionist approach, placing independence and sovereignty at the core of Swiss foreign policy, 
other interests and characteristics may have a clashing impact. In that sense, Gabriel considers 
that Switzerland suffers from dualism: “economically, scientifically, and culturally the country is 
extremely interdependent internationally, while at the same time it places extraordinary emphasis 
on maintaining its independence.”56 As a consequence, he makes a distinction between “high 
politics” (namely security and other areas of high political importance where the Swiss are more 
protectionist) and “low politics” (related to well-being and technical areas where the Swiss are 
more likely to be internationalist).57 One could argue that given this dualism, Switzerland could 
be considered independent instead of isolate, as it lacks the fear element. Indeed, in accordance 
with Holsti’s definition of independent government, Switzerland stresses the element of self-
determination and interest-driven foreign policy, as we will see below.58 
Graf and Lanz recognize a second Swiss national role conception: the role of mediator-
integrator. Holsti defines mediator-integrator governments as governments perceiving 
[...] themselves as capable of, or responsible for, fulfilling or undertaking special tasks to 
reconcile conflicts between other states or groups of states. (Statements that referred to a 
mediatory role in only one specific crisis were not counted.) The themes for this national 
role conception indicate perceptions of a continuing task to help adversaries reconcile their 
differences.59 
As the isolate national role conception, the role of mediator-integrator is a direct consequence of 
Switzerland’s neutrality. Neutrality often entails an idealistic dimension, which compels neutral 
states to promote world peace through their services. This semblance of missionary faith can be 
explained following a utilitarian logic. According to Goetschel, “neutrals felt the need to highlight 
their own role in the international system, and for this purpose they conceived their policy as 
51 Laurent Goetschel, “Neutrality, a Really Dead Concept?” Cooperation and Conflict 34 (1999), 132.
52 According to the annual security studies by the Swiss Military College at the Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich, 
from 1993 to 2004, between 80% to 90% of the population thought that Switzerland should retain its neutrality; see as 
well Jean-Marc Rickli, “Neutrality Inside and Outside the EU: A Comparison of Austrian and Swiss Security Policies 
after the Cold War,” in Small States in Europe: Challenges and Opportunities, ed. Robert Steinmetz et al. (Surrey: Ashgate, 
2010), 181–198.
53 Kalevi Jaakko Holsti, “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy,” International Studies Quarterly 14 
(1970), 233-309.
54 Graf et al., Conclusions, 411.
55 Holsti, National Role Conceptions, 270.
56 Gabriel, The Price of Political Uniqueness, 1.
57 Ibid.
58 It could even be argued that its interest-driven foreign policy may lead to an “active-independent” instead of a solely 
“independent” national conception role. Holsti, National Role Conceptions, 268 and 262.
59 Ibid., 265.
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something ‘higher’, like an ideal of justice.”60 The mediator-integrator role is for instance embodied 
in the Swiss traditions of providing good offices in situations of conflicts. Switzerland can either 
offer its protecting power or can position itself as a facilitator in the mediation process.61 Another 
example is the longstanding Swiss humanitarian tradition—a reference to this long-time tradition 
is present since the beginning of Switzerland constitutional history, in 1848.62 
A priori contradictory, the isolate and the mediator-integrator national role conceptions are 
another dualism in Swiss foreign policy. Both roles co-exist as they are traditionally associated 
with different political trends and groups within Switzerland. One or the other can prevail at 
different moment in time according to the evolving circumstances of the international world. As 
we mentioned earlier, the Cold War era led to the prevalence of the isolate role conception, while 
since 1993, a more flexible approach of neutrality has allowed a more active mediator-integrator 
role. While peace promotion appears to be a logical extension of a strong mediator-integrator role, 
activities in the field are not completely put to a stop whenever the other conception prevails. 
Peace promotion, during tense period, is a way to demonstrate Switzerland’s usefulness to greater 
powers.63 
While Graf and Lanz limit themselves to two Swiss national conceptions, it can be argued that 
other role conceptions defined by Holsti apply to Switzerland. To name a few, Switzerland could 
also be considered as a bridge state, which completes its mediator-integrator role as it searches to 
build bridges between different in times of war and peace.64 Indeed, as Didier Burkhalter, Federal 
Councilor in charge of Foreign affairs from 2009-2017, stated: “the idea of bridge-building is also an 
intrinsic part of Switzerland’s identity and foreign policy. It is part of our political DNA. As a multi-
ethnic country with four national languages, Switzerland has relied on dialogue and compromise to 
ensure its domestic cohesion for centuries.”65 It could also be argued that the government considers 
itself bound by the defender of the faith national role conception in relation to its tradition of 
promoting humanitarian value.66 
Last external factor likely to influence Switzerland’s foreign policy activities, whereas the 
majority of European States have historically been involved on other continents, Switzerland has 
no colonial past. As a consequence, Switzerland benefits from a broader flexibility to undertake 
actions and programs with a broader array of international partners. This characteristic, in 
opposition to the ones mentioned above, may not have a significant impact in foreign policy making 
process. However, it may give to Switzerland a greater freedom of action in its implementation. For 
instance, peace promotion activities from former colonial powers may sometimes be considered as 
a new form of colonial interferences and be refused on that basis. Both the lack of colonial past and 
neutrality give to Switzerland a comparative advantage in its international relations.67 
C. Swiss Foreign Policy’s Principles and Objectives
To understand how Switzerland’s activities regarding mass atrocities and genocide prevention are 
enshrined within Swiss foreign policy, it is necessary to go beyond external and internal factors 
shaping foreign policy and define what exactly stems from them and constitutes Swiss foreign 
policy’s principles and objectives. As a consequence from Switzerland’s limited power as a small 
state, as well as its neutrality, direct democracy and federalism, Swiss foreign policy historically 
60 Goetschel, Neutrality, 120.
61 Government of Switzerland, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, “Good Offices,” December 18, 2017, accessed 
February 7, 2018, https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/foreign-policy/human-rights/peace/switzerland-s-good-
offices.html.
62 Graf et al., Conclusions, 413.
63 Ibid.
64 Holsti, National Role Conceptions, 266-267.
65 Government of Switzerland, Federal Council, “Good Offices: A Swiss Speciality” (speech, Valetta, September 15, 2016), 
accessed October 3, 2016, https://www.admin.ch/gov/de/start/dokumentation/medienmitteilungen.msg-id-60927.html.
66 Holsti, National Role Conceptions, 264.
67 Government of Switzerland, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, For Peace, Human Rights and Security: Switzerland’s 
Commitment to the World. Bern, 2012, 3.
Persoz
©2018     Genocide Studies and Prevention 11, no. 3 http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.11.3
83
has not been accorded particularly high importance.68 Until the end of the Cold War, Switzerland 
usually privileged the preservation of its independence through neutrality over its international 
influence.69 In the old Federal Constitution, foreign policy was given a single goal: to preserve 
Switzerland’s independence.70 Yet, the circumstances have changed. Switzerland has not been 
viewed as a small state since the end of the Second World War. Globalization and integration tend 
to question the viability and feasibility of a foreign policy based on independence.71 However, due 
to its political characteristics and its conception of its national role, changes in Switzerland happen 
very slowly.72 
As mentioned above, the reconsideration of Swiss foreign policy in a post-Cold War conflict 
led to a new approach to neutrality. More importantly, the extremely narrow foreign policy that 
prevailed until then was considered inadequate.73 The protection of Swiss sovereignty as the sole 
goal of the country’s foreign policy was abandoned in favor of a cluster of five programmatic 
goals.74 Originally issued in the 1993 Foreign Policy Report, the goals were included in the revised 
Federal Constitution of 1999, currently in force.
According to the revised Constitution, foreign relations are primarily the responsibility 
of the federal government.75 Cantons only benefit from a limited role in shaping Switzerland’s 
foreign policy, as they shall be consulted only if the decision affects their powers or their essential 
interests.76 The Constitution establishes overlapping responsibilities of the government and the 
parliament. Special committees of both chambers on foreign policy thus enjoy a consultative role. 
The Parliament in full form addresses only the most important treaties.77 Swiss people benefits 
from a broad range of opportunities to shape foreign policy, consequence of direct democracy. 
The electorate enjoys a right of initiative on matters related to foreign policy as well. The sole 
limit of this right is that initiatives must respect mandatory international law to be considered 
valid.78 Moreover, constitutional guidelines foresee a mandatory and an optional referendum on 
international treaties.79 
In addition to the potential limits put by the Parliament or the Swiss population, the government 
does not enjoy a complete liberty to elaborate foreign policy aims and strategies. Article 2 FC 
defines the overall aims of the Swiss government and states that: “[the Swiss Confederation] is 
committed […] to a just and peaceful international order.”80 More precisely, Article 54 (2) FC gives 
the Confederation the duty to “[...] ensure that the independence of Switzerland and its welfare 
is safeguarded; it shall in particular assist in the alleviation of need and poverty in the world and 
promote respect for human rights and democracy, the peaceful co-existence of peoples as well as 
the conservation of natural resources.”81
Article 54 (2) FC upheld the five programmatic goals established in 1993. In defining its 
foreign policy, the government should equally aim to 1) maintain and promote peace and security; 
2) enhance human rights, democracy and the rule of law; 3) advance prosperity; 4) reduce social 
inequalities; and 5) protect the natural environment. However, these goals have to be understood 
68 Goetschel, Foreign Policy, 573.
69 Ibid., 587.
70 Jürg Martin Gabriel and Jon Fanzun, Swiss Foreign Policy: An Overview (Zürich, ETH Zürich - Forschungsstelle für 
Internationale Beziehungen, 2003), 3.
71 Goetschel, Foreign Policy, 757 and 587.
72 In 2003, Gabriel and Fanzun considered that political changes to adapt to the post-Cold War era had only “merely 
begun.” Gabriel et al., Swiss Foreign Policy, 3.
73 Ibid.
74 Gabriel, The Price of Political Uniqueness, 21-22; Gabriel et al., Swiss Foreign Policy, 3.
75 FC, Art. 54.
76 FC, Art. 55(1).
77 Goetschel, Foreign Policy, 578.
78 FC, Art. 139(3).
79 FC, Art. 140 – 141.
80 FC, Art. 2(4).
81 FC, Art. 54 (2).
Swiss Approaches to Atrocity Prevention
©2018     Genocide Studies and Prevention 11, no. 3 http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.11.3
84
as an expression of the duty “to ensure that the independence of Switzerland and its welfare 
is safeguarded,” considered by Goetschel as the “supreme goal” of Swiss foreign policy.82 The 
revised Constitution thus adds the notion of welfare to the traditional goal of independence. In 
comparison with the 1993 Report, it specifically provides a special treatment to trade policy, giving 
to the government a task to safeguard Swiss economy’s interest abroad.83 It is interesting to note 
that the two national role conceptions of Graf and Lanz can be linked to this segmentation—the 
supreme goal might be attached to the national role of the isolate, while the five programmatic goals 
might be an expression of the mediator-integrator national role. As such, undertaking activities 
of prevention of mass atrocities and genocide seem to easily fall within most, arguably all, five 
clusters. They must however always be taken in accordance with Switzerland’s independence and 
its welfare. 
The elaboration and implementation of foreign policy is primarily the task of the FDFA. As 
we saw, the FDFA is divided in several units, usually given different theme of foreign policy. This 
subdivision is subjective. Subjects are often cross-sectional: while the lead role is usually the task 
of a specific unit, coordination and consultation of relevant divisions, sometimes even outside the 
FDFA, are planned in internal procedure (consultation with the offices). Goestchel argues that the 
adoption of five thematic goals of foreign policy is an expression of the thematic specialization 
within the FDFA.84 
The overall constitutional aims are concretized through foreign policy reports and strategies. 
They follow the implementation principles traditionally governing Swiss foreign policy, among 
which neutrality, universality, dialogue, efficiency and coherence, solidarity and responsibility. 
Indeed, according to the Swiss government, the importance of a State within the international 
community is also measured by its responsible commitment to face global challenges in solidarity 
with other States. While the principle of universality implies that Switzerland searches to maintain 
good relationships with every States, it does not mean a lack of priority. Actions are privileged 
wherever Switzerland can make a substantial contribution. Following a logic of efficiency, thematic 
and geographic priorities are periodically redefined according to Swiss interests and area of 
competences.85 
In the heart of Europe, Switzerland has since long put an emphasis on European States in 
its foreign policy. Since 2005, Great Powers, economically powerful countries, or countries with 
whom Switzerland has strong economic ties are also awarded a special position (in particular US, 
Russia, China, Brazil, India, Japan, and South Africa). Another special focus has been set on South 
East Europe since the Balkan war, motivated by the proximity of the conflict menacing Europe’s 
stability, as well as the migratory impact the war had on Switzerland. The importance of the Middle 
East has also grown over the past few years.86 
Currently, Switzerland’s foreign policy is defined by the 2016-2019 Foreign Policy Strategy, 
explained by a Message of the Federal Council to the Parliament.87 During that lapse of time, Swiss 
foreign policy will be embodied in four interlinked strategic priorities: relations with the European 
Union and the EU and EFTA member states, relations with global partners, peace and security, and 
finally sustainable development and prosperity.88 According to the Strategy, Switzerland pursues a 
pragmatic, citizen-oriented foreign policy, which, while flexible to rapidly changing international 
82 Goetschel, Foreign Policy, 577.
83 FC, Art. 101.
84 Goetschel, Foreign Policy, 582.
85 Government of Switzerland, Federal Council, Swiss Foreign Policy Strategy 2016-9: Federal Council report on the priorities for 
the 2016–19 legislative period, Bern: Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 2016, 7.
86 Government of Switzerland, Federal Council, Rapport sur la politique extérieure 2000, Présence et coopération: la sauvegarde 
des intérêts dans un monde en cours d’intégration, November 15, 2000 (FF 00.09); Government of Switzerland, Federal 
Council, Rapport de politique étrangère, June 15, 2007 (FF 07.058); Government of Switzerland, Federal Council, Rapport 
sur la politique extérieure 2015, January 13, 2016 (FF 16.009). 
87 Switzerland, Federal Council, Swiss Foreign Policy Strategy 2016-9: Federal Council report.
88 Ibid., 5.
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circumstances, is in continuity with previous strategies.89 Moreover, it considers that Switzerland 
is comparatively well placed within the international community and enjoys considerable soft 
power.90 
D. Peace Promotion in Switzerland’s Foreign Policy
The comprehensive overview of what constitutes and shapes Switzerland’s foreign policy gives 
us the necessary context to understand Swiss political choices regarding peace promotion, and in 
extenso, mass atrocities and genocide prevention. The section below will thus take a closer look at 
the field of peace promotion, before the subsequent section can address Switzerland’s approach to 
preventing mass atrocities and genocide. 
With one out of the five objectives enshrined in the federal Constitution and a specific division 
working towards its realization, peace promotion is an important part of Switzerland’s foreign 
policy.91 In that matter, Switzerland core objective is to “[...] build on its commitment to peace 
and security, lending significant impetus to a viable an just international order.”92 It is ensured by 
mediation and crisis diplomacy, as well as the promotion human rights, fighting against terrorism, 
and a continuous commitment to international law. 
The argument used to pursue the objective on peace and security is twofold within the 2016-
2019 Foreign Policy Strategy. First, it underlines the recent unrest development worldwide and 
the negative reverberations it has for Switzerland. Indeed, “as a highly globalized country with 
an export-oriented economy, Switzerland depends for its security and prosperity on a stable 
environment and a viable an just international order.”93 Secondly, Switzerland is independent in 
its peace commitment. It is not part of any military alliance, does not dispose of sufficient power in 
itself to impose solutions, nor has a colonial history. As such, Switzerland does not follow a hidden 
agenda. Moreover, given its multicultural population, democratic institutions and appreciated 
tradition to provide good offices, Switzerland possess the knowledge and first-hand experience to 
make a substantial contribution in peace promotion.94 
The conception of peace promotion as an interest-driven policy and as a tool to assert its 
position within the international community is regularly used by the Swiss government.95 As a 
consequence, peace promotion is usually fuelled by security, economic stability and migratory 
movement interests. Other arguments are also used for an active peace promotion policy, such as the 
expectations of the international community towards Switzerland, or its sense of responsibility and 
solidarity towards civilians whose security is jeopardized by conflictual situations.96 Sometimes, the 
government states that Switzerland has to be active because the longstanding Swiss humanitarian 
tradition shares common values with peace promotion.97 However this language regime has to 
be taken with caution. Indeed, positions taken in official documents undergo scrutiny from other 
states. Thus Switzerland has an interest to reaffirm its appreciated role in peace promotion as a 
self-fulfilling prophecy. More importantly, the documents undergo the scrutiny from the Swiss 
electorate. Convincing them that any foreign policy objective is well funded is especially important 
as direct democracy give them a possibility to impede, even to forbid government activities. 
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
91 Graf et al., Conclusions, 410.
92 Switzerland, Federal Council, Swiss Foreign Policy Strategy 2016-9: Federal Council report, 21. 
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.; Government of Switzerland, Federal Council, Message concernant la continuation de mesures de promotion de la paix et 
de la sécurité humaine 2012–2016, June 29, 2011 (FF 11.045), 5893-5896.
95 For instance: Switzerland, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, For Peace, Human Rights and Security, 3; Switzerland, 
Federal Council, Message concernant la continuation de mesures de promotion de la paix, 5887-5888; Government of 
Switzerland, Federal Council, Message sur la coopération internationale 2017-2020, February 17, 2016 (FF 16.022), 2459.
96 Switzerland, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, For Peace, Human Rights and Security; Switzerland, Federal Council, 
Message sur la coopération internationale 2017-2020, 2459.
97 For instance: Switzerland, Federal Council, Message concernant la continuation de mesures de promotion de la paix, 5886. 
It is interesting to note that this document even goes as far as to imply that peace promotion is vital to preserve 
Switzerland’s neutral status, for more information on this, see 5879 of this document.
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Currently, with a majority of the population convinced of the necessity of Switzerland’s neutral 
status, and a strong conservative political party traditionally against international involvement, the 
electorate can be the main detractor of an active Swiss foreign policy. 
Swiss peace promotion is presented in a general and to some extent programmatic document 
pertaining to Switzerland’s commitment for peace, human rights and security.98 More importantly, 
the Federal Council has to review past peace promotion activities and has to present new orientation 
and strategies to the Parliament, which in turn will vote an according framework-credit. For the 
upcoming credit term (2017-2020), peace promotion measures are for the first time part of the more 
general framework of Switzerland’s international cooperation. For this credit term, 230 million 
CHF have been allocated to peace promotion and human security activities. 99
According to the coherence and efficiency principles, Switzerland is active in regions and 
themes representing a special interest for the country and where its activities are likely to have 
a substantial impact and make a difference.100 The government, however, is reticent to define 
a long-term peace promotion policy. It considers that peace promotion strategies should be 
progressive, innovative and flexible to best suit evolving conflictual context and partnerships with 
relevant actors.101 Notwithstanding this concern, thematic and geographic priorities are defined 
 and regularly updated. The Human Security Division, in charge of peace promotion, is in 
priority active in sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa, in the Middle East, within the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and in several countries in Asia and Latin America.102 
Moreover, the HSD works mainly in four areas: peace policy, which aims to resolve conflicts 
through dialogue); to further develop humanitarian policy to ensure a better protection of civilian 
during armed conflicts; to strengthen and promote human rights; and lastly, regarding migratory 
policy, to better protect migrants and internally displaced people, and fight against human 
trafficking.103 
E. Switzerland’s Approach to Preventing Mass Atrocities and Genocide
Prevention of mass atrocities and genocide are part of Swiss peace promotion policy. Since 2003, 
Switzerland has taken note of the principles developed by Louis Joinet in a report to the United 
Nations Human Rights Commission. Joinet delimitated four key areas for action: the right to know, 
the right to justice, the right to reparation and the guarantee of non-recurrence.104 Switzerland has 
subsequently focused in these four areas in situations of serious violations of human rights and 
international humanitarian law. The underlining idea has been to avoid repetition of conflicts and 
other atrocities. 
Working within this conceptual framework, in 2003, the FDFA’s Human Security Division, 
which is subordinated to the Directorate of Political Affairs, began to develop a series of activities 
pertaining to dealing with the past and the prevention of mass atrocities and genocide. The HSD 
has focused these efforts on four particular areas of interest: peace, migration, humanitarian policy 
and human rights.105 Swiss activities for preventing mass atrocities and genocide were undertaken 
by the HSD peace promotion division. Given Joinet four key areas of action and the evolution 
of the international circumstances, it became clear that the complexity of these activities called 
for an interdepartmental approach. In April 2011, the FDFA direction decided to create a new 
98 Ibid.
99 Switzerland, Federal Council, Message sur la coopération internationale de la Suisse 2017-2020, 2454. 
100 Switzerland, Federal Council, Message concernant la continuation de mesures de promotion de la paix, 5889.
101 Ibid., 5897.
102 Countries are selected following a set of criteria laid out in: Switzerland, Federal Council, Message sur la coopération 
internationale de la Suisse 2017-2020, 2327-2328.
103 Ibid., 2464 – 2466.
104 United Nations, Economic and Social Council, The Administration of Justice and the Human Rights of Detainees, June 26, 
1997 (UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20).
105 Government of Switzerland, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, “Human Security Division,” January 1 4, 2018, 
accessed February 2, 2018, https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/das_eda/organisation_deseda/direktionen-
abteilungen/politische_direktion/ams.html.
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entity: the Task Force for dealing with the past and the prevention of atrocities (hereinafter cited as 
the Task Force).106 
The Task Force is responsible for ensuring that the Swiss strategy pertaining to dealing with 
the past and preventing atrocities is coherent and consistent across the FDFA. While formally 
attached to the HSD, the Task Force currently consists of eight experts distributed across the 
FDFA’s various departments. They are based within the HSD, the Political Affairs Directorate’s 
International Organization Division (where they follow discussions happening in international 
fora and elaborate Swiss positions), the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, and the 
Directorate of Public International Law (where they focus for instance on the complementarity 
between local, regional and international justice systems). The Task Force’s head office and Special 
Envoy, who typically chairs international committees when the need arise, are based within the 
HSD. The eight experts work together on operational tasks and meet bimonthly to review current 
activities. 
The Task Force’s one-year annual planning is defined by a Steering Committee composed of 
the Ambassadors who head each expert’s department. They issue an internal annual plan that lays 
out projected working over the coming twelve months. In addition to this yearly framework, the 
Steering Committee also reviews the work undertaken by the Task Force twice a year (mid-term 
and end of term review). Credits for the Task Force are included within the human security credit, 
which is part of the global framework-credit for Switzerland’s international cooperation. 
On a bilateral level, the Task Force has also been active in conflict and post-conflict situations, 
as well as in countries undertaking a political transition from authoritarian regimes. Its overall aim 
has been to bring about reconciliation in post-conflict societies, where tragic past events can create 
smoldering resentments. This resentment, in turn, if left unchecked, can lead to social tensions, a 
resurgence of violence, and can go as far as the commission of mass atrocities and genocide. By re-
establishing social cohesion and having a deterrent effect, dealing with the past is closely linked to 
the prevention of mass atrocities and genocide.
The Task Force’s conceptual framework of action has been constructed in a comprehensive and 
holistic manner, based on the four key areas set out by Joinet’s original principles and subsequent 
recommendations.107 The idea behind the holistic approach is that the four pillars suffer from 
mutual influence and are interdependent. As a consequence, the Task Force works on a long-term 
basis to reconstruct social cohesion between victims and perpetrators.108 Its goal is to bring about 
reconciliation by contributing to a conducive environment to facilitate dialogue and by providing 
experts. This does not mean that the Task Force is always active in each pillar. It will usually 
analyze the situation as a whole, taking into account the four pillar, and subsequently tailor its 
activities to better fit each situation. As such, it is difficult to layout an exhaustive catalogue of 
activities undertaken by the Task Force, as it is constantly evolving, based on needs and means 
at disposal. A tentative list can however be established according to the Task Force’s conceptual 
framework and past activities: concerning the right to know, the Task Force works closely with 
various fact-finding and truth commissions, on the safeguarding and the publication of archives, 
and provides assistance to the search for missing persons. Concerning the right to justice, it works 
closely with local, regional and international ad hoc tribunals as well as the International Criminal 
Court. Concerning the right to reparation, it provides assistance to ensure the restitution of goods, 
individual and collective reparation as well as psychosocial counseling, public apologies and 
erection of memorials. Finally, concerning the guarantee of non-recurrence, it provides assistance 
to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate combatants, to hold elections and reform institutions, to 
reform the security sector and the judiciary system, and to ensure no human rights violations 
or war crimes perpetrators hold a position of power, for instance within the armed force or the 
106 While it seems unsure why the form of “Task Force” has been chosen for the new entity, favouring a nomenclature 
featuring “dealing with the past” over “transitional justice” was a political choice. Indeed, it was thought that the 
former benefits from a wider scope than the later, and allows two approaches focusing on victims’ rights on one hand, 
and states obligations on the other.
107 Swisspeace, Un Cadre Conceptuel pour le Traitement du Passé. Bern: Swisspeace Essentials, 2014, 2.
108 Ibid., 2.
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police (vetting).109 The holistic nature of the Task Force is a direct consequence of Joinet’s principles, 
which set out individual right of the victim (or the family of the victim), collective rights for the 
society, and the duty for the state to ensure these rights are guaranteed and implemented.110 
It is important to stress that the Task Force’s bilateral activities are solely consent-based and 
only launched upon request. No action will be undertaken without official consent from the State 
where it takes place. While it incidentally safeguards the principle of non-interference, consent 
logically enhances the probability of success of any activities aiming to diffuse a tense situation. 
There is no official procedure for establishing a program within a country: sometimes first 
contact is made through embassies, but it can also be made directly by or through the Task Force’s 
head office in Bern. In the countries where the Task Force is active, a human security adviser is 
usually attached to the staff of the local Swiss embassy and serves as the focal point for the HSD 
experts. The exact nature of the Task Force’s work is extremely diverse, and is organized to best 
suit each national context. Switzerland currently supports several initiatives, in particular the 
Philippines, Guatemala, Columbia, Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo, Ukraine, Burundi, Mali, Chad, and 
the Middle East. The geographic areas of action change over time, depending on the evolution of 
international and national situations. It provides financial, logistical, and/or political support, and 
serves in an active advisory capacity.111 
The Task Force works closely with the HSD’s peace promotion section and the geographic 
sections of the Directorate of Political Affairs to implement its activities. As a practical consequence, 
even if the Task Force is not bound to work only in specific countries, it is somewhat constrained 
by priority countries listed within Switzerland’s foreign policy. Priority countries are strategically 
important to Switzerland, and thus any support provided to deal with the past and prevent future 
mass atrocities fits within Switzerland’s broader foreign policy goals. That was for instance the case 
in the Balkans, where Swiss programs were driven primarily by interests due to the Balkans’ close 
geographical location as well as by the conflicts’ migration impact. There have also been instances 
where countries with historical ties to Switzerland, and where Switzerland has had an active 
diplomatic and economic presence, have turned to Switzerland when facing difficulties and called 
on the Task Force for support. Colombia provides an excellent example: Switzerland extended its 
good office during the conflict and is now supporting the Historical Memory Centre. 
Considerations pertaining more specifically to prevention of mass atrocities and genocide led 
Switzerland to the co-organization of four regional forums in Argentina (2008), Tanzania (2010), 
Switzerland (2011) and Cambodia (2013). They have been aiming to raise awareness among 
participating governments about genocide prevention as well as to strengthen their capacities 
in this field by sensitizing them to early warning signs and encourage timely and efficient 
responses.112 
At the initiative of Switzerland, these forums led to the establishment in 2013 of a boarder 
initiative: the international network Global Action Against Mass Atrocity Crimes (hereinafter 
cited as GAAMAC). GAAMAC’s role is twofold: it has been conceived as a platform to exchange 
information on best practices; it also provides assistance to build states capacities to prevent mass 
atrocities as well as to develop and to implement national preventive strategies. In addition, 
GAAMAC also aims to serve as a bridge-builder between the Responsibility To Protect and the 
genocide prevention communities. In fact, the name GAAMAC was specifically chosen with an 
eye to attempting to comprehensively incorporate the themes underlying both the Responsibility 
To Protect and genocide prevention. To date, GAAMAC has hosted two international conferences: 
109 Ibid., 4-12; Government of Switzerland, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. “Switzerland’s framework for action,” 
January 27, 2017, accessed February 7, 2018, https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/foreign-policy/human-rights/
peace/dealing-with-past/conceptual-framework.html.
110 Swisspeace, Un Cadre Conceptuel pour le Traitement du Passé, 4.
111 Government of Switzerland, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, “Dealing with the past,” November 27, 2017, 
accessed February 7, 2018, https://www.dfae.admin.ch/eda/en/home/foreign-policy/human-rights/peace/dealing-with-
past.html.
112 Government of Switzerland, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, “Preventing atrocities,” November 11, 2017, 
accessed February 4, 2018, https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/foreign-policy/human-rights/peace/genocide.
html.
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GAAMAC I in Costa Rica (2014) and GAAMAC II in the Philippines (2016). Switzerland chairs the 
network’s Steering Committee since its establishment.113 
In addition to GAAMAC, the Task Force is also engaged on a multilateral level in diverse 
international fora, working especially closely with the UN’s Secretariat. Swiss diplomats have 
actively promoted and assisted in the development of several new ideas and concepts pertaining 
to the prevention of mass atrocity crimes. For instance, Switzerland launched diplomatic initiatives 
in 2005, 2008, 2009, 2012 and 2016 which led respectively to the adoption of resolutions by the UN 
Commission on Human Rights and by the Human Rights Council aimed at strengthening human 
right and justice in transitional processes. Switzerland also supported the establishment of a mandate 
for a UN Special Rapporteur For The Promotion Of Truth, Justice, Reparation, and Guarantees of 
Non-recurrence.114 Within the staff of the Special Rapporteur, Switzerland financed one expert’s 
position. At the country level, Switzerland was at the origin of the resolution A/HRC/33/L.10 of 
the Human Rights Council, adopted in September 2016. It requests a joint study from the United 
113 Global Action Against Mass Atrocity Crimes, “History,” accessed September 4, 2016, http://www.gaamac.org/about-
gaamac/history.
114 Government of Switzerland, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, “Dealing with the past,” November 27, 2017, 
accessed February 7, 2018, https://www.dfae.admin.ch/eda/en/home/foreign-policy/human-rights/peace/dealing-with-
past.html. 
Figure 1. Source: http://www.dealingwiththepast.ch/about/approach.html.
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Nations Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-
recurrence and the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the prevention of genocide. The 
study should address the contribution of transitional justice to the prevention of gross violations 
and abuses of human rights as well as serious violations of international humanitarian law and 
their recurrence. The Task Force also works with other international organization on an ad hoc 
basis, providing for instance, experts to the European Union at various times. 
Since 2010, the Task Force has also organized an invitation-only advanced lecture on 
dealing with the past and the prevention of mass atrocity crimes. The goal of the course is “to 
provide participants with in-depth knowledge of fundamental Dealing with the Past concepts, 
mechanisms, best practices and lessons learned, as well as an opportunity to engage in a 
process of critical reflection about different approaches to Dealing with the Past in post-conflict 
contexts.”115 The course brings together civil society professionals and state officials from 
various countries (usually around five states). While nationals are dispersed during the course, 
the course usually ends with a group work conducted by nationals of the same country, 
which allows them to reflect on the elaboration of a road map for their national context. Over 
the years, interest in the advanced lectures has grown. Since 2015, lectures can be offered for 
specific context on a case-by-case basis. Switzerland views the course, at least in part, as a way to 
construct and consolidate a network of experts on dealing with the past and mass atrocity crimes 
prevention.116 
Since its establishment, the Task Force has been confronted with a number of diverse challenges. 
Some challenges can be attributed at least partly to the subject itself. With the rise of demands 
over the past few years as well as the expansion of GAAMAC, the Task Force is victim of its own 
success: it currently lacks the financial and personal resources to address all of the demands being 
placed on it. As a consequence, the Task Force recently developed an internal set of criterion against 
which to accept or refuse requests for help. Switzerland’s foreign policy principles of efficiency and 
coherence may provide broad guidelines in this establishment. They must however be used in 
accordance with the principles of solidarity and responsibility. Establishing an assessment process 
is not an easy task and raises multiple practical and ethical questions. 
Challenges can also be due to the holistic approach followed. As a matter of fact, dealing with 
the past and the prevention of mass atrocity crimes are extremely sensitive subjects in usually 
extremely tense contexts. Activities must be the result of a good comprehension and inclusive 
planning, taking carefully into account the conflictual situation and possible impacts to avoid any 
escalation of violence. They must be sensitive and adaptable to the evolving conflicts dynamic 
in diverse political, social and economic contexts. Moreover, to avoid problems due to the lack 
of legitimacy and unfitting planning, a “bottom-up” approach elaborated with the inclusive 
participation of significant national actors should ideally be followed. While a bottom-up approach 
allows for the establishment of a fitting mechanism, it entails the challenge of defining measures 
and mechanisms for each situation which could contribute to the transformation of a conflict, to 
reconciliation and to the rule of law. These measures and mechanisms should not lead to impossible 
expectations, but should be realistic and take into account available resources, often scarce in 
conflict or post-conflict context.117 
F. Prevention of Mass Atrocity Crimes in The Light of Swiss Neutrality and Foreign Policy
The general overview of the content and evolution of Swiss foreign policy underlined the shift 
operated in the beginning of the nineties. By adopting an active neutrality, as well as defining peace 
promotion as one of the five constitutional goals of Switzerland’s foreign policy, the Federal Council 
paved the way for the development of peace promotion activities. Moreover, peace promotion 
was actively developed as a niche diplomacy substitute for the ailing Swiss good offices. Peace 
115 Swisspeace, “Goals,” Dealing with the Past: An Advanced Learning Course for Professionals, accessed September 4, 2016, 
http://www.dealingwiththepast.ch/about/goals.html.
116 For more information: Swisspeace, “Dealing with the Past Course,” Dealing with the Past: An Advanced Learning Course 
for Professionals, accessed September 4, 2016, http://www.dealingwiththepast.ch/course.html.
117 Swisspeace, Un Cadre Conceptuel pour le Traitement du Passé, 14-18.
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promotion thus developed and specialized in different areas where Switzerland, in conformity with 
its foreign policy principles, could be efficient and make a substantial impact. Swiss characteristics 
shaped this development. The Balkans war led to more peace promotion activities focused on 
dealing with the past and genocide prevention, as a way to ensure Switzerland’s security and 
economic and migratory stability, ultimate goal of Swiss foreign policy. Neutrality and direct 
democracy also influenced this development. Military peace promotion was forbidden by popular 
plebiscite in 1994 as a result of the right wing Swiss People Party’s action for an “Independent 
and Neutral Switzerland.” Participation in UN and OSCE peace operations has subsequently been 
accepted in 2001, under the condition that it should be conform to Switzerland’s foreign policy 
and that Swiss participants would only carry a weapon for self-defence and not engage in any 
enforcement action.118 This partial acceptance does not allow Switzerland to be a prominent actor 
in military peace promotion, which could also explain the strong focus given to civilian peace 
promotion. These multiple factors and slow evolution led to the establishment of the Task Force, a 
niche diplomacy that seems to be in concordance with the values and principles of Swiss foreign 
policy, as well as its neutrality. But are the Task Force activities really compatible with the flexible 
and evolving conception of neutrality? How can neutrality influence the future of Swiss genocide 
and mass atrocities prevention? 
The following analysis aims to first establish whether the Task Force activities abide to 
neutrality law in different conflicts configurations. In a second phase, they will analysed through 
the lens of the policy of neutrality and its defining characteristic, namely the Swiss national role 
conceptions as defined by Graf and Lanz. The last part of the analysis will address the future of 
mass atrocities and genocide prevention in the light of the conclusion reached at this stage.
As we saw above, the juridical acceptation of neutrality is relatively narrow and forbids the 
neutral state to intervene in armed conflicts. One can ask whether there should be a special exception 
excluding the application of neutrality in case of mass atrocity crimes and genocide. During the 
Kosovo war, Switzerland was confronted to this problematic through NATO’s humanitarian 
intervention.119 Switzerland addressed the hypothetical applicability of neutrality law to military 
measures taken as a reaction to mass atrocity crimes or genocide, in a case where the UN Security 
Council did not endorse the measures. The Federal Council made a distinction between ethics and 
neutrality. From the ethical point of view, the Council affirmed that States are expected to lend 
support to populations suffering or being exposed to grave mistreatment. In terms of neutrality, 
however, the Council recognized that Switzerland would have to decide whether or not neutrality 
law would be applicable. The Council considered it hardly conceivable that an unlawful use of 
force would not trigger the application of neutrality law, whereas the exclusion of neutrality, if the 
use of force was undertaken in accordance with international law, was a disputable matter. In that 
case, the Council fleshed out how the decision should be made. It “[...] necessitates a careful and 
comprehensive weighing up of all the interests involved. In so doing, the prevention of and action 
against international crime, respect for the prohibition of force and consolidation of the UN’s 
system of collective security will be as important as Switzerland’s interest in a coherent, consistent 
policy which—at least at present—seems completely guaranteed only by a purely formal approach 
(i.e., existence of a decision by a legitimized organ).”120 No subsequent decisions or positions were 
taken in that regard. While the establishment of a new circumstance excluding the applicability of 
neutrality law is still open, it is however not (yet?) recognized by Switzerland. 
As cases of genocide and mass atrocity crimes do not automatically exclude the application of 
neutrality law, the common rules for its application and content must be analyzed to know whether 
it forbids prevention activities. The Swiss government reaffirmed several times that the application 
of neutrality law was limited to international armed conflict, in situations where the UN Security 
118 Government of Switzerland, State Chancellery, Votation populaire du 12.06.1994, accessed September 4, 2016, https://
www.admin.ch/ch/f/pore/va/19940612/index.html.
119 The label of humanitarian intervention is controversial but as it is the terminology used, with caution, by the Federal 
Council, the analysis will use this nomenclature without questioning it.
120 Government of Switzerland, Interdepartmental Working Group, Swiss Neutrality in Practice - Current Aspects: Report of 
the interdepartmental working group, August 30, 2000, 16.
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Council did not legitimize the use of force of one State.121 This understanding means that genocide 
and mass atrocity crimes prevention activities are thus always compatible with neutrality law if 
1) they happen in a strictly internal tensions context (civil war, political transition, etc.) or 2) if the 
Security Council has endorsed one party, in accordance with international law. While legal, such 
activities must still be confronted to the prevailing policy of neutrality, as it will be done below.
The lawfulness of the Task Force activities in case of other conflict configurations is less clear. 
In the case of an international armed conflict where no side’s use of force has been legitimized 
by a resolution of the UN Security Council, Switzerland considers that neutrality law forbids 
Switzerland to militarily support a belligerent State.122 This interdiction is a corollary of the 
obligation of equal treatment, core obligation of neutrality law.123 However, it is nuanced: the 
principle of equal treatment only applies to acts of the neutral state which are of military relevance 
to the parties of the international armed conflicts.124 In a hypothetical situation where State A and 
B are opponents in an international armed conflict, State A is at the verge of committing mass 
atrocities against State B’s nationals. If we consider that leading prevention activities provides a 
military advantage to State B or military impede State A, then, by acting, Switzerland may violate 
its neutral state’s duty of equal treatment. While preventing mass atrocities committed against 
State B’s troops logically impacts the outcome of the conflict and should be considered as giving 
at least an indirect military advantage, the status of crimes targeting civilian is less clear. Indeed, 
given the psychological impact mass atrocities and genocide are likely to have on the victim State’s 
nationals, as well as how they weaken the victim State’s apparatus and economy, they could be 
considered as having an indirect effect on the military capacity of the victim State. As the Swiss 
government recognized in its 2005 Neutrality Report, it is debatable how far the law of neutrality 
governs measures which could indirectly influence the conflict to the advantage or disadvantage 
of one conflict’s party.125 While some argue that a broad notion of military support should be 
retained, which scope includes all indirect military support, the general acknowledged duties 
of neutral States, including Switzerland, tend toward limiting neutrality law to its military core. 
According to this understanding, providing indirect military support, limited to the principle of 
equal treatment in trade, is forbidden.126 As such, activities of prevention may lawfully take place 
in this context. They must however still undergo the policy of neutrality scrutiny. 
The same debatable analysis has to take place in the case of an internationalized internal armed 
conflict. In that configuration, State B might suffer from an internal conflict against a rebel group, 
whose committing mass atrocities or a genocide. State A and State B are not directly in conflict 
with each other. However, State A might be providing assistance to the rebel group in State B. It 
is unclear if this configuration enters the scope of application of neutrality law. If the international 
element of the internal armed conflict is deemed sufficient to trigger the application of neutrality 
law, then the same analysis has to be made to define if undertaking prevention activities are 
violating the neutral state’s duties. 
As we have seen thus far, activities of prevention of mass atrocities might be taken in 
accordance with neutrality law. However, if neutrality law does not seem to forbid all prevention 
activities, a State can still politically choose to go further by adopting a stronger policy of neutrality. 
Any mass atrocity crimes and genocide prevention activities that were deemed legal according to 
neutrality law must also be compatible with Switzerland’s policy of neutrality to be carried out. 
As aforementioned, Swiss policy of neutrality aims to give credibility to Switzerland’s position as 
a neutral state. As such, bilateral activities—if led in purely internal armed conflict context, or, in 
case of international armed conflict, if the activities do not fall in the scope of neutrality law—as 
121 Ibid., 13 and 16; Government of Switzerland, Federal Council, Neutrality Under Scrutiny in the Iraq Conflict, December 2, 
2005, 2.
122 Switzerland, Federal Council, Neutrality Under Scrutiny, 12.
123 Paul Seger, “The Law of Neutrality”, in The Oxford Handbook of International Law in Armed Conflict, ed. Andrew Clapham 
et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 257. 
124 Ibid.
125 Switzerland, Federal Council, Neutrality Under Scrutiny, 12.
126 Ibid., 13.
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well as multilateral activities irrespective of an armed conflict, should be analyzed through the lens 
of the neutrality policy.
Given its nature of flexible tool, there is no precise definition of what the policy of neutrality 
entails. Since the shift operated in 1993, Switzerland is following an active neutrality to answer 
global threat—in opposition to the isolationism prevailing during the Cold War Era—and should 
be realized “in the service of peace.”127 This conception is twofold: on the one hand, to compensate 
the loss of Switzerland’s importance for providing good offices, neutrality should be interpreted 
in a way that allows a stronger peace promotion policy. On the other hand, the Federal Council 
affirms that neutrality is subordinated to the solidarity principle, which underpins Swiss foreign 
policy.128 The Council concludes that “Switzerland will continue to direct its neutrality toward 
humanitarian and peaceful goals. [...] In shaping its neutrality, it will also take the needs of 
international solidarity into account in order to serve the community of nations. Swiss neutrality 
must remain a peace-promoting factor both in Europe and throughout the world.”129 
However, this ambiguous and vague definition of active neutrality does not necessarily 
mean that mass atrocities and genocide prevention are compatible with the current Swiss policy 
of neutrality. By using a deliberatively vague language in 1993, the Federal Council allowed the 
expansion of peace promotion activities, while keeping a leeway to forbid any future politically 
delicate activities in the name of neutrality. This seems to be confirmed by subsequent practice. 
Instead of better define what the new conception of active neutrality meant, the Federal Council 
used the same language on policy of neutrality in its two subsequent throughout analysis in 2000 
and in 2005. In 2005 however, the Council introduced a slight change to its reaffirmed position, 
stressing that “neutrality should not be equated with indifference” and considered that Switzerland 
activities aiming to increase the respect of international humanitarian law by the parties to the Iraqi 
conflict were deemed compatible with the Swiss policy of neutrality.130 An analogy could probably 
be drawn from this consideration for the Task Force multilateral activities, such as GAAMAC, as 
its aims are similar. On a bilateral level, it seems harder to conclude that the Federal Council’s 
previous positions expressly allows Switzerland to play a more active role within a country party 
to an international armed conflict. 
Given the lack of clear and written policy of neutrality regarding mass atrocity crimes and 
genocide prevention, and its evolving and fluctuant nature, we have to take a closer look on what 
is shaping it, namely Switzerland’s national role conceptions—which stem from neutrality and, as 
well as the aims of neutrality. 
As mentioned earlier, two main and seemingly contradictory national role conceptions are 
shaping Switzerland policy-making. The first one is the isolate national role conception—the 
tendency to fear and avoid international relations. The second one is Switzerland’s mediator-
integrator national role conception, which can to some extent be linked to its less pronounced 
bridge-builder and defender of faith national role conception. The inherent nature of mass atrocities 
and genocide prevention seems to be the logical extension of the mediator-integrator national role 
conception, and be in direct contradiction with its isolate national role. If we consider it to be the 
case, then the existence of the Task Force implies that the mediator-integrator is actually stronger 
than the isolate national role conception in the political sphere—and, through direct democracy, 
the public sphere— as it can afford to contradict it. 
However, another reading of the situation is possible. As underlined by Goetschel’s dualism 
between “high” and “low” politics, not every international relation is following an isolationist 
trend. Mass atrocity crimes and genocide prevention, though primarily aiming at avoiding the 
commission of atrocities abroad, are part of Swiss peace promotion policy and thus obey its 
interest-driven logic, fuelled by security, economic stability and migratory movement interests. 
Its secondary aim is thus to ensure Switzerland’s stability and security, as well as its well-being. 
127 Switzerland, Federal Council, White Paper on Neutrality, Annex to the Report, 11.
128 Ibid.
129 Ibid., 27.
130 Switzerland, Federal Council, Neutrality Under Scrutiny, 14.
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Because the work of the Task Force is not directly affecting Switzerland’s security, but only has a 
future, negative and difficult to quantify impact (in the sense that it does not improve but allows 
the situation to remain unchanged), it can be argued that mass atrocities and genocide prevention 
should be labeled as “low” politics. 
This second understanding seems to be confirmed by three facts. First, there is no available 
document issued by the government to confirm that the Task Force’s activities are compatible 
with neutrality. An internal analysis might have been realized, however, the lack of published 
document on the matter seems to attest that government policy-makers did not believe it would be 
in contradiction with the Swiss population conception of neutrality. Second, while neutrality is a 
recurrent subject of parliamentary interpellation, no parliamentarian asked the Federal Council to 
justify any genocide and mass atrocities prevention activities in regard to neutrality. Third, there 
has been no plebiscite regarding civilian peace promotion activities, in opposition to military peace 
promotion. The lack of reaction raised by prevention activities seems to confirm that they must be 
considered as low politics, which are not limited by the isolate national role conception. 
In conclusion, by following the current trend to limit the neutral state’s obligations to its 
military core, Switzerland excludes mass atrocities and genocide prevention activities from the 
scope of neutrality law. Moreover, as an expression of the mediator-integrator national role 
conception or as a matter of low politics, they thus appear to be in conformity with the current 
Swiss policy of neutrality. 
What does it mean for the Task Force future? As the policy of neutrality is conceived as a 
flexible instrument, its evolution is likely to influence Switzerland’s peace promotion and the Task 
Force’s existence. Changing international circumstances may lead the Federal Council to reinterpret 
Switzerland’s neutrality. One possible development would be to go even further than the current 
active neutrality, interpreting Switzerland’s policy of neutrality and neutrality duties in a narrower 
sense. In that scenario, the activities of the Task Force would remain unchallenged. 
On the contrary, if Switzerland evolves toward a strict neutrality due to the resurgence of 
a neighboring threat, similar to the integral neutrality of the Cold War, it would affect them 
to a certain extent, depending on the degree of the evolution. A first step would be to adopt a 
broad definition of what constitutes a military advantage in neutrality law, effectively forbidding 
prevention in international armed conflict. A second step would be the adoption of a strict policy of 
neutrality. In that configuration, the change in the political climate would likely result in a stronger 
isolate national role conception over its mediator-integrator rival. 
Two scenarios might unfold in this case: if mass atrocity crimes and genocide prevention stems 
from the weakened mediator-integrator conception, the reinforcement of the isolate national role 
conception will probably lead to discard prevention in favor of a more isolate behavior. If however, 
prevention activities are, as we argued, part of Goetschel’s low politics, then it is possible that 
they would not be challenged by the strengthening of the isolate conception. Given their inherent 
international nature however, it seems unlikely that they would not attract further notice. The 
Federal Council would probably have to realize an in-depth analysis of prevention activities 
in the light of their utility to Switzerland and the international community, and their potential 
contradiction to the aims of a strict understanding of neutrality. In case of clashing interest, the Task 
Force’s existence would probably be in peril. While it could be argued that the indirect security 
and stabilizing effects of prevention may be a sufficient replacement of neutrality, it seems unlikely 
that Switzerland would abandon neutrality in favor of prevention. Indeed, prevention, while it 
might ensure security, would not be able to ensure social cohesion by providing Swiss population 
with a distinct identity. Moreover, national role conceptions at the basis of prevention —mediator-
integrator, bridge-builder and to a certain degree defender of the faith—are a direct consequence 
of neutrality. It seems thus extremely difficult to replace neutrality by prevention, as neutrality is 
indirectly one of the justifications of Swiss prevention activities.
G. Conclusion
Before the end of the Cold War, Switzerland was following a strict policy of neutrality which tended 
toward isolationism. The shift from a bipolar to a multipolar world led to a new interpretation of 
the policy, which allowed for the development of peace promotion activities. Peace promotion 
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was then enshrined in the revised Federal Constitution as one of the five goals of Swiss foreign 
policy. Two decades later, a specialized and cross-departmental entity—the Task Force for Dealing 
with the Past and Prevention of Atrocities—was created. This specialization could be the result 
of multiple factors: the diminishing role of the good offices, the need to reassert Switzerland’s 
position in the international community by investing in new diplomatic niches, the impossibility 
to develop military peace promotion as a consequence of direct democracy, etc. After a few years 
of working both at the multilateral and bilateral level, following an inclusive and holistic approach, 
the Task Force has to overcome a new challenge induced by the lack of resources and lay out a set 
of criterion to accept or decline help request. 
At the same time, Switzerland neutral status did not lose its force. The Federal Council 
reaffirmed several times that neutrality has proven its capacity to protect Switzerland security and 
stability. As we saw above, neutrality is thus both what allowed prevention activities to flourish—
as a consequence of the mediator-integrator national role conception—and what can potentially 
limit them, as a consequence of the isolate national role conception. As we demonstrated, the 
current interpretation of Swiss neutrality law and policy is compatible with mass atrocities and 
genocide prevention. However, if new threats considered grave enough to adopt a stricter policy 
of neutrality were to arise, it could have serious consequences on the existence of the Task Force. 
A broader understanding of the interdiction to provide military advantages to the belligerents, 
including in its scope indirect advantages, may lead to the illegality of prevention activities. The 
strengthening of the isolate national role conception could also have an enormous impact on these 
activities. If prevention activities are based on the mediator-integrator national role conception, 
they may stop in favor of a more isolate behavior. However, if, as we argued, they are considered 
to be part of Goetschel’s low politics, they may survive to the strengthening of the isolate national 
role conception. 
Regardless of the national role conception’s affiliation of mass atrocity crimes and genocide 
prevention, the cessation of the Task Force activities must also be analyzed regarding Switzerland’s 
international relations. Indeed, neutrality proves a lack of hostility, but peace promotion proves 
usefulness vis-à-vis greater powers.131 In the light of Switzerland’s candidacy for the Security 
Council in 2023-2024, niche diplomacy will surely be highly put forward to distinguish Switzerland 
from rival countries. In addition, as Switzerland is a small, almost absent, player regarding military 
peace promotion, it will probably counterbalance this weakness by an active, efficient, and, more 
importantly, specialized civilian peace promotion. As a consequence of its candidacy, Switzerland 
will probably intensify in the upcoming years its activities regarding genocide and mass atrocity 
crimes prevention, especially in multilateral fora.
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Introduction1
“East Asia’s recent past is littered with examples of conscience shocking inhumanity against 
civilian populations,” writes Alexander Bellamy. 2 “Indeed, for much of the Cold War, people in 
East Asia were arguably at greater risk of death by genocide and mass atrocities than anyone else 
in the world,” Bellamy observes.3 He continues: 
Almost unnoticed, however, the region has been transformed. There are fewer cases of 
genocide and mass atrocities in East Asia today than at any point in history for which 
we have reliable records. This change has coincided with, and been informed by, a quiet 
revolution in the region’s understanding of the rights and responsibilities of sovereignty.4  
This “quiet revolution” is due in part to an unfolding commitment to what Steven Pinker has called 
the global human rights revolution, which broke out in the wake of World War II and spread to the 
countries in East Asia.5  
Pinker has assembled in his book, The Better Angels of Our Nature, compelling “big data,” 
drawn from a host of sources, that since 1945 the world community has experienced a significant 
reduction in the number of genocides and mass atrocities.6 While it is a controversial thesis that 
seems to be defied by current events, including President Bashar al-Assad’s barrel bombing of 
Syrian civilians and the rise of ISIS, Pinker has effectively answered his critics and has updated his 
argument.7 In comparative terms, “the world’s civilians are several thousand times less likely to be 
targeted today than they were 70 years ago,” argue Pinker and Mack.8 The development of norms 
by the global community that are then adopted by regional organizations like the Association of 
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)9 help explain the success of the post-World War II human 
rights revolution. 
The global community created the UN (1945), held 13 trials holding the Nazis responsible 
for crimes against humanity (1947-1948), and endorsed the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948), and more recently, the Responsibility to Protect 
doctrine (2005). The doctrine, based on three pillars, makes it a responsibility for the member states 
of the United Nations to prevent genocide and mass atrocities that may result from interstate and 
1 This article is based on a paper presented to the Carnegie Council for Ethics and International Affairs Global Ethics 
Fellows Fifth Annual Conference, New York, NY, October 2015.  I would like to thank Edward Luck, Dana Luck, and 
Alexander Bellamy for the conversations that inspired this essay. 
2 Alexander  J. Bellamy, “The Other Asian Miracle? The Decline of Mass Atrocities in East Asia,” Global Change, Peace & 
Security 26, no. 1 (2014), 1.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid., 1; Timo Kivimäki, “East Asian Relative Peace and the ASEAN Way,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 11, no. 
1 (2010), 57-85; Benjamin E. Goldsmith, “A Liberal Peace in Asia?,” Journal of Peace Research 44, no. 1 (2007), 5-27.
5 Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined (New York: Viking, 2011). Pinker’s thesis covers 
a 10,000 year period, not just to 1945.
6 Ibid.
7 Steven Pinker, “Response to the Book Review Symposium: Steven Pinker, the Better Angels of Our Nature,” Sociology 49, 
no. 4 (2015), 3-5.
8 Steven Pinker and Andrew Mack, “Why the World Is Not Falling Apart,” Slate Magazine, December 22, 2014, accessed 
December 30, 2017,  http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2014/12/the_world_is_not_falling_
apart_the_trend_lines_reveal_an_increasingly_peaceful.html.
9 The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has ten members: Brunei Darussalam, Myanmar/Burma, 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
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intrastate conflict.10 Luck and Luck correctly argue that R2P has been a success; it has been called 
one of the fastest-developing international norms in history.11 Beginning in 2005, the norms of 
R2P have inspired international activism, have been invoked in twenty-five UN Security Council 
resolutions, have been used to justify successful efforts to prevent or mitigate atrocity violence in 
Africa (Kenya, 2008; Burundi, 2008; Cote d’Ivoire, 2010; Libya, 2011), and have contributed to the 
reduction of mass atrocities in East Asia.   
I suggest that the reduction of mass atrocity crimes in East Asia can be attributed to the 
global human rights revolution and ASEAN genocide and mass atrocities prevention norms 
and mechanisms that work to assimilate the global values of R2P with those of ASEAN member 
states. The “ASEAN way” serves as a positive model for other regional organizations.12 To be sure, 
the recent mass atrocities committed against the Rohingya civilians in Myanmar, a member of 
ASEAN, illustrate that the creation of shared human rights norms may be a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for the prevention of human rights abuses. However, the horror visited upon 
the Rohingya stands out in relief against a relatively violence-free period in the region, and as a 
2015 report issued by the Holocaust Museum indicated, there were many warning signs, including 
the violation of accepted regional and international norms of human rights, suggesting that the 
Rohingya would become targets of mass atrocities.13 The government of Myanmar has violated 
established international and ASEAN human rights norms; the issue now concerns the political 
will needed to enforce the norms. 
Bellamy is careful to acknowledge that the acceptance of the R2P norm is but one of four 
factors in the reduction of mass atrocities in Southeast Asia:
The dramatic and sustained decline of genocide and mass atrocities in East Asia was not 
produced by any single factor, but by the combined effects of at least four important ones: a 
reduction in the deliberate targeting of civilians in war, growing incomes across the region, 
creeping democratization, and changing ideas about the nature of sovereignty and the 
responsibilities for protection.14
Three of these factors, Bellamy observes, are structural; the fourth is cultural and symbolic, a result 
of the incorporation of norms adapting the values of global human rights and R2P to those of East 
Asia.15 These structural forces have played powerful roles in the reduction of mass atrocities and in 
the creation of prevention mechanisms. Research has suggested as well that these structural factors 
alone, without the appropriate cultural and ideational norms, do not and cannot lead to reduction 
in mass atrocities.16 In the case of East Asia, it is clear that the establishment of human rights 
norms and the values codified in R2P have played a role in the reduction of atrocities. As Pinker, 
Bellamy, and others document, the structural factors that influence the outbreak or prevention of 
mass atrocities are framed by ideas, norms, and discourse.17 The post-World War II human rights 
revolution has, in Bellamy’s words, altered the thinking in East Asian countries 
10 Alexander J. Bellamy, ed., The Responsibility to Protect: A Defense (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
11 Edward C. Luck and Dana Luck, “The Individual Responsibility to Protect,” in Reconstructing Atrocity Prevention, eds. 
Sheri P. Rosenberg, Tibi Galis, and Alex Zucker (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 207–248.
12 Mikio Oishi, “Can ASEAN Cope with ‘Human Insecurity’ in Southeast Asia? In Search of a New ASEAN Way,” in 
Human Insecurities in Southeast Asia, Vol. 5, eds. Paul J. Carnegie, Victor T. King, and Zawawi Ibrahim (New York: 
Springer, 2016), 103-119.
13 United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, They Want Us All To Go Away: Early Warning Signs of Genocide in Burma 
(Washington D.C.: United Holocaust Museum Press, 2015). 
14 Bellamy, The Responsibility to Protect, 19.
15 Ibid., 1-2; Bellamy, The Other Asian Miracle?.
16 Bellamy, The Other Asian Miracle?; Jennifer M. Welsh, “Norm Contestation and the Responsibility to Protect,” Global 
Responsibility to Protect 5, no. 4 (2013), 365-396; Noële Crossley, Evaluating the Responsibility to Protect: Mass Atrocity 
Prevention as a Consolidating Norm in International Society (New York: Routledge, 2016).
17 Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature; Alexander  J. Bellamy, “Atrocity Prevention: From Promise to Practice in the Asia 
Pacific,” Global Responsibility to Protect 8, no. 2-3 (2016), 180-199.
The Reduction of Mass Atrocity Crimes in East Asia
©2018     Genocide Studies and Prevention 11, no. 3 http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.11.3
100
about what constitutes legitimate conduct. These ideational shifts, which came in part from 
global transformations, and in part from within the region, were transmitted by the region’s 
growing middle class and activist civil societies and changed the expectations about the 
proper relationship between governments and peoples.18 
Scholars have corroborated Bellamy’s conclusions: Okere, Aning, and Nelson find that the 
countries of ASEAN “have become increasingly involved in moving the [R2P] norm from rhetoric 
to practice.”19 While there is a significant body of work that examines the three structural factors 
that play significant roles in the decline of genocide and mass atrocity in East Asia, I seek here 
to briefly explain how ASEAN’s genocide and mass atrocity prevention mechanisms intended 
to foster changes in thinking and norms about human rights have contributed to the atrocity 
prevention mechanisms and how they are evolving. 
ASEAN was formed in 1967 to promote economic development and regional stability and 
has contributed to the reduction in interstate war in the region.20 However, until the creation of 
the R2P doctrine, ASEAN countries did not concern themselves with the mass atrocities that have 
taken place within the borders of their member states until the advent of R2P. The Asia Pacific 
Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (APCR2P is “the most important norm entrepreneur and 
advocate for R2P in Southeast Asia…”).21 The Centre “has led efforts to socialize the region on the 
2005 version of R2P” and seeks to embed the three pillars of R2P, including extension of the human 
rights imperative into the internal politics of ASEAN member countries. 22 Launched in February 
2008 with the help of Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations Edward Luck and former 
Foreign Minister of Canada Lloyd Axworthy, the aspiration of the Centre, observes Noel Morada, 
one of the Centre’s directors, is to build “domestic constituencies around” the R2P norm with its 
various programs.23 
To build the R2P norm, the APCR2P uses a “bottom-up” approach through use of seminars and 
workshops at the local level in the Asia-Pacific region on R2P and offers scholars the opportunity 
to conduct policy-relevant, peer-reviewed academic research. The efforts of the Centre and the 
more general and gradual acceptance in the region of the responsibilities of the state to protect its 
citizens, and when it doesn’t, the responsibility of outside bodies to assist or to intervene to protect 
human beings, irrespective of their geographical location, has borne some fruit in Southeast Asia. 
The consensus of the emerging literature suggests that if global norms of human rights are to find 
a place in ASEAN mass atrocity prevention mechanisms, they will need to be grafted onto those 
that currently rule in the region; they cannot be imposed.24
The first mission of the APCR2P is to offer R2P norm-building training, projects, activities, 
and workshops. Noel Morada, after conducting a series of interviews and workshops at different 
locations in the Asia-Pacific region in 2005 to determine what might be done to promote R2P norms, 
identified three best practices: translations of important UN and R2P materials into East Asian 
languages, development and inclusion of R2P materials in the curriculum of East Asian universities, 
and R2P workshops for government officials, military personnel, and important civilian groups. 
The legacy of the Centre’s first R2P constituency-building workshop, hosted by the Centre in the 
Philippines on June 25-26, 2009, is of importance. The workshop brought representatives from 
18 Bellamy, The Responsibility to Protect, 14.
19 Frank Okere, Kwesi Aning, and Susan Nelson, “Article 4(H) of the African Union Constitutive Act,” in Africa and the 
Responsibility to Protect: Article 4(H) of the African Union Constitutive Act, eds. Dan Kuwali and Frans Viljoen (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2013), 279.
20 Kivimäki, East Asian Relative Peace, 57-58.
21 David Capie, “The Responsibility to Protect Norm in Southeast Asia: Framing, Resistance and the Localization Myth,” 
The Pacific Review 25, no. 1 (2012), 82.
22 Ramesh Thakur, “The Responsibility to Protect at 15,” International Affairs 92, no. 2 (2016), 430.
23 Noel M. Morada, “ASEAN Responses to the Responsibility to Protect: Challenges, Opportunities and Constraints,” in 
Responsibility to Protect: From Principle to Practice, eds. Julia Hoffmann, André Nollkaemper, and Isabelle Swerissen 
(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012), 242.
24 Capie, The Responsibility to Protect Norm in Southeast Asia, 75-93.
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all of the important constituencies and focused on how the R2P norm could be promoted in the 
Philippines. Morada reports that the workshop played an important role in providing information 
on R2P to the Philippines’ Department of Foreign Affairs, which in turn influenced the Philippines’ 
taken on R2P during a meeting about the doctrine at the UN in July 2009.25
The second mission of the Centre is to promote research on R2P. The Centre has served as a 
publishing house for works of research and as a scholarly clearinghouse for R2P in the Asia-Pacific 
region. The APCR2P website hosts an “R2P Ideas in Brief” webpage. As a “resource hub,” the 
webpage lists reports, podcasts, newsletters, and issue briefs outlining problems facing R2P. The 
Centre has published full reports. A review of the “Ideas in Brief,” which lists five annual volumes 
of research summaries of major issues, reveals well-researched and written case studies of R2P as 
applied to human rights problems in the Asia-Pacific region.26 Individual scholars sponsored by 
the Centre have made significant scholarly contributions to our understanding of genocide and 
mass atrocity prevention mechanisms set forth by ASEAN. Two stand out as norm entrepreneurs: 
Noel Morada and Alexander J. Bellamy. Both have provided comprehensive treatments of 
efforts made by ASEAN member states to establish and develop the architecture for atrocity 
prevention. 
Morada, in his 2006 article “R2P Roadmap in Southeast Asia: Challenges and Prospects,” 
outlined a future of R2P in the Asia-Pacific region.27 Written one year after the doctrine was 
endorsed by the United Nations, Morada’s contribution is prescient, as he accurately predicted 
both the obstacles to and the promise of implementing R2P in Southeast Asia. ASEAN member 
states, with their principle of noninterference, have successfully avoided interstate war, but the 
principle undercuts interference and interventions that might prevent mass atrocities committed 
by ASEAN member states against its citizens.28 Morada has led efforts to embed the values of R2P 
in the East Asian cultural context.  
Bellamy is a prolific author, and he has emerged as an international authority on R2P.  His 
articles in Ethics and International Affairs, reviewing R2P at five years (2010) and at ten years (2015), 
are major contributions to an understanding of R2P’s perils and potential. Articles published in 2008 
(on conflict prevention and the responsibility to protect), 2009 (on R2P in the Asia-Pacific region), 
three in 2011 (on R2P, the invasion of Libya, global politics, and international law), and his 2015 The 
Responsibility to Protect: A Defense (Oxford University Press) contribute to an understanding of R2P 
and the importance of norms and their creation, adaptation, and adoption.29 Morada and Bellamy 
provide important leadership and support for ASEAN member states to implant the norms of 
human rights and R2P as mass atrocity prevention mechanisms. 
25 Morada, “ASEAN Responses,” 243.
26 See for example, Garima Mohan, “India and the Responsibility to Protect,” R2P Ideas in Brief 4, no. 3 (2014), 1-9.
27 Noel M. Morada, “R2P Roadmap in Southeast Asia: Challenges and Prospects,” UNISCI discussion papers, no. 11 (2006), 
59-70. 
28 Ibid.; Noel M. Morada, “Entrenching Responsibility to Protect in the Asia-Pacific,” in The Globalization of World Politics: 
Case Studies from Australia, New Zealand and the Asia Pacific, eds. Charles Hawkesly and Nichole Georgeou (South 
Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2014); Noel M. Morada, “Institutionalization of Regional Order: Between Norms 
and Balance of Power,” in Regional Order in East Asia: ASEAN and Japan Perspectives, ed. Jun Tsunekawa (Tokyo: 
National Institute for Defense Studies, 2007); Noel M. Morada, “The Association of Southeast Asian Nations,” in 
An Institutional Approach to the Responsibility to Protect, eds. Zyberi Gentian and Kevin T. Mason (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013); Noel M. Morada, “The Responsibility to Protect: Why This Evolving Norm 
Matters and Is Here to Stay,” in Debating the Endtimes of Human Rights: Activism and Institutions in a Neo-Westphalian 
World, eds. Doutje Lettinga and Lars van Troost (Amsterdam: The Strategic Studies Project, Amnesty International 
Netherlands, 2014).
29 Alexander J. Bellamy, “Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and Humanitarian Intervention 
after Iraq,” Ethics & International Affairs 19, no. 2 (2005), 31-54; Alexander J. Bellamy, “Whither the Responsibility to 
Protect? Humanitarian Intervention and the 2005 World Summit,” Ethics & International Affairs 20, no. 2 (2006), 143-
169; Alexander J. Bellamy and Sara E. Davies, “The Responsibility to Protect in the Asia-Pacific Region,” Security 
Dialogue 40, no. 6 (2009), 547-574; Alexander J. Bellamy, Global Politics and the Responsibilty to Protect: From Words to 
Deeds (London and New York: Routledge, 2011); Alexander J. Bellamy, Sara Ellen Davies, and Luke Glanville, The 
Responsibility to Protect and International Law (Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011); Bellamy, The 
Other Asian Miracle?,1-19; Alexander J. Bellamy, “The Responsibility to Protect Turns Ten,” Ethics & International Affairs 
29, no. 2 (2015), 161-185; Bellamy, The Responsibility to Protect.
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Seaman writes that ASEAN “provides one of the most interesting case studies in relation to 
R2P.”30 Although Morada notes that the doctrine “remains a difficult norm to promote and gain 
acceptance in South-East Asia,” some progress is evident.31 R2P seems to be “making significant 
inroads as a regional norm in the Asia-Pacific region”32 and has “great promise as a norm developer 
for the principles of underpinning conflict prevention...”33 The literature suggests that at least four 
norms, with varying levels of acceptance, are in use or development by ASEAN member states. 
The ASEAN Way: The Norm of Collective Decision Making through Networked Civil 
Societies in South East Asia
The formation of ASEAN in 1967 fostered diplomatic communication, promoted the creation of 
shared values among the ten-member states, and helped create a regional civil society. As Morada 
writes,
For almost 40 years, ASEAN has relied principally on norm-building and promotion to 
manage inter-state conflicts... Much of the pressure [to create norms] emanates from an 
increasingly networked civil society groups in Southeast Asia, which has undeniably become 
a moral force to contend with especially on humanitarian issues and concerns. In short, 
ASEAN states cannot just simply ignore the emergence of a regional civil society that now 
serves as the main avenue for promoting more people-oriented norms in ASEAN.34 
ASEAN, according to James Waller’s recent survey, “has demonstrated a constructive capacity 
to partner with existing institutions, mechanisms, and relevant government actors of the 10 
countries within their organization to promote genocide prevention.”35 After the end of the Cold 
War, ASEAN countries sought to create shared norms between 1997 and 2007, which then led 
community building between 2008 and 2015.36 To be sure, the progress toward shared norms has 
not been without setbacks, as ASEAN’s collective decision making resists rapid implementation of 
new values. Rather, over time, the networked ASEAN civil societies work out through compromise 
and accommodation the tensions between global and local norms.37  
Bellamy points to the numerous efforts made by his Centre and ASEAN member states to 
promote atrocity prevention. There are a “number of regional initiatives” under way to strengthen 
mass atrocity prevention norms, including the Asia Pacific Partnership for Atrocities Prevention.38 
These initiatives build from the progress made to prevent mass atrocities in the region, doing 
so by recognizing that individual nations will need to assimilate global human rights values 
through dialogue and debate. ASEAN uses a consensus model of decision making, with all of 
its drawbacks and strengths. While it takes time to secure a consensus, a process Bellamy rightly 
calls “exasperating,” the shared judgments that produce norms are “sustainable and considered 
legitimate.”39 The progress to establish norms against mass atrocity made through the networked 
30 Kate Seaman, “The Regionalization of the Responsibilty to Protect,” in The Responsibility to Protect and the Third Pillar: 
Legitimacy and Operationalization, eds. Daniel Fiott and Joachim Koops (New York: Springer, 2014), 63.
31 Morada, The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 248.
32 David Carment, Joe Landry, and Sean Winchester,“The Role of Regional Organizations: A Responsibility Gap?,” in 
The Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect, eds. Alexander  J. Bellamy and Timothy Dunne (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016), 360.
33 Alexander J. Bellamy and Timothy Dunne, The Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2016).
34 Morada, R2P Roadmap in Southeast Asia, 64-65.
35 James Waller, Confronting Evil: Engaging Our Responsibility to Prevent Genocide (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 
196.
36 Noel M. Morada, “Southeast Asian Regionalism, Norm Promotion and Capacity Building for Human Protection: An 
Overview,” Global Responsibility to Protect 8, no. 2-3 (2016): 118-119.
37 Sarah Teitt, “Asia Pacific and South Asia,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect, eds. Alexander  J. 
Bellamy and Timothy Dunne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 380-381.
38 Bellamy, Atrocity Prevention: From Promise to Practice, 187.
39 Ibid., 189.
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civil societies of ASEAN member states has been, in Bellamy’s judgment, “impressive.”40 As a 
preventative mechanism, the collective decision making based on consensus is understood as the 
“ASEAN Way.”41 ASEAN has, over time, assimilated some of the global human rights norms.
The Norms of Global Human Rights 
Although Bellamy categorizes the decrease in the use of mass atrocities as a stratagem of war 
as a structural factor, he also acknowledges that the “principal reasons why states have moved 
away from employing mass atrocities as a tactic are both ideational and material in nature.”42 
The creation of international norms prohibiting genocide and mass atrocity after World War II, 
backed by the physical and moral force of the United Nations and the International Criminal Court 
(ICC), found their way into the value structures of ASEAN member states. These actions include 
an ongoing interrogation of norms that have been used to justify mass atrocity. Norms in the Asia- 
Pacific region that were once viewed as “natural,” such as the right of a nation to attack another 
or the right of a state to commit mass atrocities against its citizens, have been inverted. Since 2005, 
countries in the Asia-Pacific region have gradually come to view human rights as a responsibility 
of the sovereign state. Rather than framing relationship between global human rights and state 
sovereignty as an antinomy, the R2P doctrine has prompted ASEAN member states to define the 
protection of human rights as a responsibility of the state.    
The R2P doctrine has encouraged sovereign states in the Asia-Pacific region to broaden the 
range of their responsibilities to include the prevention of mass atrocities. As such, ASEAN member 
states are attending to factors that spark atrocity crimes, including climate change, economic 
disparities, food security, and others. Teitt identifies two efforts made by ASEAN member states 
to broaden the focus of mass atrocity prevention.43 First, the Japanese are working to broaden 
the definition of human security to include social and economic inequalities, health disparities, 
hunger, and other problems. Second, ASEAN member states are seeking to implement policies 
that confront poverty and economic inequality as mass atrocity prevention measures. The “narrow 
but deep approach to implementing R2P,” Teitt writes, “which recognizes a broader development 
assistance agenda is part of the global effort to end atrocities, resonates both with human security 
concepts originating in the Asia Pacific and the structural capacity-building agenda advocated by 
the states in the region.”44
The consensus of the scholarship on ASEAN human rights norms and mass atrocity 
prevention mechanisms suggests that both are the result of slow and incremental modifications of 
local norms through consensus-building decision-making procedures. International and regional 
organizations, including ASEAN, are in constant dialogue through the offices of the United Nations 
and institutions like APCR2P. The goal is to assimilate the universal values of human rights into 
the norms of ASEAN countries. Indonesia and the Philippines, for example, endorsed both the 
nonintervention policy favored by ASEAN member states and the third pillar of R2P that called 
for intervention into the affairs of a sovereign state when that state had failed to protect the human 
rights of its citizens. The “consensus decision-making and evolutionary institutional change” in 
use by the United Nations “appears to have increased comfort among Asia Pacific states” with the 
R2P implementation agenda.45 However, ASEAN member states have not fully worked through the 
tension between the doctrine of nonintervention, which has decreased interstate mass atrocities, 
and R2P in its call for humanitarian intervention by outside forces when a state has failed in its 
responsibility to protect its citizens. A norm bridging the two is forming. 
40 Ibid., 190.
41 Ibid., 117. Morada, Southeast Asian Regionalism. 
42 Bellamy, The Other Asian Miracle?, 8.
0 Teitt, Asia Pacific and South Asia.
44 Ibid., 379.
45 Ibid., 380.
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An Evolving Norm Nesting the Principle of Noninterference and the Responsibility to Protect 
within the Sovereign State
ASEAN’s founding documents (1967), the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration 
of 1971, and the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and Article Two of the ASEAN Charter 
(2007) commit ASEAN to the principle of noninterference by external parties in the sovereign 
affairs of member states.  The significant decline in the number of mass atrocities due to armed 
conflict between states in the region since the end of the Cold War can be traced to this principle.46 
Indeed, “scholars are relatively unanimous in agreeing that during the first decades of ASEAN, 
the principle [of non-interference] managed to translate into reality.”47 As a result, “there has 
been no interstate conflict involving casualties between two ASEAN members, despite the fact 
that some ASEAN members have been traditional enemies since before joining the organization. 
This is the case also in East Asia: inter-state war has almost disappeared after 1979, and especially 
after 1987.”48 Paradoxically, the principle also protected and shielded states that committed mass 
atrocities against its own citizens. ASEAN has resisted contesting human rights abuses conducted 
by its member states against its citizens.49
The application of the principle of noninterference by ASEAN “has been extremely strict 
and has presented one of the major obstacles for ASEAN human rights bodies to interpret their 
mandates and their functions effectively since their inception.”50 ASEAN was faced with the choice 
of either rejecting or accepting R2P’s principle that interference and intervention in the affairs of 
an ASEAN member state is justified if the government is committing human rights abuses against 
its citizens. Rather than framing the choice as a binary, ASEAN is attempting to bridge the two 
through an act of creative accommodation and dissociation.51
ASEAN is on a trajectory that is slowly, with its ponderous, consensus-based decision 
making, aligning and assimilating the principle of noninterference with the three pillars of R2P.52 
The networked international and regional civil societies have insisted that the ASEAN principle 
of noninterference “evolve in a way that reflects a degree of receptivity to principles associated 
with R2P... Thus, many Southeast Asian states are moving away from the traditional notion of 
sovereignty and towards accepting a localised variant of sovereignty as responsibility.”53 This act 
of assimilation and dissociation is not simply a crude importation of global human rights norms 
or a continuation of local practices with a symbolic nod to R2P. Rather, ASEAN has engaged in the 
negotiation and creative adaptations producing new norms “that alters both the new norm (R2P) 
and those more established norms (non-interference).”54 
The ASEAN dissociation and creative reframing of the principle of non-interference and those 
of R2P has broadened the definition of ASEAN state sovereignty to include the responsibility to 
safeguard the human rights of its citizens. Bellamy and Drummond highlight two illustrations 
of this new formulation in action: ASEAN’s response to Cyclone Nargis, which caused 138,000 
causalities in Myanmar in 2008, and the positions taken by the region’s governments during the 
2009 UN General Assembly debate on R2P. Both illustrations demonstrate how ASEAN honored 
the principle of noninterference, while justifying intervention to secure the human rights of 
individuals within member states as acts of assisting sovereign states to protect their citizens. 
46 Bellamy, The Other Asian Miracle?.
47 Kivimäki, East Asian Relative Peace, 64.
48 Ibid., 73.
49 Alexander  J. Bellamy and Catherine Drummond, “The Responsibility to Protect in Southeast Asia: Between Non-
Interference and Sovereignty as Responsibility,” The Pacific Review 24, no. 2 (2011), 185-186.
50 Sriprapha Petcharamesree, “ASEAN Human Rights Regime and Mainstreaming the Responsibility to Protect: 
Challenges and Prospects,” Global Responsibility to Protect 8, no. 2-3 (2016), 138.
51 Bellamy and Drummond, The Responsibility to Protect in Southeast Asia.  On the role of creative accomodation and 
dissociation as a means of transcending binaries, see Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, eds. The New 
Rhetoric, a Treatise on Argumentation (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971), 411-459.
52 Bellamy and Drummond, The Responsibility to Protect in Southeast Asia.
53 Ibid., 196.
54 Ibid., 197.
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Bellamy, in his 2016 survey concludes, “significant normative progress has been made in building a 
regional consensus around the principle of the responsibility to protect.”55 In light of this progress, 
ASEAN member states are now creating the norms necessary to prevent mass atrocity. 
The Norm of Mass Atrocity Prevention 
While atrocity crimes have decreased in Southeast Asia, there is a need to strengthen existing and 
build new structures designed to prevent future outbreaks. The research suggests that mass atrocity 
prevention is best done at the national level. Scholars and government officials are seeking to build 
from the ASEAN’s successes in reducing the frequency of mass atrocities to develop an ASEAN-
inflected R2P. Toward this end, a major effort is under way to fully mainstream R2P in Southeast 
Asia. Government reports and scholars have offered recommendations that if implemented would 
help create national architectures for ASEAN member states designed to prevent mass atrocities.56 
Among the many recommendations, three are at the top of the agenda: 
A. The need to continue promoting R2P and adapting it to the values and norms in the region. 
To accomplish this end, R2P should be “properly contextualized in ASEAN’s language.”57 
An effort should be made to suggest that ASEAN regional norms, values, and principles 
are embedded in the Responsibility to Protect and are not alien to it.”58  
B. A dedicated effort to strengthen and develop mass atrocity early warning systems. 
Social science has identified the precursors to mass atrocity. ASEAN member states seek 
to develop the tools needed to alert policymakers and the general public to conditions, 
speech, and behavior that foretell mass atrocity. There is a need for networks that join 
the ten ASEAN member states for the purpose of gathering and analyzing information 
on human rights violations. At present, ASEAN countries need to devote resources to the 
development of national architectures designed to prevent atrocity crimes.
C. The constructive management of diversity and deep pluralism. Atrocity crimes are often 
the result of identity-based conflict. Government reports and scholarship highlight the 
need for ASEAN countries to create cultural space and government institutions for people 
of multiple and overlapping identities. Legal protections for minorities or those who do 
not adhere to the majority’s religion or lifestyle are necessary to inoculate against atrocity 
crimes. Conflict management systems, including conciliation, mediation, and arbitration, 
should play major roles in atrocity prevention.   
Conclusion
The member states of ASEAN have successfully reduced the number of wars and as a result, the 
frequency of mass atrocities since the formation of the association in 1967. Scholars have identified 
structural factors (reduction of mass atrocities as a weapon of war, rising incomes, and the spread 
of democracy) and the norms framing them as explanations. The norms in play determine the 
influence of the structural factors on the frequency of mass atrocities.  The effectiveness of these 
norms can be debated. Kassim argues, “R2P has only enjoyed lip service in Southeast Asia.”59 
However, Kassim agrees with Bellamy and others that the doctrine is gaining acceptance as the 
norm is debated and discussed by ASEAN member states.60 ASEAN member states have adopted 
norms of collective decision making and global human rights and are integrating global human 
rights into regional and national value systems. Although there are serious environmental and 
political issues facing ASEAN, the association can draw from its history of success to develop new 
norms that equip member states with the tools needed to prevent atrocity crimes. ASEAN stands as 
55 Bellamy, Atrocity Prevention: From Promise to Practice, 199.
56 High Level Advisory Panel, Mainstreaming the Responsibility to Protect in Southeast Asia (New York: United Nations, 2014); 
Petcharamesree, ASEAN Human Rights Regime; Bellamy and Drummond, The Responsibility to Protect in Southeast Asia.
57 Panel, Mainstreaming the Responsibility, 333.
58 Ibid.
59 Yang Razali Kassim, “ASEAN and R2P,” in The Geopolitics of Intervention (New York: Springer, 2014), 54.
60 Bellamy and Dunne, The Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect.
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a model in its success at decreasing atrocity crimes, and the norms it has set forth and is developing 
can offer lessons to other regional organizations. Future studies of successful norm creation should 
include the roles played by the ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and the Protection of the 
Rights of Women and Children (ACWC), the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human 
Rights (AICHR), the R2P focal points adopted by Australia, Cambodia, and Timor-Leste, and the 
UN’s “Human Rights Up Front” initiative on the formation of ASEAN’s human rights norms. 
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Introduction
Concerns about people fleeing war-torn homelands have become part of our daily news. Vivid 
images of destroyed cities, brutally murdered civilians, and crowded refugee camps have resulted 
in an outpouring of compassion and humanitarian aid. Many countries, including the United 
States, are being pressed to simultaneously undertake actions to halt genocide1 and to open their 
doors to new waves of refugees. As a result, policy makers and citizens are asking themselves: 
How do we decide when to get involved and if we are doing enough to halt the killing (or its 
threat)? What types of actions might be most effective? How can we ensure that things go right? 
And what constitutes a successful or unsuccessful intervention?
The importance of preventing genocide is not at issue. The doctrine of responsibility to protect 
(R2P),2 articulated in 2005, permits the international community to intervene in the affairs of a 
sovereign state if it fails to protect its population from mass atrocity crimes. In the United States, 
the Executive Summary of the Genocide Prevention Task Force, co-chaired by Madeleine Albright 
and William Cohen, begins by emphasizing “the fundamental reality that genocide and mass 
atrocities threaten American values and interests.”3 President Obama supported and strengthened 
this position by proclaiming, as part of Presidential Directive 10, the establishment of the Atrocities 
Prevention Board (APB) and by stating that “Preventing mass atrocities and genocide is a core 
national security interest and a core moral responsibility of the United States.”4
It might then be assumed that clear criteria and policies are in place for deciding when and 
what to do. The reality, in sharp contrast, is that the absence of coherent procedures for addressing 
intervention decisions is widely acknowledged. For example, in their comprehensive 2008 review 
of genocide prevention strategies, Albright and Cohen wrote that “Simply put, the U.S. government 
does not have an established, coherent policy for preventing and responding to genocide and mass 
atrocities.”5 Drawing on techniques from decision analysis, psychology, and negotiation analysis, 
we highlight a general approach to assessing genocide prevention decisions that we believe could 
provide decision makers with insights about how to construct defensible intervention policies and 
link proposed actions to national values in a manner that promotes consistency, efficiency, and 
defensibility. 
1 This paper follows the lead of U.S. Executive Order No. 13729 and is concerned with decisions to prevent or reduce 
“large-scale and deliberate attacks on civilians,” a concept that includes actions which could be described as genocide 
or as mass atrocities. Barack Obama, Executive Order 13729 of May 18, 2016, A Comprehensive Approach to Atrocity 
Prevention and Response (Washington, DC: The White House, 2016).
2 United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome, October 24, 2005 (UN Doc. A/RES/60/1), 
paras. 138–140.
3 Madeleine K. Albright and William S. Cohen, Preventing Genocide: A Blueprint for U.S. Policymakers (Washington, DC: 
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2008), xv.
4 Barack Obama, Presidential Directive Study 10, August 4, 2011. (Washington, DC: Office of the Federal Register, 2011).
5 Albright and Cohen, Preventing Genocide, 3.
Michael Harstone 
Compass Resource Management Ltd.
Vancouver, BC, Canada
Paul Slovic 
Decision Research & University of Oregon
Eugene, OR, USA
©2018     Genocide Studies and Prevention 11, no. 3 http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.11.3
110
Although we lack direct experience as senior-level policy officials, our research—as academics 
and frequent advisors to governments—has focused on understanding how people both do and 
should make decisions characterized by multiple dimensions of value, uncertain consequences, 
and difficult tradeoffs. This characterization applies to most decisions concerning genocide 
prevention but also to a host of other tough public policy choices facing governments such as 
responses to climate change, storage of high-level nuclear wastes, or prevention of terrorism. Each 
of these national-level policy choices is said to have an influence on “national security” and the 
long-term “national interest”—two terms that often surface as part of discussions of genocide 
prevention. In each of these diverse policy arenas the consequences of decisions typically are 
subject to uncertainty (and thus good outcomes are not guaranteed). Nevertheless, appropriate 
decision-making approaches have the capability to improve the quality of outcomes by identifying 
choices that better align with and achieve the considered interests of decision makers. As President 
Obama stated when discussing U.S. policies in the Middle East, “We have to be able to distinguish 
between these problems analytically, so that we’re not using pliers where we need a hammer, 
and we’re not using a battalion when what we should be doing is partnering with the local 
government.”6
Evaluating Tough Intervention Choices
Everyone would acknowledge the many difficulties facing national leaders making decisions about 
intervening in a foreign country in hopes of preventing genocide and mass atrocities. Whether 
the U.S. (or any nation) should intervene and attempt to stop genocide is complicated, on many 
levels.7 Such choices place a cognitive demand on decision makers because they involve multiple 
dimensions of value and a wide range of possible alternative actions. The decision context typically is 
characterized by numerous constraints including insufficient time, limited information, and scarce 
financial resources. Intervention decisions also involve strong emotions because people’s lives—
foreign as well as domestic—are at issue and because decision makers feel a moral responsibility 
for the outcomes of their choices. 
In a widely cited speech to a group of foreign policy experts meeting at the Holocaust Memorial 
Museum in Washington, DC,8 then Secretary of State Clinton emphasized the importance of 
preventing mass atrocities when she said “The United States and our partners must act before the 
wood is stacked or the match is struck.” She also noted that intervention efforts should “ensure 
that all our tools and resources are being put to good use.” However, there was no explicit linkage 
to methods or deliberative processes that might provide a practical and generalizable template for 
assessing what it means to put resources to “good use”—presumably, a reference to undertaking 
genocide prevention efforts that help to achieve (remembering Albright and Cohen) the Nation’s 
“values and interests.” 
Two basic approaches typically are used to come up with strategies and action plans in the 
face of difficult choices. The first is to rely on past experiences and informed intuition. For such 
decisions, some maintain, there is no substitute for experience and little role for external decision 
aids or methods. This perspective—“decision making as an art”—is a reasonable characterization 
of much of medicine,9 law,10 and the military:11 good decisions will arise naturally from discussions 
among a small group of experienced experts. The alternative perspective—“decision making as a 
6 David Remnick, “Going the Distance,” The New Yorker, January 24, 2014, accessed May 11, 2017, http://www.newyorker.
com/magazine/2014/01/27/going-the-distance-david-remnick.
7 Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 2002).
8 Rebecca Berg, “Foreign Policy Experts Discuss Ways to Avert Future Genocide,” The New York Times, July 25, 2012, A8, 
accessed May 11, 2017, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/25/world/clinton-and-other-experts-discuss-ways-to-avert-
genocide.html.
9 Atul Gawande, The Checklist Manifesto: How to Get Things Right (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2009).
10 Paul Brest and Linda Hamilton Krieger, Problem Solving, Decision Making, and Professional Judgment: A Guide for Lawyers 
and Policymakers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
11 Rex Brown, Rational Choice and Judgment: Decision Analysis for the Decider (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2005).
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discipline”—derives from studies in decision analysis,12 psychology,13 and behavioral economics.14 
It maintains that peoples’ unaided judgment is prone to numerous biases and errors, particularly 
when decision contexts are novel, choices are sequential and shared (i.e., requiring multiple 
decisions among multiple individuals), or when the task of balancing diverse objectives is critical.
Prescriptive Decision Aids
Prescriptive decision making is concerned with how people can improve their choice processes. 
As succinctly characterized in the book Smart Choices,15 a recommended decision-making sequence 
forms the acronym PrOACT: understand the Problem context, clarify Objectives and associated 
measures, define Alternatives, identify their likely Consequences and important uncertainties, and 
highlight key Trade-offs. When used in an iterative fashion, cycling back to re-examine assumptions 
due to shifts in the importance of different objectives or because new information is available, the 
approach is both rigorous and links with the logic of common sense. 
To the extent that similar decisions are made over time, the use of a consistent decision-
making framework encourages learning because it facilitates the comparison and review of 
choices, examining criteria and reasons that (in hindsight) will turn out to have a stronger or 
weaker rationale. The use of a simplifying structure to address intervention choices also has the 
benefit of forcing decision makers to confront a paradoxical truth: it is because the issues involved 
in framing such choices can appear overwhelmingly difficult that a simplifying structure is useful. 
Without an organizing structure, the breadth of concerns involved in thinking about interventions 
to prevent genocide can effectively serve to paralyze rational decision making. As a result, what 
often happens is that the difficult becomes (falsely) easy by relying on a single consideration (what 
is the dominant concern?), habit (what did we do last time?) or intuition (what is my gut feeling?). 
Unstructured discussions often serve to bias decisions in favor of short-term, emotionally satisfying 
goals (they attacked us so we’ll attack them) or achieving objectives that are easy to defend, such 
as national security, without carefully weighing these against less prominent, more long-term, 
or more difficult-to-achieve objectives such as enhancing human rights or reducing the loss of 
civilian lives.16
In our experience, significant clarity can be gained through the simple act of developing a 
common language for the key decision elements and placing considerations into their proper place 
or order—an organizing or binning process referred to as “decision sketching.”17 The structuring 
process begins by identifying a small set of objectives that effectively capture the concerns that 
matter most in the context of a defined problem. Alternative responses can then be compared in 
terms of their ability to achieve these identified values; the outcomes collectively determine the 
overall benefits and costs of any selected policy. Some of the consequences will matter more to 
some people than to others, which can help to shed light on individuals’ underlying values as well 
as their interpretation of the available facts. The balancing of these different outcomes forms the 
basis for discussions of trade-offs: how much of a potential gain in one objective is needed to offset 
potential losses in another?
A decision-aiding approach uses several specific tools to help structure deliberations about 
tough intervention choices, with the goal of highlighting key considerations and—by making 
relationships among key decision elements more transparent—encouraging participants to pay 
12 John S. Hammond, Ralph L. Keeney, and Howard Raiffa, Smart Choices: A Practical Guide to Making Better Decisions 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1999).
13 Sarah Lichtenstein and Paul Slovic, The Construction of Preference (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Daniel 
Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011).
14 Paul R. Kleindorfer, Howard C. Kunreuther and Paul J. H. Schoemaker, Decision Sciences: An Integrative Perspective 
(Cambridge, UK: The Press Syndicate of The University of Cambridge, 1993).
15 Hammond et al., Smart Choices.
16 Paul Slovic and Daniel Västfjäll, “The More Who Die, the Less We Care: Psychic Numbing and Genocide,” in Behavioral 
Public Policy, ed. Adam Oliver (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 94–114.
17 Robin Gregory, et al, Structured Decision Making: A Practical Guide to Environmental Management Choices (Chichester: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2012).
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attention to areas of agreement and disagreement. Four tools drawn from the decision sciences are 
particularly helpful. 
Objectives hierarchies provide a vehicle for identifying and ordering concerns relevant 
to a decision.18 For example, key values for intervention decisions to prevent mass atrocities 
and genocide will typically include effects on national security (including both domestic and 
international political or economic threats), loss of lives and injuries (both domestic and foreign), 
economic costs of intervention and aid, effects on the nation’s reputation (related to meeting moral 
and legal obligations), and the anticipated impacts on regional stability. Each of these fundamental 
concerns often will include several sub-objectives: “protecting human lives,” for example, includes 
deaths and injuries that might affect either civilians or members of the military. Delineating 
objectives (a) provides a clear basis and record for identifying what matters to the decision, (b) 
identifies an explicit and consistent framework for comparing the consequences of alternative 
actions or for generating new, creative alternatives, and (c) allows different participants to express 
the importance they place on each concern, which often provides the rationale for disagreements 
regarding choices. 
Means-ends networks (also known as influence diagrams) are a common decision structuring 
or modeling tool that graphically represents the relationship between decisions, uncertainties and 
outcomes, using nodes and arrows.19 They emphasize the causal variables over which decision 
makers have some control and their sequential influence on the values and objectives at stake: an 
increase in funding for on-site medical personnel is a means that leads to better-staffed hospitals 
which, in turn, allows for lower response times and helps to achieve the fundamental (i.e., end) 
objective of saving more lives (see Figure 1). These diagrams can play an important role in defining 
evaluation criteria to better estimate the consequences of different courses of action and improve 
understanding of ways to achieve strategy objectives: meeting with leaders in Congress could be 
shown as a useful as a way to build support and, in turn, to maximize domestic political acceptance 
of proposed actions intended to protect the nation’s security. Moreover, means-ends networks 
provide an easily accessible visual tool that facilitates communication among technical experts, 
decision makers, and stakeholders about their understanding of the decision context, what 
information is important, and why.
Performance measures establish one or more specific metrics (aka attributes) that account for 
changes in the achievement of objectives related to an action. Developing good measures for each 
interest is essential to the consistent evaluation of alternatives and also permits clear communication 
about what matters among the decision participants. To work well, performance measures should 
be understandable, complete (otherwise important concerns are omitted), concise (to facilitate 
the ready comparison of alternatives), direct and unambiguous (to ensure clear communication), 
and measurable (so that data can be found to estimate consequences among different intervention 
alternatives).20 Coming up with good measures for some objectives is relatively easy, for 
example using dollars to measure cost. Other important objectives, such as “national security” 
or “national reputation,” are more ambiguous and can be difficult to define. In his 2016 review 
of the “Obama doctrine,” journalist Jeffrey Goldberg notes that within the Pentagon or State 
Department, America’s “national-security credibility” is seen as “an intangible yet potent force.”21 
Because vague definitions—however strongly held—can lead to misunderstandings among 
the different players,22 deliberations will be improved to the extent that different intervention 
18 Ralph L. Keeney, Value-Focused Thinking: A Path to Creative Decisionmaking (Cambridge, MA: President and Fellows of 
Harvard College, 1992).
19 Ronald A. Howard, “Decision Analysis, Practice and Promise,” Management Science 43, no. 6 (1998), 679–695.
20 Ralph L. Keeney and Robin Gregory, “Selecting Attributes to Measure the Achievement of Objectives,” Operations 
Research 53, no. 1 (2005), 1–11.
21 Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine,” The Atlantic, April 2016, 74.
22 This same problem arises in the context of many objectives considered straightforward to measure, such as using 
numbers of fatalities for lives lost. The issue is that any measure frames the objective using a specific lens; numbers 
of fatalities, for example, counts all deaths as equal and fails to distinguish the age and gender of people or the 
circumstances of their deaths.
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alternatives can be compared on key dimensions and with all participants using the same working 
definitions. 
Consequence tables are another key structuring tool,23 used to emphasize the link between 
the consequences of alternative actions and the concerns that matter the most. They provide a 
simple visual tool that conveys the anticipated changes across multiple accounts. As noted by 
Samantha Power: “You have to take into account the other collateral issues that you’re dealing 
with on the international stage.”24 Columns show the different intervention alternatives that are 
under consideration; rows show the different values that may be impacted. Each cell of the table 
thus shows what is likely to happen if that alternative is selected. Consequence tables can be kept 
simple or they can be constructed to incorporate additional considerations such as the existence 
of sequential decisions, information changes over time, thresholds signaling the need for possible 
shifts in actions, or important geographic differences among potentially affected regions. In 
complex decision contexts, consequence tables can also be used to highlight and characterize critical 
uncertainties and to express probabilities and confidence levels in the expected consequences of 
alternatives.
Expert elicitations provide a formal set of tools for incorporating the judgments of experts 
whenever data needed as part of an intervention decision is either lacking or of low quality, a 
situation that is common to many war-torn countries that are experiencing rapid and profound 
economic, environmental, or social changes. Although ad-hoc approaches are still widely 
employed, there exists a well-established consensus on best practices for selecting experts, 
setting up elicitation protocols, avoiding bias (such as being overconfident in one’s knowledge 
or anchoring on recent events), aggregating across experts, and documenting findings so that 
their limits are clear and peer review is made easy.25 A common requirement is constructing a 
conceptual model that facilitates decomposition of a complex technical question into its component 
parts, which in turn allows for estimates of the uncertainty associated with the occurrence 
of these key elements. Experts are encouraged to assign plausible upper and lower bounds to the 
likelihood of an event as well as to identify the most likely value and the confidence held in their 
assessments. All of this information then becomes the basis for discussions among experts, which 
23 Robert T. Clemen and Terence Reilly, Making Hard Decisions with DecisionTools, 3rd ed. (Mason: South-Western, 2014).
24 Evan Osnos, “In the Land of the Possible,” The New Yorker, December 22 & 29, 2014, 90–107.
25 Mark A. Burgman, Trusting Judgements: How to Get the Best out of Experts (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2016).
Figure 1. Illustrative (partial) means-ends network. The full-size version of this figure is available for 
download at http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.11.3.1496.
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facilitates learning and leads to improved transparency in the comparisons that are made among 
alternatives.
Fast vs. Slow Thinking
A structured, decision-aiding process also can help to balance the role of two main judgmental 
mechanisms, involving the automatic and the more thoughtful responses that have been termed 
System 1 and System 2—fast and slow—thinking by Kahneman26 and others. System 1 is a fast, 
automatic system based on experience and involving intuition and feelings. System 2 brings in 
slower, more reasoned responses that involve cognition and analysis. Together these two ways of 
comprehending reality form the basis for how we identify and make difficult tradeoffs; different 
individuals and different groups—at the extreme, different countries—will rely on varying 
mixtures of System 1 and System 2 inputs when addressing intervention decisions.
A particular concern with respect to genocide prevention choices is that the fast, automatic 
thinking of System 1 can override the slower, more deliberate thinking of System 2 and lead 
to a reliance on emotional responses and judgmental shortcuts. Although these “judgmental 
heuristics” help decision makers to cope with the complex cognitive demands placed on them, 
they can also open the door to a variety of decision-making biases that lead individuals to anchor 
on past experience and oversimplified analogies or to give insufficient attention to their own 
perspective and values, thus resulting in the well-known phenomenon known as “groupthink.” 
Results from behavioral research also show that people facing multi-sided choices, particularly 
in crisis situations, often tend to focus on only one or two prominent dimensions of a choice to 
the neglect of other considerations that they previously have said to be important (Slovic, 2015). 
Awareness of these judgmental biases—which research has shown to influence the choices and 
reasoning processes of experts as well as laypersons—can help significantly to improve the quality 
of decisions and aid in balancing the contributions of our System 1 and 2 inputs to choices.
Understanding Psychological Influences
Both policy makers and citizens ask themselves similar questions when considering the wide range 
of genocide prevention intervention strategies: What can we do to halt or reduce the killing of 
civilians? How do we even think about such large-scale losses of human lives? How do we decide 
when we are doing enough? 
These questions bring into play—for individual citizens and for national policy makers—a 
mix of feelings and empathy that can run counter to the rational argument that the larger the loss 
of life, the more serious the problem and the stronger the case for intervention.27 A key insight 
from research into how people frame choices concerned with helping others—whether focused on 
charitable giving or taking actions to prevent harms or civilian deaths—is that people often exhibit 
a sharply diminishing sensitivity to what should be meaningful differences in the numbers of 
affected people. Although an argument can be made that large losses of life are disproportionately 
more serious, because they may threaten the social fabric or viability of a community or group, 
research clearly has shown that the importance of saving one life is large when it is the first, or 
only, life saved but diminishes as the total number of lives at risk increases.28 This effect, known 
as psychic numbing (or, in the context of charitable giving, as compassion fade), can be extreme. 
In some situations, for example, the value of protecting two lives is less than twice the value of 
protecting one life, and the value of saving 10,000 lives not significantly different from saving 100 
lives. It appears that peoples’ System 1 automatic, fast thinking systems can visualize and feel 
empathy for the plight of one person but this emotional connection quickly becomes tenuous as the 
number of people involved increases and statistics take the place of an identified person.29
26 Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow.
27 Paul Bloom, Against Empathy: The Case for Rational Compassion (New York: Harper-Collins, 2016).
28 Slovic and Västfjäll, The More Who Die.
29 Deborah A. Small, George Lowenstein and Paul Slovic, “Sympathy and Callousness: The Impact of Deliberative 
Thought on Donations to Identifiable and Statistical Victims,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 
102, no. 2 (2007), 143–153.
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Psychic numbing is often enhanced by an accompanying (and often false) feeling of inefficacy, 
that nothing important can be done about the underlying issue. Although we can get our heads 
and hearts around helping one person at risk, helping hundreds or thousands of people at risk 
seems like it is beyond our capacity to make a difference This feeling of pseudo-inefficiency leads 
us to believe that nothing we do will be effective, leading to inaction and passivity; similar feelings 
may lie behind the lack of response on the part of many individuals to other large-scale global 
issues such as climate change.30 The problem is that although it is true that these are massive and 
urgent issues, in fact the actions taken by individuals—considered one by one, or when summed 
across many people—can make an important difference.
A third reason for lowered levels of concern in the face of mass atrocities is that intervention 
decisions involve multi-sided trade-offs. We care about the lives of civilians in other countries but 
we also worry about the cost of an intervention, whether it will be successful, and whether America’s 
long-term security will be improved. In such circumstances other considerations, thought to be 
justified more easily than the uncertain ability to save foreign lives, often become more prominent 
and capture both peoples’ attention and the bulk of public resources. Thus “homeland security” 
or “the national interest,” despite being only vaguely defined, may be viewed by policy makers as 
more easily justified; to the extent these objectives conflict with other goals of intervention, then 
little may be done to address the ongoing loss of innocent civilian lives.31
These psychological mechanisms operate in the background as citizens and decision 
makers ponder what is an appropriate response to an emerging genocide or mass atrocity event. 
Different people will feel differently about proposed interventions to protect the lives of foreign 
civilians, and this is as it should be: our interest is not to push decision makers in one direction 
or another. Instead, our intent is to make sure that psychological tendencies such as psychic 
numbing, a false sense of inefficacy, or ignoring less prominent attributes, are not permitted to 
push us (or our elected representatives) into sub-optimal decisions, ones that they and we will 
regret and would want to change if only we had a better understanding of what is guiding our 
intervention choices.
Communicating About Intervention Choices
Decisions about whether to intervene to prevent or halt genocide and mass atrocities are rarely 
made by a single individual or a group at a single point in time. Instead, a small group or groups 
of experts (e.g., embassy staff within the country at issue along with colleagues working at the 
home office) typically assembles relevant data and frames various alternatives, then presents this 
information to other decision makers and elected officials. In addition to this internal dialogue 
there are often formal discussions with selected interest parties (e.g., allies, NGOs, and business 
leaders operating in the named country) and an informal dialogue with the general public (e.g., 
coordinated through the media). 
These broader aspects of the intervention decision-making process, involving the justification 
and communication of possible intervention choices, are often neglected as part of analyses of 
intervention decision-making processes but hold important implications for their structure and 
outcomes. The prominence effect, noted earlier, can play a key role whenever political agendas 
enter into the picture. One result is that the expressed values of agency staff can be over-ridden 
by decision makers’ perceived need to justify any eventual decision. As a result, humanitarian 
and other objectives that are thought to be more difficult to define or to defend, and that perhaps 
lack the emotional intensity of other concerns such as the maintenance of national security or 
positive relations with key allies, can be assigned less importance in the course of the decision-
making process due to the perceived need to provide a defensible argument to elected officials or 
to citizens. 
30 Scott Slovic and Paul Slovic, Numbers and Nerves: Information, Emotion, and Meaning in a World of Data (Corvallis: Oregon 
State University Press, 2015).
31 Paul Slovic, “When (In)action Speaks Louder than Words: Confronting the Collapse of Humanitarian Values in Foreign 
Policy Decisions,” Illinois Law Review Slip Opinions, 2015, no. 1 (2015), 24–31.
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Case Study: Structuring Intervention Decisions with Experts
Workshop Background and Participants
To test these ideas and the role of decision-structuring aids in the context of decisions to prevent 
genocide and mass atrocities, a 1.5 day workshop involving experienced individuals was held 
in 2015 in Eugene, Oregon (with funding support from the U.S. National Science Foundation 
and the University of Oregon). Participants included Ambassadors, former officials of the U.S. 
Department of State, analysts, academics, and other knowledgeable experts with experience in 
genocide intervention decisions. Workshop objectives included discussing genocide intervention 
decision making processes and examining different decision aiding techniques that may improve 
deliberations related to intervention decisions. To ensure the relevance of workshop discussions 
and results, we enlisted the help of four invited participants—two Ambassadors, one Agency 
director, and one analyst—to review and comment on the agenda and background materials in 
advance of the workshop. 
Our Day 1 introductory comments to the group emphasized that substantial insights often 
can be gained simply through organizing the various sources of decision complexity. To promote 
discussion, we presented the following initial listing of key contextual concerns, values, and 
alternatives:
• Decision context: geographic location, history, economic capabilities, leadership stability
• Values/objectives: national security, civilian lives and injuries (domestic, foreign), military 
lives and injuries (domestic, foreign), economic costs (intervention, aid), reputation of 
Nation (moral, legal, leadership), regional stability (social, political, economic)
• Intervention alternatives: diplomatic, economic, legal, military (covert or overt—air strikes, 
ground troops, etc.)
With this context as a common starting point, workshop participants explored a series of 
questions concerning the key elements of the decision context, the fundamental values that 
ultimately would determine whether the selected course of action was considered successful, and 
the various intervention alternatives that—singly or in combination—could be implemented. On 
Day 2 participants worked through a formal trade-off evaluation to explore each other’s values 
and preferences and to identify the most sensitive factors influencing their choices. As several 
participants pointed out, this ordering of key decision elements could be reframed as a series of 
criteria or questions that might serve, in varying degrees, as a checklist to encourage more consistent 
thinking as part of any intervention decision. 
The Decision Problem 
All participants were provided with a short memo, reportedly from the U.S. Ambassador to the 
Assistant Secretary of State, which described the current humanitarian crisis in a fictional small 
Asian country (called “Adler”) that threatens to soon expand to involve large numbers of civilian 
deaths and possibly genocide. Because this brief introduction necessarily left many questions 
unanswered—some of which typically would have been covered as part of agency memos and 
background discussions—participants were encouraged, as part of their small-group deliberations, 
to add (and document) contextual details as needed to proceed with a meaningful analysis of 
intervention choices. 
The memo summarized the dramatic recent increases in violence as part of Adler’s decade-
long war between the ruling majority and rebels from an ethnic minority; participants were told 
that estimates placed the number of people killed over the past two years at 90,000, with civilian 
casualties accounting for over one-half the deaths. Information is scarce, however, with field 
reports infrequent since the recent killings of five foreign journalists (two American and three 
French). Rebel forces are demanding greater political and religious autonomy as well as a share 
of government funds received from petroleum exports, developed in conjunction with both U.S.-
based and Chinese companies. The government, which has been in power for nearly 20 years and 
continues to enjoy U.S. support, has demanded that rebels lay down their arms as a pre-condition to 
the renewal of negotiations, which broke off nearly three months ago. However, both sides continue 
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to cite fundamental ethnic and religious differences. Some actions already have been undertaken: 
equipment has been brought in to jam TV and radio signals being used by rebel militants and the 
Ambassador has been working closely with neighboring countries to reduce the rebel’s recruitment 
of fighters and supplies. In addition, a Financial Intelligence Unit has been formed to reduce rebel 
fund-raising through identification and freezing of foreign bank accounts. But the Ambassador’s 
memo warns that new actions are urgently needed, with shipments of food and medicines largely 
prevented from reaching the areas most in need and large numbers of civilians—perhaps as many 
as 400,000 people—fleeing the country in search of safety and refugee status. 
The Ambassador’s memo was said to have prompted swift action from the Assistant Secretary 
of State, who called in six trusted advisers and led discussions focused on whether the US should 
quickly do more to prevent further civilian casualties and, if possible, to help stabilize the region. He 
prefaced his remarks by citing from the 2006 National Security Strategy that “Where perpetrators 
of mass killing defy all attempts to peaceful intervention, armed intervention may be required, 
preferably by the forces of several nations working together . . .”32 The Ambassador remains in the 
country but arrangements are being made for her evacuation, along with the remaining five staff 
members.
Following the discussion of the problem context and the Ambassador’s memo, a proposed 
objectives hierarchy was discussed based on the information contained within the briefing note (see 
Table 1). In contrast to the usual focus on alternatives, the development of an objectives hierarchy 
at the start of discussions was intended to provide a common framework for highlighting what is 
important and the key values that could be affected as a result of the proposed actions. This discussion 
further distinguished fundamental concerns (e.g., maintaining national security, protecting human 
lives) from means objectives or contributing factors (e.g., obtaining congressional support). In 
addition, the creation of the objectives hierarchy helped to build a common understanding of terms 
such as “national security,” “national reputation,” or “regional stability,” which—as participants 
confirmed—often claim a front and center position in intervention debates despite their ambiguous 
definition.33 The objectives hierarchy was also used to facilitate the identification of sub-objectives, 
more detailed components of these larger concerns that served to aid understanding and, in turn, 
could lead to evaluation criteria useful for assessing the different intervention alternatives.
Once a common set of objectives and sub-objectives had been outlined, participants turned 
their attention to thinking about how to express the different consequences of each intervention 
option in terms of these identified concerns. This part of the deliberations built on the concept of 
using explicit performance measures or attributes that would track the ability of each option to 
satisfy the different objectives highlighted for the scenario. In some cases familiar quantitative 
measures (such as dollars or lives) were used to express differences in the objectives across the 
alternatives. In other cases, when concerns were brought into the evaluation that lacked familiar 
measures or that required additional context, qualitative constructed scales were used (see Table 
2). Keeping in mind the illustrative nature of this decision-structuring exercise, substantially 
less time was spent on the development of precise measures than would characterize a real-life 
intervention decision. Nevertheless, participants felt that—at least as a first approximation—the 
range of objectives, sub-objectives, and scales were sufficient to ensure a common understanding 
of key decision elements and to facilitate an initial comparison of the consequences of the different 
intervention options.
Performance measures are particularly useful in the type of multidimensional, highly nuanced 
decision environment that typically characterizes intervention choices. This is because they help 
add precision to what otherwise often are vague criteria, thereby lowering the quality of initial 
32 George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: The White House, 2006), 
17.
33 In his careful review of the APB, Finkel writes that “the Board’s prescriptive deliberations” would be improved were it 
able to “develop a common understanding of what atrocity prevention means,” in part because this would address 
the concern “. . . that various Board members have very different notions about what prevention should and can 
accomplish.” James P. Finkel, Atrocity Prevention at the Crossroads: Assessing the President’s Atrocity Prevention Board 
After Two Years (Washington, DC: United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2014), 3, 20, 23.
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Category (Fundamental Objective) Sub-Objectives Potential Defining or Contributing 
Factors (Illustrative)
U.S. National Security
Within the context of assessing genocide 
intervention decisions, national security 
is broadly defined as potentially 
weakening or destabilizing domestic 
well-being.
Domestic Political Party support (internal)
Congressional support
Voter and public support
Foreign/International Consistency with and/or facilitating 
U.S. foreign policy priorities
Support from key U.S. allies
Support from other countries or 
agencies
Economic Costs to U.S. companies
National budget
Adverse energy security implications
Homeland Security Risk of terrorism (on U.S. soil)
Perception or feeling of insecurity
Exit Certainty Avoiding enlarged or protracted 
conflict (certainty of exit strategy?)
Protecting Human Lives Civilian Lives (and Injuries) U.S.
Foreign
Military Lives (and Injuries) U.S. 
Foreign
U.S. International Reputation Moral Imperative Requirement for action consistent 
with what is the right thing to do
Legal Obligations Consistency with ratified agreements 
/ treaties (E.g. U.N. or Genocide 
Convention)
Intervention Costs Costs to U.S. Government Administrative and management 
costs 
Military costs (equipment, salaries, 
etc.)
Humanitarian Costs (food, housing, 
medical—with vs. without 
intervention)
Costs to Others Foreign governments
Foreign companies
Regional Stability Political Political upheaval
Balance of power in the region
Social Social unrest
Economic Uncertainty & losses to local/regional 
economies
Table 1. Case study objectives hierarchy.
communication among decision participants and, at a later point in time, making it more difficult to 
evaluate the success of intervention initiatives. As noted by Power,34 a decision-aiding framework 
should not seek to homogenize these concerns and priorities but, rather, to clarify value differences 
and to help decision makers understand their implications. She identifies two primary aspirations 
of U.S. decision makers when facing mass atrocities: to “avoid engagement in conflicts that posed 
little threat to American interests” and to “contain the political costs and avoid the moral stigma 
34 Power, A Problem from Hell, 508.
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associated with allowing genocide.” Being true to these two concerns requires an understanding of 
the other interests that also matter to decision makers, the types of threats that might be posed to 
specific American interests, and what kinds of political or moral costs might arise as the result of 
various levels of engagement in foreign conflicts.
Pre-workshop discussions with collaborating participants led to the generation of five 
intervention options—drawn from a much larger set of possible actions, but useful to help focus 
discussions—that would likely form the basis of intervention choices. These are briefly described 
below and also are shown as the columns in Figure 2.
• A first option is to continue the current “economic sanctions but no intervention” strategy, 
perhaps with the addition of new educational or communications initiatives. 
• A second (“train and arm”) strategy would involve the identification of critical gaps in 
Adler’s military capability and bringing in needed new military equipment for use by 
Adler’s army. Costs for the one-year operation are about $250 million. 
• A third option (“air strikes”) would initiate bombing raids on rebel forces, using a U.S. 
aircraft carrier as a base of operations and working in conjunction with allied air forces. 
The targeted air strikes on rebel centers would cost nearly $100 million/month and limit 
demands on an already overstretched U.S. military, but they could further reduce the 
amounts of food available in the markets and lead to criticism of foreign intervention. 
• A fourth alternative (“safe zones”), to be organized in concert with regional and 
international allies, would bring in as many as 6,000 ground troops (half from the U.S.) 
to help create safe zones in areas of central Adler now experiencing the heaviest fighting. 
Initial cost estimates for the U.S. share of the military intervention range from $3–5 billion, 
with concerns expressed by the White House about possible U.S. military casualties and 
adverse domestic implications as well as negative effects on the international reputation 
of the U.S. 
• A fifth alternative (“full military intervention”), favored by some members of Congress, 
would seek to defeat rebel troops by bringing in as many as 60,000 U.S. ground soldiers 
and an equal number of troops from allies, with U.S. military personnel working alongside 
members of Adler’s military and cleared for combat roles. Key arguments in favor include 
the moral and legal obligations of the U.S. to prevent foreign civilian deaths and to protect 
the interests of U.S. oil companies, U.S. costs would be as high as $5 billion, support 
among other countries is mixed, and questions are being raised about the lack of a clear 
exit strategy.
Table 2. Constructed scale used for estimating consequences of case study genocide intervention scenario.
+3 Significant Improvement: a significant net improvement is expected compared to current conditions
+2 Moderate Improvement: a moderate net improvement is expected compared to current conditions
+1 Small Improvement: a small but measurable improvement is expected compared to current conditions
0 No change: no changes are expected to occur relative to current conditions (i.e. neither a measurable improvement nor a worsening in conditions)
-1 Small Deterioration: conditions are expected to worsen slightly (but measurably) compared to current conditions
-2 Moderate Deterioration: conditions are expected to worsen moderately compared to current conditions
-3 Significant Deterioration: conditions are expected to worsen significantly compared to current conditions
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These structured decision elements were then used to predict and compare the consequences of 
the different intervention alternatives. These effects were summarized through a consequence table 
(Figure 2) that shows the concerns in rows and the five leading intervention options in columns. 
This visual display was useful in that it facilitated discussions of the pros and cons of different 
actions and, in some cases, led to the refinement and alteration of the anticipated consequences as 
new information was shared among the participants.35 To more easily compare the performance 
between alternatives, the consequence table was color-coded to highlight significant differences in 
the performance measures relative to the selected reference alternative (the blue column in Figure 
3); programming easily shows this comparison with reference to any of the alternatives. The use of 
colors facilitates the comparison of how well an alternative achieves each of the stated objectives:36 
cells shown in green mean that another alternative is preferred for that objective, cells shown in 
red mean that alternative is inferior with respect to the objective, and cells with no shading are 
functionally identical to the highlighted reference alternative.
Workshop participants undertook two distinct prioritization techniques—direct ranking and 
swing weighting—to identify their preferences about the intervention alternatives. Both involve the 
elicitation of experts and include techniques intended to minimize the judgmental errors (discussed 
in Section 2.1) which can bias experts’ opinions. Direct ranking is a more intuitive and experiential 
technique (often associated with System 1 thinking and very common within governments) where 
the best option is selected outright: given a set of alternatives, which one is preferred? Swing 
weighting is a more deliberative and analytical technique (i.e., more closely aligned to System 2 
thinking) whereby a preferred option is inferred based on the relative importance (i.e., the weights) 
assigned to the different sub-objectives that characterize, to a greater or lesser degree, each of the 
specified options. Direct ranking of alternatives is therefore viewed as more holistic and ranking of 
sub-objectives (through swing weighting) as more decomposed. 
An important point—often missed as part of policy assessments—is that the value weights 
reflect importance of the relative differences in each of the sub-objectives rather than the importance 
of the sub-objective as a category. In other words, it is not just how important a particular objective 
35 The illustrative nature of this case study meant that there was less information than usually would be available; as a 
result, more rows of the consequence table are, of necessity, filled in using constructed scales.
36 Keeney and Gregory, Selecting Attributes to Measure.
Figure 2. Consequence table for case study genocide intervention scenario. The full-size version of this 
figure is available for download at http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.11.3.1496.
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or sub-objective may be (such as national security) but also how much it varies across the set of 
alternatives: if a sub-objective is fairly insensitive (i.e., the estimated performance measure values 
do not vary significantly) then it will be less important, and have a correspondingly lower weight, 
for selection of a preferred alternative. 
 Our goal was to highlight possible differences in preferred intervention scenarios depending 
on which technique was used (see Figure 4) and to stimulate dialogue among workshop 
participants. This goal is in line with general advice about how to deal with complex problems; 
in a paper titled “The Realities of Risk-Cost-Benefit Analysis,” for example, Fischhoff37 suggests 
that the logic of analysts is to “Decompose complex systems into manageable components and 
then calculate how they might perform together.” However, decomposition brings its own set of 
challenges38 and, for this workshop, we emphasized that neither technique necessarily provides 
the right answer; both have strengths and weaknesses. The decision-aiding benefit is that the two 
approaches offer different perspectives about people’s values and the associated trade-offs, which 
in turn often allows individuals to learn more about their own values and the reasoning underlying 
their choices.
The incorporation of decision-aiding tools also allowed participants to explore the degree to 
which they preferred one alternative over another and to observe how their preferences varied 
relative to everyone else (Figure 5). In addition, the use of a more decomposed approach permitted 
the invited experts to unbundle their thinking and to see which objectives were most instrumental 
in determining their preferred alternative. As shown in Figure 6, some alternatives were very 
successful at satisfying one objective and other alternatives were successful at satisfying other 
objectives. Discussions clearly revealed that participants found this information to be helpful; as 
several workshop members told us, the use of these visual tools permitted them to gain a better 
understanding of their own preferences and, in some cases, to realize that adjustments in their 
scoring of alternatives were requested to represent their own values accurately.
37 Baruch Fischhoff, “The Realities of Risk-Cost-Benefit Analysis,” Science 350, no. 6260 (2015), 527.
38 Gregory et al., Structured Decision Making.
Figure 3. Color-coded consequence table (using Alt 2 as the reference alternative). The full-size version of 
this figure is available for download at http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.11.3.1496.
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Figure 4. Participant direct ranking and swing weighting preferences. The full-size version of this figure is 
available for download at http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.11.3.1496.
Figure 5. Direct ranking weights of Participant 1 (in blue) of their preferred intervention alternative 
relative to other participants. The full-size version of this figure is available for download at http://doi.
org/10.5038/1911-9933.11.3.1496.
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Discussions on Day 2 of the workshop then led to the use of two other methods as aids for 
further exploring participants’ reasoning. Figure 7 digs deeper into the importance of each objective 
in shaping choices by showing the sensitivity of the weights placed by each participant on the 
different objectives and how changes, small or large, in these weights could lead to the selection 
of a different alternative. Finally, participants also were able to compare the consistency in their 
rankings and weightings according to the two techniques using consistency plots (Figure 8) that 
show their preferred alternatives: the closer preferences are aligned to the 45 degree line, the more 
consistent they are across the two techniques, which suggests the presence of greater stability.39
Participant Feedback
Participants’ responses to the workshop were very positive, with an explicit values-based approach 
to making intervention decisions considered both new and promising. Some concerns were raised 
about the realism of the case-study scenario, which were anticipated; several of the participants 
had previous experience with scenario development lasting several weeks (e.g., through the 
National Defense University) and all participants, as part of their previous working experience, 
had been part of scenarios that took shape over years and with thousands of inputs. Nevertheless, 
a strong consensus emerged for adoption of a more structured framework to help in (a) untangling 
and organizing the fundamental values relevant to intervention deliberations, (b) highlighting 
potential decision biases that could lead to inferior choices, (c) clarifying information gaps and 
uncertainties critical to the decision context, and (d) exposing key trade-offs associated with 
different intervention choices. 
As several participants pointed out, the framing of atrocities prevention as a core national 
interest and the initiation of high-level groups such as the Atrocities Prevention Board also 
underscore the importance of anticipating and preventing genocide as a fundamental interest of 
the United States. A keen interest was expressed by participants in identifying key elements that 
could help to characterize conflicts in the weeks or months prior to the escalation of violence and 
the beginnings of genocide or mass atrocities. If a more structured process could anticipate and 
target countries at risk of genocide and thus lead to effective, early-on intervention strategies, then 
the approach merits additional examination.  
39 We are well aware that this workshop focused on a hypothetical case-study and that not all groups would be so open 
to the sharing of information about the importance of objectives underlying members’ expressed preferences; one 
implication is that increased anonymity might be required as part of the exploration of participants’ reasoning in 
high-conflict situations.
Figure 6. Relative importance of the objectives for Participant 1 in determining their preferred alternatives 
according to swing weighting. The full-size version of this figure is available for download at http://doi.
org/10.5038/1911-9933.11.3.1496.
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Questions also were raised by participants about whether use of a more structured process 
for identifying and scoring intervention alternatives might ask too much of participants in terms 
of requiring them to be honest and transparent about what matters, both to themselves and to 
the agency they represent. The workshop organizers are familiar with this concern and have 
observed it in other contexts; it is real, but no more so—no more difficult to address and overcome 
successfully—in the realm of intervention choices than for any other complex, multi-dimensional 
problem. Workshop participants also noted that many of the key intervention decisions are made 
by a small number of government staff who know each other well and are experienced in shared 
Figure 7. Swing weight sensitivity analysis for Participant 1 between consistency plot of Participant 1’s 
preferred alternatives according to their direct ranking and swing weighted results. The full-size version 
of this figure is available for download at http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.11.3.1496.
Figure 8. Consistency plot of Participant 1’s preferred alternatives according to their direct ranking 
and swing weighting results. The full-size version of this figure is available for download at http://doi.
org/10.5038/1911-9933.11.3.1496.
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discussions, so that a basic level of ease and familiarity—at least in many situations—may already 
be established. This will aid in the creation of trust but it may also work against the introduction of 
any new approaches to analysis or deliberations.
Conclusion and Recommendations
The doctrine of responsibility to protect (R2P),40 articulated in 2005, permits the international 
community to intervene in the affairs of a sovereign state if it fails to protect its population from 
mass atrocity crimes. In this paper we argue in favor of adopting a more structured decision making 
process when considering possible intervention strategies that may help to prevent or reduce the 
threat of genocide and mass atrocities. We link this argument to several shortcomings associated 
with conventional deliberation processes, including paying attention only to more prominent 
objectives (such as national security or economic costs) in order to justify a given strategy and 
failing to respond appropriately to larger numbers of injuries and deaths because our automatic, 
feeling response does not easily scale up from one to many. The workshop results highlighted the 
insights that can be gained, in terms of the role of competing objectives and inferences, from the 
use of different elicitation techniques to help select a preferred alternative. Leaving these factors 
implicit takes away the opportunity for decision makers to learn more about their own preferences 
as well as others’ views and can have the unintended result of discouraging interventions to save 
lives unless this humanitarian objective aligns closely with the other economic, national security, 
or reputational interests that underlie the intervention choice.
The use of different structuring techniques for displaying the results of the scenario-evaluation 
exercises successfully stimulated discussions and prompted a constructively critical review of 
participants positions: because choices were being made without access to perfect information and 
because time constraints were severe (as they also would be as part of most real-world intervention 
choices), it was important that individuals be given an opportunity to revisit their expressed values 
and opinions and to reconsider their choices in light of the new information that becomes available 
both through introspection and through subsequent discussions with colleagues. In addition, the 
more structured deliberative process led to several new hybrid intervention scenarios that may not 
otherwise have been identified.
We also note that uncertainty may play a complementary role in this de-emphasis of the 
humanitarian aspects of the choice. If estimates of cost or the anticipated impacts of national 
security risks are perceived as subject to less uncertainty than are foreign lives saved, then as a 
result they may be weighted relatively more heavily. Analysis can address this possible bias, at least 
to some extent, through the careful examination and communication of uncertainty and through 
an accurate summary of the uncertainty associated even with supposedly precise estimates (e.g., 
predictions of future prices or expenditures). 
Yet despite the best of intentions and the adoption of appropriate techniques, decision makers 
may ignore the results of a more structured process, relying instead on System 1 intuitions and 
prior experience. In such cases, highlighting the key elements and consequences of an intervention 
choice will at minimum document the argument for selecting an intervention action—including 
what is left out of the picture as well as what is included—and all this information will be available 
and transparent if a subsequent review is conducted to determine why a selected strategy failed to 
meet expectations. In time, this information is likely to make it more difficult for decision makers 
to overturn the results of a thoughtful deliberative process.
Workshop results, including feedback from participants, provided clear support for our 
hypothesis that depicting genocide intervention decisions in terms of fundamental values, clearly 
articulated measures of performance, and the consequences of different alternatives can help to 
organize what is known about the predicted consequences of interventions while highlighting key 
information gaps. Because the primary goal of the workshop was to obtain feedback from these 
experienced participants regarding the potential advantages and disadvantage of a more structured 
framework for making intervention decisions, we did not formally seek to compare results of the 
40 United Nations, 2005 World Summit Outcome, paras. 138–140. 
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holistic vs. decomposed approaches (e.g., through the use of control groups or over different 
contexts) other than to observe afterwards that the two approaches offered different insights to 
participants as aids for exploring which alternatives may best achieve their interests. Based on the 
initial positive feedback we received from participants, this is clearly a subject for future study; as 
several workshop members pointed out, the relevance of results would be improved to the extent 
that the decision-making situation is an actual, unfolding case study and involves individuals 
engaged in the decision-making process. 
A more structured approach to intervention decisions also has the capability to examine 
carefully a vague doctrine, such as “promote the national interest” or “implement our responsibility 
to protect” and transform it into an organized framework that promotes both understanding and 
discussion. Of course, no decision-aiding framework can or should “make” the tough choices 
required of the US government with respect to interventions intended to reduce genocide and 
mass atrocities. What it can do is to improve the quality and extent of intervention deliberations, 
laying the groundwork for a more comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the threats posed 
to American values and interests using a common language for analysis that facilitates input and 
involvement from all key parties.
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“Genocide is not a crime that happens in dark alleys.”1 This pithy observation and over-all 
graceful analysis investigates five separate genocides committed by the Iraqi government of Saddam 
Hussein: the Arabization of historical Kurdish lands such as Kirkuk, the forced displacement 
of Faylee Kurds, the disappearance of eight thousand Barzanis in 1983, the Anfal campaign in 
1988-89, and the chemical attack on Halabja in 1988. However, the post-Saddam “Iraqi federal 
governments showed no will to heal the wound caused by these events  . . . with the exception 
of some ineffective legal decisions.”2 Thus, “justice has been very limited and has left the Kurds 
deprived of the compensation to which they were entitled, as well as feeling betrayed by Baghdad 
and its judicial system.”3 
As a former member of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)—serving as Minister for 
Human Rights between 2001 and 2005 and later as Minister of Extra Regional Affairs and the 
KRG representative in Baghdad until May 2014 as well as being an academic holding a Ph.D. in 
international law from the University of London and another Ph.D. in Arab and Islamic Studies 
from the University of Exeter—Mohammed Ihsan is well-placed to write this account. His 
concluding table on page 134 portrays each of the five genocidal crimes, how vast the Iraqi agencies 
participating in them were, but how paltry were the number of final retributive verdicts. Thus, 
many felt that his Shia enemies executed the ex-president [Saddam Hussein] before he was 
made to pay for crimes against the Kurds. This led most Kurds to think that justice had been 
hijacked by the tensions between Sunnis and Shias, leaving the Kurds without the possibility 
of seeing justice for the crimes committed against them. 4 
As a result, “any attempt to build a credible judicial system in Iraq was severely undermined 
by this event.”5 In also blaming the “many witnesses . . . [and] the willingness of the greater part of 
society to do nothing”6 Ihsan further concludes that his analysis “has been able to demonstrate that 
the responsibilities lay far beyond the top of the regime.”7  
The author further takes issue with the many well-placed who solely blame the murderous 
insurgency that ravished Iraq after the U.S. victory [in 2003] on Paul Bremer’s de-Ba’athification 
and disbanding of the Iraqi army, which put millions onto the streets with guns, but without jobs. 
He argues instead that “people who took part in the Arabization and genocide campaigns are 
still in the civil service and in the military structure of the government.”8 Nevertheless, General 
1 Mohammed Ihsan, Nation Building in Kurdistan: Memory, Genocide and Human Rights (New York: Routledge, 2017), 135.
2 Ibid., 4.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid., 134.
5 Ibid., 21.
6 Ibid., 135.
7 Ibid., 135.
8 Ibid., 35.
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David Petraeus’s reawakening gestures to the newly disenfranchised Sunnis temporarily stabilized 
Iraq until these lessons were tragically forgotten and ignored by Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-
Maliki’s disastrous Shite government that helped birth another genocidal disaster known as ISIS. 
Ihsan emphasizes ISIS’s origin from “such myopic politics” and this “dangerous mismanagement 
of post-Saddam Iraq . . . [and resulting] vacuum of power” that has led to the “now-inevitable 
disintegration of the country.”9 
Ihsan further argues that this deplorable situation in part “stems from the Bush administration’s 
ignorance of the history of Iraq and its multicultural population . . . [and] because the Bush 
administration never had a real postwar plan in place and it was merely looking for easy exit 
policies.10  
As for Kirkuk, it 
is about more than oil. . . .  For Kurds, Kirkuk symbolizes decades of forced displacement, 
the destruction of their homes and the occupation of their lands by Arab settlers. . . .  Kirkuk 
is key to peace settlement and the key to restoring justice to the [Kurdish] people.11 
Illustrating his attempt to be fair to Kirkuk’s non-Kurdish population, however, Ihsan warns 
that “the Kurdish claim over this land could trigger a new, deadly sectarian war,”12 one that 
this reviewer also feels might follow when ISIS is driven from Mosul and ethnic and sectarian 
boundaries reset. “The Kurds have to face reality. . . .  Giving up the claims to Arab-majority towns, 
for example, in which Arab residents are not the consequence of Arabization, would be a first step 
to smoothing the negotiations with Baghdad.”13
As for Halabja, “according to the Federation of American Scientists, this crime was, and 
still remains, the largest chemical weapons attack directed against a civilian-populated area in 
history.”14 Thus, Ihsan concludes that “it is evident that Halabja constitutes the peak of the state-
engineered genocide against the Kurds…[where] the regime distanced itself completely from an 
indifferent international community and international law.”15 
There are a few errors in the manuscript that should be flagged. The KRG first appeared after 
the election held on May 17, 1992, not “in November 1992.”16 Unifying the “Peshmerga, or local militias, 
into the Unified Peshmerga Force under the direction of the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs”17 is largely a 
myth since the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) still 
actually control these forces. Jus cogens, not “jus gogens…is a basic concern, an independent principle, 
and a mandatory precept…in international law.”18 The author fails to explain why he thinks the cease-
fire that ended the Gulf War against Saddam Hussein in February 1992 constituted “unjust terms.”19 
The domestic jurisdiction clause of the United Nations Charter is Article 2, paragraph 7, not “article 
2, chapter 7.”20 It is not clear which war the author means when he states that “in particular the 
war in Europe, paved the way for a new phase in Kurdish and Iraqi relations.”21 “KRG Prime 
Minister Nechir Van Barzani”22 almost sounds like a Dutch name. The correct spelling, of course, 
9 Ibid., 25, 137, 118.
10 Ibid., 32.
11 Ibid., 31.
12 Ibid., 39.
13 Ibid., 129.
14 Ibid., 97.
15 Ibid., 112.
16 Ibid., 6.
17 Ibid., 13.
18 Ibid., 16.
19 Ibid., 17.
20 Ibid., 17.
21 Ibid., 19.
22 Ibid., 35.
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is Nechirvan. Endnote twenty-four on page forty-one confuses Gareth Stansfield as an editor of 
the book Crisis in Kirkuk when actually he is the co-author along with the correctly listed Liam Anderson. 
The well-known Kurdologist Ofra Bengio is a woman, and therefore it is not “his book”23 that is referred 
to. If “killing members of a group is considered a basic element in the recognition of the crime of 
genocide,”24 how does this differ from regular war? 
Ihsan includes fourteen helpful maps, a list of abbreviations, five appendices each dealing with 
the five case studies of genocide detailed in the book, a short index, and a longer useful bibliography 
of secondary sources. However, one wonders why the author includes eleven separate works by 
the Armenian genocide scholar Vahakn N. Dadrian, dealing mostly with the Armenians, yet does 
not even mention the more apropos studies by Joost Hiltermann and Choman Hardi on the Iraqi 
Kurdish genocide. Nevertheless, Ihsan’s jargon-free, reader-friendly study is recommended for 
scholars and practitioners as well as the intelligent lay public.  
23 Ibid., 79.
24 Ibid., 105.
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In mid-July 2017, six thousand people gathered at the white-power music festival Rock gegen 
Überfremdung (Rock against Foreign Domination) in Themar, a small town in Thuringia, Germany. 
At the event, the police recorded forty-six crimes, including assault, threatening behavior, 
contravention of German weapons law and displaying illegal (i.e. Nazi) symbols. Six people 
were arrested and the authorities recorded the identities of 440 festival-goers. An undisclosed 
sum was raised for the far-right political cause.1 Music festivals of this kind and the violence that 
accompanies them are part of today’s German political reality and, increasingly, of other countries 
around the world. This makes the white-power music scene worth the attention of any scholar 
studying extremist political movements, racism, or genocide.
The ethnomusicologist and genocide historian Kirsten Dyck is one of them. Unlike other 
scholars in the field of white-power music, she looks beyond the country-specific variations of 
such music scenes, and, in her book Reichsrock, makes a convincing case that festivals like the one 
in Thuringia are anything but fringe phenomena. On the contrary, as she reveals, the white-power 
music scene has become a diffuse ideological network with interconnected outposts in countries 
around the world. 
Dyck begins by explaining why she applies the term white-power—as opposed to white-
supremacist or white-nationalist—to the music scene she investigates. Because its promoters are 
convinced that the existence of the white race is threatened, their music must express a sense of 
power and of their empowerment. The umbrella term white-power music encompasses many local 
scenes, each with its own type of pro-white racist music; its musicians and fans may or may not 
interact or agree with their counterparts in other regions. She defines white-power music as “any 
music produced and distributed by individuals who are actively trying to advance what they view 
as a white-power or pro-white racist agenda.”2 In general, these individuals believe in a so-called 
international Jewish conspiracy and stand in opposition to national governments and international 
power structures like the United Nations or the World Bank while displaying hostility toward 
racial, ethnic and sexual minorities.3 White-power music allows the far right to generate money 
for its cause, to disseminate its ideology, to offer opportunities for social bonding, and to provide 
a way in to white-power beliefs and activism for those who haven’t yet had interest in or contact 
with such ideological beliefs and communities.
Dyck sets two ambitious goals for herself. The first is to present an in-depth study of white-
power music as a transnational rather than merely a local phenomenon; the second is to explore 
the connections between seemingly non-racist elements of mainstream ideology and the blatantly 
racist aspects of white-power philosophy. Although issues of gender and religion are central 
themes of white-power ideology and music, they remain excluded from this study; the author 
plans to focus on them in her future work. 
1 “6,000-strong neo-Nazi music festival sparks call for ban on far-right gigs.” DPA/The Local,  July 17, 2017, accessed September 
22, 2017, https://www.thelocal.de/20170717/6000-strong-neo-nazi-music-festival-sparks-call-for-ban-on-far-right-gigs
2 Kristin Dyck, Reichsrock: The International Web of White-Power and Neo-Nazi Hate Music (Brunswick: Rutgers University 
Press, 2017), 2. 
3 Dyck, Reichsrock, 3.
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Other scholarly works on the subject have mainly used ethnographic methods, but Dyck’s 
work stands out for her analysis of the primary and secondary texts the white-power music web 
produces. White-power songs and albums, music magazines and Internet fora serve as sources; she 
also analyzes sales figures, market demographics, and other key statistics—to the degree that they 
are available in this murky arena. 
In the following four chapters, the author first describes the history of the white-power music 
scene in Great Britain, where the genre was founded in the early 1970s. It was British musicians 
who drove its early development, in particular Ian Stuart Donaldson and his band “Skrewdriver.” 
The following chapter then moves to continental Europe where white-power music soon appeared 
in Germany, and then in Sweden, Norway, and other western Mediterranean countries. Dyck 
follows the phenomenon through its rise in Eastern European countries like Russia, Belarus, 
Ukraine, Poland, and Greece, and finally into countries outside Europe, in particular the United 
States and  Canada, Latin America, and finally Australia. The chapters link the regions’ histories 
to their white-power ideology and their white-power music scenes, showing how they differ from 
country to country while retaining a common core ideology. These elaborations demonstrate the 
connections between particular lyrics and acts of violence by their fans, documenting cases of 
criminals who sang or shouted phrases from the lyrics as they committed acts of racist violence. 
She also argues convincingly that even the most forceful governmental interventions do not 
extinguish—indeed, they often hardly disturb—the white-power music scenes for longer periods 
of time. This is particularly evident in Germany, the spiritual home of most white-power neo-Nazi 
musicians today, and the physical home of the world’s numerically largest white-power music 
scene. Although the German constitution allows the government to ban materials it sees as threats 
to democracy or to young people, and despite continued police monitoring, raids and law-suits, the 
German white-power music scene is still growing. In only one country—Great Britain—have anti-
racist protests succeeded in making it more difficult for the white-power music scene to organize 
concerts and to attract large numbers of attendees. Dyck’s study also shows the lasting influence 
of the Nazi-version of white-power ideology, which is glaringly evident in the names of bands, 
and songs, and of white-power ideological fan groups. There is, for example, a British organization 
called “Blood & Honour,4” from the German Blut und Ehre, a slogan that was etched onto Hitler 
Youth knife-blades; a German band is called “Endstufe,” a reference to the Nazi’s so-called Final 
Solution to the Jewish Question (a Nazi plan for the extermination of the Jews during the Second 
World War); the Greek band name “Der Stürmer” (the stormer) takes its name from the Third 
Reich’s main propaganda newspaper, while a Russian song is titled “Holocaust Erotica.”
What stands out most in Dyck’s study is the malleability and flexibility of the white-power 
ideology, which adapts to each country’s historical situation and its music scenes’ ambitions. Taken 
together, its hackneyed ideas do not represent an internally consistent or contradiction-free belief 
system. Although according to the Nazi and neo- Nazi systems of racial hierarchy, ethnic Slavs are 
considered Untermenschen, or sub-humans, white-power ideology and its music scene thrives in 
Russia and other Eastern European countries. In their ideology, Slavs are white and they reserve 
their hatred for targeting Jews and other non-Slavic ethnic minorities. Even more problematic 
for a German or Scandinavian neo-Nazi would be the way Spanish and South-American white 
supremacists claim membership in white power circles. Their standards of racial purity would 
not pass the Anglo or North American movement’s standard concept of “one-drop of blood”—
which automatically excludes individuals of mixed-race heritage—but instead involves a gradual 
hierarchy of racial value depending on the proportion of European ancestry in a given person’s 
family. 
The music that comes out of these different national scenes is as dynamic and innovative as its ideologies 
are flexible, encompassing the traditional British oi!-style and varieties of National Socialist 
Black Metal (NSBM), neo-folk, industrial, and even hip-hop and dub. Dyck’s work supports her 
4 The organization “Blood & Honour” started out to support struggling British white-power bands that were no longer 
under contract with mainstream music labels. It runs a glossy magazine and promotes activism and white-power 
violence. After various in-fights it allied itself with music labels in other countries. By 2009 the organization listed 
sixteen separate divisions within Britain and twenty-four non-British divisions around the world. 
Alsop
©2018     Genocide Studies and Prevention 11, no. 3 http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.11.3
133
assertion that “one must understand white-power music as an international genre because one 
must understand contemporary white-power racism—along with the older forms of racism and 
white supremacy that have preceded it—as a global phenomenon.”5
The author also claims to show that mainstream western ideology is built on a form of unspoken 
and taboo racism that is ubiquitous but unacknowledged in the culture; and she claims to show that 
this mainstream ideology opens up the space for the extreme and outspoken forms of white-power 
music so present in contemporary societies around the globe. White-power musicians’ ideologies, 
she argues, descend directly from older types of racism which still persist and which mainstream, 
avowedly non-racist populations in European-descended societies continue to tolerate. Russia, 
for example, has long been profoundly xenophobic, an attitude that was sanctioned and even 
fostered by the state, especially in the Stalin years. This xenophobic paranoia expresses itself in 
hostility to actual foreigners but also to internal minority groups like the Ukrainians, Crimean 
Tatars, and Chechens. Russia’s post-Cold War oligarchy, its financial crisis in 1998 and other factors 
left large parts of the population in poverty and dissatisfaction, and it became fertile ground for 
racist ideologies. In Moscow alone there were 450 racist killings and more than 2,500 injuries from 
racist attacks between January 2004 and May 2010. The racism of Russian neo-Nazi groups finds 
support from mainstream organizations like the administration of Moscow State University and 
the Russian Orthodox Church.6 Similarly, the United States offers many examples of mainstream 
support of racism, as evidenced by, among other things, “police brutality toward African Americans 
and deep-rooted systems of structural inequality that leave this group living in poverty at rates far 
higher than the national average.”7 
Although Dyck’s arguments here have a degree of plausibility, her examples remain rather 
broad, making her assertion that mainstream music and mainstream ideology supply the 
scaffolding for the white power music web less convincing than it might otherwise be. This lack of 
clarity is partly due to murky terminology (what is mainstream music and mainstream ideology, 
and what is its’ structure? How does the author define race—a pseudoscientific term to begin 
with—or racism, terms that she does not include in the otherwise excellent index of her book?). It 
also stems in part from some issues that are integral to the subject: the bands and their products 
are taboo in many societies and illegal in some, making sales figures hard to come by and hiding 
many distribution channels deep in the recesses of the dark web. Adding to the challenge is the 
fact that for copyright reasons, lyrics cannot be quoted, so the reader is not always clear about what 
exactly the author is referring to. Mainly though, the lack of clarity is due to the fact that Dyck is not 
specific about the theoretical frameworks or the political theory that informs her inferences, or her 
conclusions about the ways mainstream ideology and music influence or give rise to white-power 
ideology and music. Without a theoretical foundation, it is hard for the reader to determine if 
Dyck’s conclusions are the result of her scientific investigation or rather of her own liberal political 
beliefs. 
These unanswered questions do not detract from the fact that Reichsrock is a significant 
contribution to the exploration of white-power racism in its contemporary forms. Its historical 
accounts are detailed and resourceful and their wide range and focus on worldwide connections 
are highly valuable. Kirstin Dyck has delivered a much-needed contribution to the field, one that 
historians, political scientists, and genocide scholars alike (as well as activists against extremist 
political movements) will find to be an important resource for their work. 
5 Ibid., 11.
6 Ibid., 81.
7 Ibid., 107.
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The influence of perpetrators of massive violations of human rights does not vanish with 
their death. This idea is so self-evident that it hardly seems to require further  research. However, 
La Muerte del Verdugo. Reflexiones Interdisciplinarias Sobre el Cadáver de los Criminales de Masa [The 
Perpetrator’s Death. Interdisciplinary Reflections About Mass Murderers’ Dead Bodies] takes up 
the challenge and sheds new light on several aspects of regime transition, transitional justice, and 
the politics of memory. The volume, edited by Sévane Garibian, Professor of Law at the University 
of Geneva and Associate Professor at the University of Neuchâtel, is a collection of chapters written 
by authors from various backgrounds (historians, legal scholars, anthropologists, psychologists, 
novelists) that brilliantly succeeds in drawing our attention to fascinating but hitherto neglected 
issues.
In the volume’s introduction, Garibian underscores that while the literature has extensively 
discussed the question of the death and burial of victims of mass violence, analysing the 
perpetrators’ dead body is “a taboo within the taboo itself”1insofar as their death is hardly discussed 
in the first place. Garibian introduces the three main questions around which the chapters are 
articulated, namely the circumstances of the perpetrator’s death, “what to do with their remains?” 
and “how to approach their legacy, the memory of their person and of their crimes?,” or their 
“patrimonialization.”2 The first question is used to divide the book into three sections (“natural 
death,” “judicial execution” and “extrajudicial killing”) that analyse case studies from various 
geographical areas and historical periods. These are preceded by a discussion of the legality of 
tyrannicide in international law. The status of this chapter as prologue seems rather odd since it 
is only related to the third kind of perpetrator’s death. Including it in the third part of the volume 
would have made more sense as it complements the other chapters, in particular those about the 
death of Osama bin Laden and Muammar Gaddafi.
All the chapters are very informative and well-written, though their degree of engagement 
with the issues outlined in the introduction and analytical depth varies. The first section of the 
volume is entitled “Natural death, death under suspicion” to stress that its causes are often 
contested or questioned (which may be used to present perpetrators as victims of injustice or 
conspiracy), but also the fact that it means that perpetrators escape justice and accountability. The 
section includes chapters about Pol Pot, Jean-Bédel Bokassa and Idi Amin Dada, Francisco Franco 
and Augusto Pinochet, and Slobodan Milošević. The chapters about the Cambodian and African 
dictators recount the circumstances of their death and explain how cultural and religious beliefs, 
some of which pertain to the dead body, have shaped their surprisingly merciful memories. The 
consequence of the perpetrator’s natural death are well highlighted by Milošević’s fate. Because 
he died in prison a few days before the end of his trial, the truth about his role in the Balkan Wars 
could not be officially established. Florence Hartmann refers to his “posthumous victory”3 insofar 
1 Séviane Garibian, “Introducción: La muerte del verdugo o el tiempo incontable de su eternidad,” in La Muerte del 
Verdugo. Reflexiones Interdisciplinarias Sobre el Cadáver de los Criminales de Masa, ed. Séviane Garibian (Buenos Aires: 
Miño y Dávila editores, 2016), 25.
2 Ibid., 23.
3 Florence Hartmann, “La revancha póstuma de Slobodan Milosevic,” in La Muerte del Verdugo. Reflexiones Interdisciplinarias 
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as Milošević will enjoy perpetual impunity, the truth about his crimes will remain partial, his 
responsibility can still be denied, and both the victims’ work of mourning and reconciliation are 
significantly hindered. In other words, he “wins several of the battles he had fought during his 
life […] [and ends up killing] Justice and Truth.”4 Milošević’s dead body reflects how his death 
represents a way out (muerte-escapatoria):5 no picture was ever seen and uncertainty surrounds 
the site where Milošević is buried. Finally, the contribution by Rosa Ana Alija Fernández further 
explores the relationship between the perpetrator’s dead body, truth and justice by comparing the 
deaths of Franco and Pinochet. The author highlights the direct relationship between the dictator’s 
dead body and the struggle for human rights and against impunity in both cases. Franco is buried 
in a huge monument outside Madrid, el Valle de los Caídos (the Valley of the Fallen). Franco himself 
had ordered its construction to celebrate his victory in the Civil War (1936-1939) and the works to 
build it entailed the death of hundreds of Republican prisoners. Over the past two decades, several 
actors have requested the transfer of Franco’s remains to another site in an attempt to recover the 
site and resignify it, which has proved impossible. Alija Fernández argues that Franco’s mortal 
remains symbolise the lack of a break with the past that characterised the Spanish transition to 
democracy, and the legacy of the dictatorship in contemporary Spain. She astutely observes that 
the demands to transfer Franco’s body have increased since Spanish courts ruled out the possibility 
of judging his crimes, “as an alternative way of putting a symbolic end to impunity.”6 On the other 
hand, though Pinochet had plans to have his own Valle de los Caídos built in Chile, he later decided 
that his ashes would remain in a family mausoleum. Stressing the contrast with Franco, the author 
underlines that the choice of a private burial site is the consequence of the political and judicial 
struggle for memory and justice in Chile.
The second section focuses on judicial executions and has only two chapters. While the chapter 
about Saddam Hussein’s death focuses mainly on the religious symbolism surrounding the 
execution of “the Butcher of Baghdad” and the meanings of the footage of the event, Nicolas Patin 
offers a historical perspective on the issues surrounding the treatment of the perpetrators’ dead 
bodies by analysing the debates about the execution of the Nazi leaders sentenced to death after the 
Second World War. He shows that the public character of the execution was seen as necessary to 
avoid transforming perpetrators into martyrs and to symbolise the birth of a new political system. 
Patin also critically engages with the idea that incinerating the perpetrators’ bodies and denying 
them a burial (site) may prevent turning them into cult figures. 
Finally, the third section is about extrajudicial killings or “death as vengeance.” Garibian is 
interested primarily in the meaning and significance of the trial that led to the acquittal by a German 
tribunal of the survivor of the Armenian genocide who killed Mehmet Talaat Pasha. The following 
chapter by Didier Musiedlak about the mystery surrounding Mussolini’s death is very detailed 
but fails to engage with the issues raised in the volume’s introduction. In her chapter, Muriel 
Montagut is critical of the media and political leaders’ silence (or, rather, silent relief) following 
the lynching of Muammar Gaddafi. She claims that the failure to condemn the cruelty of his death 
and the degrading display of his body in an industrial freezer turns us from distant witnesses into 
indirect accomplices and does not augur well for post-Gaddafi Lybia. The most challenging and 
theoretically sophisticated chapter of the third section is Frédéric Mégret’s analysis of the “fugitive 
death” of Osama Bin Laden. Drawing on Foucault, he argues that it is a practice that constitutes 
and legitimises the knowledge and techniques of the so-called War on Terror at the same time as it 
reaffirms the state’s sovereign power.
The chapters in La Muerte del Verdugo draw important lessons summarised by Garibian in 
the introduction: “Natural death […] ‘makes [perpetrators] more human’ but does not repair. 
Judicial execution […] condemns but does not demystify. [Extrajudicial killing] […] dishonours 
Sobre el Cadáver de los Criminales de Masa, ed. Séviane Garibian (Buenos Aires: Miño y Dávila editores, 2016), 135.
4 Ibid., 139.
5 Ibid., 135-9.
6 Rosa Ana Alija Fernández, “El inextricable camino entre el lecho de muerte y la lucha contra la impunidad: los casos de 
Franco y Pinochet,” in La Muerte del Verdugo. Reflexiones Interdisciplinarias Sobre el Cadáver de los Criminales de Masa, ed. 
Séviane Garibian (Buenos Aires: Miño y Dávila editores, 2016), 111.
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but does not pacify.”7 Besides, although it depends on a multiplicity of factors, the posthumous 
transformation of perpetrators into cult figures is almost inevitable.8 
The book is very enjoyable to read, though readers will likely lament the fact that it does 
not include any pictures, which would have been particularly appropriate. The volume’s main 
weakness is the confusion about what the chapters actually focus on. Indeed, some of them are 
not so much about the perpetrators’ dead body—the book’s central theme—as about the pictures 
or footage that immortalise it, the perpetrators’ grave or memorial, or simply his/her death. 
Nevertheless, this may be one of the defects of volumes such as La Muerte del Verdugo that are 
innovative and truly interdisciplinary contributions to the existing scholarship.
7 Sévane Garibian, “Introducción: La muerte del verdugo o el tiempo incontable de su eternidad,” in La Muerte del Verdugo. 
Reflexiones Interdisciplinarias Sobre el Cadáver de los Criminales de Masa, ed. Séviane Garibian (Buenos Aires: Miño y 
Dávila editores, 2016), 33.
8 Ibid., 34.
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With the recent migration crisis in the global North and the unrelenting pressure on host 
countries in the global South where the vast majority of refugees continue to reside, Simon Turner’s 
is a book that should be read widely. Turner’s careful ethnographic study of the micropolitics 
unfolding in Lukole refugee camp for Burundian refugees in Tanzania remains one of the few books 
offering an intimate portrait of daily life and conflicted politics of a refugee camp. By combining 
the bird’s eye perspective with that of a close-up street view, Turner diverges from the removed 
global economy analyses or the overly technical language of humanitarian reports by offering a 
perspective that is both empirically rich and theoretically engaged. 
Turner’s aim is to explore not how history creates conflict but how conflict creates histories 
and how this relationship manifests in the space of the camp. As such, the book sits within an 
emerging body of literature that challenges a one-sided Agambenian characterization of camp 
inhabitants as “bare life” suspended in an exceptional state of limbo and an apolitical space of 
exclusion. Research in conflict-affected areas such as Western Sahara or Eastern DRC has shown 
that refugee camps are instead saturated with refugee politics, at extreme ends acting as quasi-
states or “practice polities.” While Turner doesn’t deny that liminality and exceptionality do define 
the refugee camp, his picture is fundamentally one of ambiguity and he skillfully foregrounds the 
interplay of “powers” in Lukole— between Tanzanian authorities and humanitarian agencies on 
the one hand, and the refugees as they maneuver the space of the camp and construct their own 
subjectivities. At the same time as they link the space of the camp with social and moral decay, 
with experiences of status loss and emasculation (“UNHCR is a better husband”1 being fed by 
“food distribution”2) Lukole’s inhabitants also strategically take advantage of new opportunities. 
Chapter five excels in tracing concrete stories of such “liminal experts.” 
In fact, the book is at its best when it discusses such paradoxes and ambiguities of camp 
governance. Chapter three is especially strong on this, foregrounding the tensions between real 
disempowerment faced by the refugees due to the restrictions and prescriptions (down to the form 
and style of their blindé)3 imposed by the camp commandant and the humanitarian agencies, and 
on the other hand the “empowerment” in form of participation promoted by the same agencies,4 or 
the fact that indeed camp life did offer empowerment of sorts to its inhabitants by shaking up old 
hierarchies and opening up new opportunities.
Turner’s careful study certainly succeeds in breaking down some of the pervasive stereotypes 
surrounding the figure of the refugee and the space of the camp. The book challenges the notion 
that the space of the camp is uniformly disempowering in chapter four by showing how the 
politics of gender plays out differently for men and women, and across status lines. The book also 
deconstructs the image of the refugee as a passive victim by foregrounding the politics of guilt 
and the loss of innocence among the Hutu, who in the 1990s can no longer claim the mantle of 
1 Simon Turner, Politics of Innocence: Hutu Identity, Conflict and Camp Life (New York and Oxford: Berghahn, 2010), 66.
2 Ibid., 68.
3 Ibid., 45.
4 Ibid., 52.
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“innocence” due to their own imbrications in violence inside Burundi. Through analysis of the 
political parties operating in the camp in chapter six, the book breaks down the image of refugee 
as an apolitical figure of a human in need. Turner’s distinct contribution here is his portrayal of 
the camp as a political arena where different parties and ideologies compete for allegiance and 
the ability to shape the historical narrative. Chapter six is a fascinating reflection on rumor as a 
currency mediating this political competition.
Turner’s Politics of Innocence presents a key contribution to the study of camps and encampment, 
in Africa and more widely. It builds on and extends the seminal work by Liisa Malkki5 who, 
incidentally also working with Burundian refugees in Tanzania a decade prior, linked the space 
of the camp to the production of strongly ethnonationalist historical narratives, narratives likely 
to perpetuate rather than diffuse violence. But Malkki left camp politics aside, making it seem 
that the narratives she gathered arose in a political vacuum. By contrast, Turner foregrounds 
the fundamental ambiguity of the camp as both a space depoliticized through humanitarian 
quasi-governance and hyperpoliticized through competition among political parties. Through 
the struggle between the CNDD and Palipehutu, Turner persuasively shows that production of 
history depends on power struggles in the space of the camp. The narratives of Hutu ethnic and 
moral purity that Malkki collected could simply not arise again. The histories that emerged during 
Turner’s time in the camp were not only conditioned by intra-Hutu political competition but also 
constrained by the loss of the Hutu victim position through their own imbrication in violence in 
the early 1990s and onwards. 
Future work is needed to extend and systematize some of the insights that Turner offers in 
his book. The experiences of women in the camp are notably missing. Accent is also primarily on 
“big men” and the liminal experts benefitting from the opportunities of the camp rather than those 
“sitting around” or bemoaning their loss of status. Going forward, more historical depth and a 
comparative perspective would be useful in order to map out the historical transformation in the 
experiences of Burundian encampment, the changing operation of political parties in exile and 
across the different camps, and the circulation of refugees between the national space, the space of 
the camp and other exilic spaces. Only such more systematic political exploration could deliver the 
answer to the key question that Turner and Malkki open up to view: What is the relation between 
the space of the camp, the production of history and the nature of nationalism that emerges in 
exile? And how do these tie to the dynamics of ongoing conflict?  If it is not Turner’s intention to 
provide such broader-ranging investigation, it is certainly the merit of the book that it inspires us 
to ask novel and more pointed questions about encamped experiences and their relation to both 
conflict and peace building in a region that has seem some of the most entrenched and large-scale 
violence of recent decades. The recent mass outflow of Burundians out of the country marks a new 
chapter in the regional conflict-displacement nexus and further underscores the continued and 
pressing relevance of the queries tackled in Turner’s Politics of Innocence.
5 Lisa H. Malkki, Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology Among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1995).
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Andrea Purdeková, in her review of Politics of Innocence: Hutu Identity, Conflict and Camp Life,1 
asks what the relationship is between the space of the camp, the production of history, and the 
nature of nationalism that emerges in exile? And, she continues, “how do these tie to the dynamics 
of ongoing conflict?”
These are important questions that go beyond the scope of my book. As she rightly points 
out ‘more historical depth and a comparative perspective would be useful.’ Let me, however, 
give some suggestions on the matter. In her seminal book Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, 
and National Cosmology Among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania,2 Liisa Malkki suggests that the kind of 
ethnic nationalism she found in Mishamo camp, did not appear among the self-settled Burundian 
refugees that she studied in Kigoma town. These apparently had a more cosmopolitan worldview. 
Rather than cultivating roots and purity like the camp refugees, they were more rhizomatic in a 
Deleuzian sense, living in the present and unconcerned with cultural purity. Malkki has indeed 
been criticized for projecting her own ideals onto these town refugees. I am not able to judge 
whether this is the case. I have, however, also done fieldwork among Burundian refugees who left 
Lukole camp to try their luck in Nairobi. While the picture is not as clear-cut, as Malkki suggests, 
several of the refugees suggested that they left the camp due to its saturation with politics, making 
individual choices nearly impossible. On the one hand, Nairobi was the hub of communication 
for opposition parties, while on the other hand, many chose to leave party politics and pursue 
individual hopes for a better future elsewhere – often strongly attached to charismatic churches.3
These findings seem to support the idea that the refugee camp became a place for shaping 
political ideologies—although I argue against Malkki’s findings that they must necessarily 
be radically ethno-nationalist. One of the main arguments in the book is that there are several, 
competing ideologies in the camp and that the dominant ideology was relatively ‘moderate’ and 
democratic in its outlook. I argue in the book that the answer to this must be found in recent history 
in Burundi and Rwanda, and therefore that we cannot see the camp in isolation from the outside 
world and from the history of the region. 
The findings also support the idea that refugees outside the camp are less shaped by such 
political ideologies, although they also maintain relations with the camp and dreams of a different 
future Burundi—and are therefore not merely rhizomatically living in the present.
So to answer Purdeková’s questions: the camps do indeed play a central role in shaping certain 
political subjectivities that in turn shape the nature of conflict—and peace—in the region. And 
while the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian 
agencies seem to be oblivious to this fact and keep on treating refugees as innocent victims, other 
actors in the region are well aware of the ways in which camps shape political subjectivities. I 
have written elsewhere how the Rwandan state treated the returning refugees radically different 
to the international community.4 Rather than perceiving the refugees as ‘bare life,’ lacking political 
agency, the Rwandan state perceived them as what I have termed ‘bad life,’ containing harmful 
political agency that could threaten the post-genocide nation and hence in need of re-education 
in Ingando camps. Purdeková’s own book similarly demonstrates that the Rwandan state does 
1 Simon Turner, Politics of Innocence: Hutu Identity, Conflict and Camp Life (Oxford and New York: Berghahn, 2010).
2 Lisa H. Malkki, Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology Among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1995).
3 Simon Turner, “Staying out of Place: The being and becoming of Burundians refugees in the camp and the city,” Conflict 
and Society 2, no. 1 (2016), 37-51; Simon Turner, “We Wait for Miracles—Ideas of Hope and Future Among Clandestine 
Burundian Refugees in Nairobi,” in Ethnographies of Uncertainty in Africa (Anthropology, Change, and Development) ed. 
Elizabeth Cooper et al. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015),173-192.
4 Simon Turner, “New Citizens and a New Beginning—Repatriation and Nation-building after genocide in Rwanda,” 
Development and Change 45, no.3 (2014), 415-433.
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not see its education camps as places for simply containing victims of history without agency, but 
treats those who enter the Ingando camps as potentially having negative ideas that need removing 
and replacing with new, patriotic mentalities.
In a sense, Purdeková and I both explore camps as sites of intense identity making. However, 
the contexts and the foci of our work differ. The Ingando camps were created in the context of a 
post-genocide regime that was acutely aware of the threat of ‘negative mentalities’ and bent on 
creating subjects that were supportive of the new regime. The refugee camp, on the other hand, 
existed in a context of international humanitarianism that is blind to political subjectivities and 
more concerned with ‘pure victims’ devoid of agency—whether negative or positive. 
In terms of focus, Purdeková primarily explores the camp from the outside, thus loosing out 
on the negotiations and repositioning that might take place inside the camp, but demonstrating 
nicely how the Ingando camps are part of a larger state building project. She is in other words, 
making an important point about how camps are affected by the surrounding society and how 
they in affect society. In my book, on the other hand, I have neglected this aspect as Purdeková 
also remarks. Although I argue that ‘the camp was not an island unto itself’5 and show how the 
conflict in Burundi followed the refugees into the camp, my focus was on the internal dynamics 
of the camp, demonstrating that the refugees transformed the camp into something else than was 
intended by its planners.
Both views are relevant and both are important, as much scholarships on camps makes 
the double mistake of firstly treating camps as isolated entities and secondly assuming that the 
policies of camp planning succeed. Our studies show that one should not assume either and that by 
understanding camps—in their context as well as from the inside—we may understand a lot about 
the constitution of society and its conflicts.
5 Turner, Politics of Innocence, 164.
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Genocide scholars are of course familiar with the work of John K. Roth who has authored, co-
authored, and edited numerous volumes on the Holocaust and other genocides. His most recent 
book, The Failures of Ethics: Confronting the Holocaust, Genocide, and Other Mass Atrocities, may well 
be his most insightful work yet. It is a work that deserves a careful reading by all of us in the field 
of Genocide Studies, irrespective of disciplinary lens.
Perhaps most noteworthy is the fact that he is resolute in confronting the horrors of genocide. 
He quotes Emmanuel Levinas to the effect that “The Holocaust of the Jewish people under the 
reign of Hitler…seems to me the paradigm of gratuitous human suffering, in which evil appears 
in its diabolical horror.”1  He concludes his chapter on “God’s Failures” with a call for “no more 
theodicy.” Roth explores the possibility that in an era of postmodern relativism the Holocaust 
might well be a “negative absolute.”2  And following Jean Améry, Roth takes to heart the insight 
that the Holocaust and other atrocities including rape and torture mark “the destruction of trust in 
the world.”3 Yet like Primo Levi and Elie Wiesel—Roth acknowledges a deep debt to Wiesel—Roth 
refuses to abandon hope.  At the conclusion of Part I (of II) Roth writes:
’And yet . . . and yet,’ Elie Wiesel has said, ‘this is the key expression of my work.’ That 
outlook should also be a key response to the failures of ethics, including God’s failures, 
because life persists, history continues, and they embody so much that is good and precious, 
so much that must not be abandoned—perhaps even God?—lest failure is compounded to 
the point of no return.4
And Roth certainly strikes a similar albeit cautious message of hopefulness at the end of the 
entire work. What then, are the failures of ethics that Roth discusses? For as he is right to claim, 
“if ethics is to be a safeguard against its own failures, then people who try to be ethical have 
to acknowledge the failures, own them when they should, and protest against them.”5  The first 
failure he discusses is the problem and process of bystanding.  Drawing from Wendy Lower6 and 
Omer Bartov,7 among others, Roth draws attention to the scope of the problem—most Germans 
during the Holocaust were neither perpetrators nor victims—and also problematizes the received 
understanding of bystanders as entirely passive and without agency.  He is surely right in claiming 
“No single size fits all bystanders, but conditions for inclusion in that category involve knowledge 
1 John K. Roth, The Failures of Ethics: Confronting the Holocaust, Genocide, and Other Mass Atrocities (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2015), 99.  Roth is quoting Emmanuel Levinas, Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-Other, trans. Michael B. 
Smith and Marsha Harshav (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 97.
2 Roth, The Failures of Ethics, 21.
3 Ibid., 30.
4 Ibid., 101. Roth is quoting Elie Wiesel, “Exile and the Human Condition,” in Against Silence: The Voice and Vision of Elie 
Wiesel, ed. Irving Abrahamson (New York: Holocaust Library, 1985), 1:183.
5 Roth, The Failures of Ethics, 7.
6 Wendy Lower, Hitler’s Furies: German Women in the Nazi Killing Fields (New York: Mariner Books, 2014).
7 Omar Bartov, ed. The Holocaust: Origins, Implementation, Aftermath (New York: Routledge, 2000).
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and agency.”8 Many, if not most, of us have the power to in various ways challenge the scope and 
depravity of genocidal violence.
A second failure is the abandonment of moral absolutes in favour of a postmodern, Nietzschean 
celebration of the individual and the will to power as the source of value.  A related problem is 
that celebrating the individual as the source of all value risks abandoning our responsibility to and 
for others.  Roth is hesitant to call for the recovery of a religiously grounded moral absolutism—
something embraced by, among others, David Patterson.9  Roth seems forced to acknowledge that 
“ethical outlooks” are social constructs with a history, but even so something like the Holocaust 
can still serve as a negative absolute; in his view even a socially constructed ethics can still be 
extremely powerful.10 
The shortest chapter of the book, “Rape as Torture and the Responsibility to Protect”—a mere 
fourteen pages—is nevertheless important for its recognition that rape and other forms of torture 
have an as yet insufficiently understood enduring destructive potential: the ubiquity of rape as 
a weapon of genocide prompted the Outcome Document of the United Nations World Summit 
(2005),11 along with Resolution 2150.12 Roth, among others, remains sceptical about the efficacy of 
the Responsibility to Protect initiative; he argues that a sense of “urgency and reality” might well 
require attentive listening to the dead.  He suggests that “listening to those ‘done to death’ by rape/
torture-as-policy in war and genocide, [might] improve the odds that moral motives will bite in the 
ways we need them to do.”13
Additional chapters cover more familiar but nevertheless important topics. An additional 
chapter calls for a trialogue among Jew, Christians, and Muslims to refocus attention on the 
proscription of murder, a proscription at the heart of all three religions.  He devotes a chapter to 
“God’s failures” as well.  Part II, “Resisting Failures,” adopts a more personal voice; “The Holocaust’s 
impact on Christian-Jewish Relations” reads more like personal memoir.  As a practicing Christian, 
Roth has spent decades confronting Christian-Jewish relations and how European Jews such as 
Elie Wiesel both understood and feared Christianity, and how “Christian understandings—better 
identified as misunderstandings—of Judaism have produced immense suffering and sorrow.”14 
Strongly influenced by Elie Wiesel—Roth published “Tears and Elie Wiesel”15 in 1972—Roth does 
not shy away from the claim that but for centuries of Christian anti-Semitism the Holocaust would 
not have happened.16
Roth makes a strong case for the failures of ethics, and there are many.  And many of these 
failures have their origins in philosophy itself.  Philosophy is implicated in bystanding and 
failing to protect; philosophy is similarly implicated in the logic of racism and the collapse of 
moral absolutism.  Reflecting on Kristallnacht and the destruction of the synagogue in the city 
of Nentershausen, Roth claims: “A decisive failure of ethics, the destruction of the Torah scrolls 
signified unbounded rejection of Jewish tradition, a ‘cleansing’ of the Ten Commandments and 
their injunction against murder.”17 Given the scope and depth of these failures, how does Roth 
propose, in his words, “resisting these failures?”18 
8 Roth, The Failures of Ethics, 15.
9 David Patterson, Genocide in Jewish Thought (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
10 Roth, The Failures of Ethics, 22.
11 “Paragraphs 138-139 of the World Summit Outcome Document,” International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, 
accessed May 20, 2017), http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/component/content/article/35-r2pcs-topics/398-
general-assembly-r2p-excerpt-from-outcome-document.
12 United Nations, “Resolution 2150,” accessed May 20, 2017, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-
6D27-4E9C-8CD3-F6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2150.pdf.
13 Roth, The Failures of Ethics, 37.
14 Ibid., 107.
15 John K. Roth, “Tears and Elie Wiesel,” Princeton Seminary Bulletin 65, no. 2 (1972): 42-48.
16 Roth, The Failures of Ethics, 115ff.
17 Ibid., 74.
18 Ibid., 103.
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As mentioned earlier in this review, Roth proposes reconceptualising the status of bystanding 
and recognizing that bystanding makes genocides possible. Moreover, bystanding involves some 
degree of agency and therefore moral culpability.  He also advocates giving moral traction to 
the duty to protect, especially in the case of rape and torture, and deconstructing the concept of 
race.  More provocatively, and in the continuing reverberations of the Holocaust, Roth claims, 
“Christians have yet to come to terms fully with the Holocaust’s implication that Christianity can 
no longer take itself to be superior to Judaism.” This recognition needs to deepen for Christianity 
to advance, and “such advancement,” claims Roth, would require profound changes in Christian 
thought and practice.”19
A great and still growing body of scholarship is devoted to concerns over how best to define 
genocide. Lemkin’s definition that was adopted as part of The Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in 1948 
has been and continues to be contested both as a juridical term and as a scholarly concept.20  Roth 
wades into the definitional issues only briefly but suggests that what is needed is courage and 
resolve.  Roth claims that definitional conundrums aside, 
“that genocide refers to a reality that deserves no more victories.  Like so much else in human 
experience, more than half the battle depends on the force of will to say, in spite of imperfect 
definitions, that the most reliable evidence and straight forward clarity insist that genocide 
is taking place there and must be stopped, or that genocide is likely to take place here and 
must be prevented.”21
Roth’s chapter on “the politics of testimony” is especially illuminating for the recognition 
that genocide testimony, in all its forms, “plunges one into abysmal darkness.”22  Here he quotes 
Philip Hallie: “You cannot go down into hell with impunity.  You must pay an entrance fee, and 
an exit fee too.”23 The research of Lawrence Langer,24 for example, contravenes our platitudes 
that good will prevail over evil or even that such testimonies can form a coherent narrative to 
help make sense of things. Victim testimony for Langer gives knowledge that “does not unify, 
edify, or dignify the lives of former victims.” 25 Yet for Roth, the abyss of the darkness that is 
revealed in survivor testimony cannot be ignored. Contained in the abyss of darkness are glimmers 
of hope.  Citing Primo Levi’s Moments of Reprieve26 and the story of Lorenzo Perrone, Roth reminds 
us that testimonies also provide “reminders of obligations and possibilities that can resist the 
failures of ethics, even when it may seem hopeless to do so.”27 In the end, one cannot continue 
to escape the moral responsibility of resisting the failures of ethics, and find meaning and joy 
in doing so.
At times I found The Failures of Ethics somewhat frustrating to read owing to the brevity of the 
arguments as they were cast.  But then I was reminded of what Robert Pogue Harrison says of his 
own book, The Dominion of the Dead.  Harrison warns his readers that his book is not a writer’s book 
but a reader’s book in that 
“its articulation is full of empty spaces for the reader to enter and wander about in.  It calls on 
the interlocutor not only to think along with the author but to establish independent connections, 
 
19 Ibid., 127.
20 For an overview of problems defining ‘genocide’ see James Snow, ““Don’t Think But Look:” Using Wittgenstein’s 
Notion of Family Resemblances to Look at Genocide,” Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal, no.3, 
154-173. http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.9.3.1308.
21 Roth, The Failures of Ethics, 137.
22 Ibid., 173.
23 Ibid. Roth is quoting Philip Hallie, Tales of Good and Evil, Hope and Harm (New York: Harper Collins, 1997), 22.
24 Lawrence Langer, Holocaust Testimonies: The Ruins of Memory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991).
25 Roth, The Failures of Ethics, 178.
26 Primo Levi, Moments of Reprieve: A Memoir of Auschwitz, trans. Ruth Feldman (New York: Penguin, 1987).
27 Roth, The Failures of Ethics, 183.
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leap over abysses, pursue his or her own paths of inquiry, bring to bear adventitious considerations, 
and, through the tracings offered here, discover the topic for him-or herself.”28    
Harrison’s description of the structure of his own book is also an apt description of Roth’s 
book.  Roth will not allow us to read his book as bystanders.  Roth has written a reader’s book, and 
that is what the best books are, after all.
28 Robert Pogue Harrison, The Dominion of the Dead (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2003), xii.
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Shifting his focus from the German-Turkish question to one of the biggest taboos in Turkish 
history, Fatih Akin continues digging deep in the racial-ethnic world-narratives. By honouring 
the memory of those died during the infamous and often forgotten Armenian Genocide, The Cut 
challenges the current ostrich policy to the Turkish ethnic cleansing that caused the death of about 
1,5 million Armenians between 1914 and 1923. 
After more than hundred years, the mass murder, deportation and systematic torture of 
thousands of Armenians still form a less-known territory in the official historio-political European 
discourse. The historical falsification and distortion causes a deep division between Turks and 
Armenians, and builds tension between those countries that recognize the Genocide and those 
who deny it. It is most probably because of this political tension that Akin decided to focus on the 
emotional perspective of the genocide and avoided to put any emphasis on the socio-political and 
historical context that embraces the tragedy. 
The Cut follows the Armenian Nazaret Manoogian (Tahar Rahim) on his eight-year long 
transatlantic journey from Mardin through Aleppo and Cuba to as far as North Dakota. The story 
begins in 1915, when the blacksmith Nazaret, the father of two young twin-daughters, is forced 
into slave labour by Ottoman command. Together with his Armenian mates, the family man must 
build roads in the scalding desert, where they often witness Armenian groups marching through 
the squally, dry landscape. Although it is unclear whether Nazaret is aware of the systematic 
extermination of his folk, he tries his best to persevere and help his dying and tortured fellows. 
One day however, he and his mates must meet their end and the small Armenian working group 
gets executed. Luckily, Nazaret’s executioner is incapable of cutting the man’s throat, and only 
wounds his neck, in this way helping the family man to survive the massacre. Although Nazaret 
gets rescued by the Turkish soldier and later by a soap-maker from Aleppo, his wound makes him 
mute, which only exacerbates his already hopeless and depressing situation. When he accidently 
learns that his daughters might be still alive, he gains new strength and, sparing no effort to re-
unite with his family, goes on an endless journey to find his twins. 
While trying to communicate via writing into his small notebook, Nazaret always finds Turks 
and Armenians that help him on his journey. Thanks to this, he soon learns that his daughters 
got married and moved to Cuba. In Cuba then, it turns out that the twins work in the United 
States, which urges Nazaret to travel there as soon as possible. Despite his endeavour however, he 
eventually loses track of his family and starts working at a railway construction in North Dakota. 
We are in year 1923, when Nazaret overhears some Armenian songs coming from a small cottage 
and learns that her twins might be in Ruso, some miles away. In the end, he mysteriously finds his 
daughter on the icy-cold streets of the village, but the long-awaited reunification has a bittersweet 
aftertaste for Nazaret soon learns that only one of his daughters survived the eight-year long ordeal. 
As the story illustrates, The Cut is an ambitious, cosmopolitan production that was shot in 
more than five countries with an international crew from all over the world. What Akin created 
this way, is a global road-movie that, by using the Armenian Genocide as core of its narrative, 
depicts a historical tableau of the early 20th century. Although the costumes, the design and the 
landscape of the movie provide a spectacular glimpse into the era, the vision often annihilates the 
personal motivation of the protagonist, who is illustrated as absolutely lost amidst the spotless 
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historical design. The more the story progresses, the more unclear it is how Nazaret feels about his 
own roots, own history, the death of his folks and the people who caused the massacre. Thanks 
to this blurry mental map, the blacksmith gets absolutely objectified in the story, a part of the 
historic design who, while walking great distances in the film sets, gets lost behind the beautifully 
choreographed images. 
Akin tries to stress the transformation of Nazaret through the man’s turning away from 
Christianity, which constructs the very core to his Armenian identity. However, he keeps this line 
too much on the surface, without explaining what Nazaret might think of his Saviour in the context 
of the tragedies he witnessed. In the first sequences of the film, Akin depicts the man as deeply 
religious who confesses his sins, prays before eating and stands for his Christian convictions when 
the Turks ask them to convert to Islam. After contributing to the death of his sister-in-law in the 
death camp of Ras-al-Ayn, Nazaret angrily throws stones in the air – as if aiming at Jesus – and 
hopelessly tries to erase his cross-tattoo from his wrists with a stone. His endeavour to get rid of 
the sign marks a turning point in the story and, together with the stone-motif, forms a metaphoric 
structure in the film. Later, at the Turks’ march of shame in Aleppo, Armenian survivors throw 
stones on the walking crowd but Nazaret, similar to his Turkish executioner, is morally incapable 
of the act. Instead, being shocked of the image of a bleeding young Turkish boy, he quickly leaves 
the march and returns to his shelter. 
With representing the crimes and cruelty, as well as the helpfulness of both the Armenian and 
Turkish folk, Akin tries his best to communicate a neutral standpoint in the film, thus urging both 
sides to take moral responsibility for the happenings. Also, with the stone-motif, he often refers to 
the Biblical message to throw back bread instead of stones, in this way to emphasize forgiveness 
and moral compassion. Unfortunately, Akin’s mainly neutral point of view that is based on mercy, 
erases the personal perspective of Nazaret to religion, who never talks about his relationship with 
God. It is only in Cuba, where it becomes clear that the blacksmith has reckoned with his Christian 
past. The father does not wait for his hosts’ pre-dinner prayer in Havana, nor is he willing to go 
to church anymore. However, these smaller signs of Nazaret’s atheism are not exploited in depth, 
which is most probably due to the very episodic narrative formula of the film that embraces too 
many places in a time being way too short. Thanks to this structure that focuses on movement and 
visuals instead of the very personal world of Nazaret, the films turns into a road-movie halfway, 
thus shifting the emphasis from the Armenian genocide to a long flaneuring in the American 
landscape. 
Another point that makes the identification with Nazaret and his journey rather problematic, 
and exacerbates his objectified position in the narrative, is his muteness that does not leave the 
man any space for any verbal-emotional communication. This Biblical motif – God rendered 
Ezekiel mute for seven and half years, which also corresponds to the length of Nazaret’s journey – 
emphasises the already excluded position of the man. On the one hand, the blacksmith is member 
to one of the ethnic minorities of the Ottoman Empire that puts him at the margins of the society 
– existing outside the hegemonic power structure. In this Spivakian subaltern position, the only 
way of Nazaret to be heard is to convert to Islam which, however, would mean to give up his 
Armenian identity. He thus rejects the only opportunity to leave the camp and, such as Ezekiel, 
gets muted by God. Nazaret thus takes on a double subordinated position. First, he is the Other is 
the narrative, the inferior Armenian who is governed by the Turks who relocate him into the desert. 
This dispossessed position is exacerbated by his muteness that puts him in an ever more vulnerable 
and oppressed situation. He communicates by using Arabic, Turkish and English language and 
completely ignores Armenian, the other pillar to his very identity. Deprived of his language, home 
and religion, Nazaret becomes an absolutely homeless person and even more marginalized when 
he travels to Cuba. In Havana, he does not know the language while, because of his muteness, he 
cannot get a visa to the States. He drifts as a second-class citizen from one city to the other without 
any stabile identity and legal status. 
Nazaret’s in-between position recalls the marginalized position of the German-Turkish 
director, which might be one of the reasons why Akin’s attention has shifted to the Armenian 
question. Similar to Nazaret – his alter-ego – the director is subjected to the German law, while 
he himself has a constant longing for the land of his parents, Turkey. In his fatherland, however, 
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he is treated as an outsider for his German background, which results in an in-between, fractured 
and torn identity-structure, depriving him of a full identification with Germany or Turkey. The 
only way to acquire a pseudo-stable identity is to become a true cosmopolitan, constantly drifting 
in space and time – a fluid position where Akin locates Nazaret. This might be an explanation 
why all the Armenians speak English in the film. Avoiding the Armenian language and using a 
very accented English throughout the film is most probably the biggest shortcoming of The Cut 
that, only accelerates to the subaltern position of the characters and makes the identification with 
Nazaret difficult. 
His muteness, together with his minority-and-cosmopolitan position and the loss of his 
religion, deprives Nazaret of his very Armenian identity that transforms the movie into a pseudo-
blockbuster cinema whose narrative reflects the aimless journey of a lost soul. In this Homerian 
wandering, the landscape and its capturing in wide shots get special attention. Nazaret is often 
portrayed against the barren, rocky and windy scenery of the desert and the icy, inhospitable hills 
of the States. On the one hand, his long walks in the empty, austere landscapes signify his outsider 
position – the wanderer who is rejected by the virgin environment – while the extreme long shots 
that capture his stranger position put him into an even more isolated place. Nazaret’s physiognomy 
and gestures that could help to understand his inner journey, and could overcome his muteness, 
thus remain hidden from the spectator whose attention shifts to the landscape instead of the man’s 
personal tribulation. 
The beautifully choreographed images, the very detailed historic settings and the breath-
taking sceneries of Jordan, Malta, Cuba and Canada are linked by a recurring Armenian folk-
music motif that accompanies the whole film. Together with the extended use of extras and the 
very episodic structure that is built on textual references to signal the exact time and space of the 
happenings, Akin’s story becomes a grandiose attempt to mimic the Oscar-winning Hollywood-
formula. Unfortunately, the most important message, the Armenian Genocide gets scarified on 
the altar of this ambitious experiment. Despite its shortcomings however – the pseudo-Hollywood 
aesthetics, a huge lack of historical references and possible identification – The Cut deserves critical 
attention for it is one of the first and bravest efforts to touch upon a taboo that deeply divides 
nations. While there were attempts to represent the Armenian Genocide on screen, most directors 
used the documentary genre (Eric Friedler’s Aghet, a Genocide, 2010) or only referenced the 
massacre in feature films (Atom Egoyan’s Ararat, 2002), which makes Akin’s production a historio-
political milestone in the representation of the systematic extermination of Armenians. The Cut 
and the recently released American production, The Promise (Terry George, 2016) illustrate that the 
collective remembrance on the Armenian Holocaust has just started, and the historical falsifications 
and speculations can be finally addressed not only in literature, but in the cinema as well. 
Title of the Film: The Cut; Director: Fatih Akin; Screenplay: Fatih Akin, Mardik Martin; Producers: 
Fatih Akin, Karl Baumgartner, Reinhard Brundig; Music: Alexander Hacke; Cinematography: 
Rainer Klausmann; Editor: Andrew Bird; Sound Designer: Zubin Sarosh; Cast: Tahar Rahim, Simon 
Abkarian, Makram Khoury, Hindi Zahra, Kevork Malikyan, Bartu Küçükçaglayan; Country: 
Germany, France, Italy, Russia, Poland, Canada, Turkey and Jordan; Year of Release: 2014; 
Production Companies: Bombero International, Opus Film, Pandora Filmproduktion. Duration: 
138 minutes.
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